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Abstract 
The tremendous increase in usage and complexity of modern communication and 
network systems connected to the Internet, places demands upon security management 
to protect organisations’ sensitive data and resources from malicious intrusion. 
Malicious attacks by intruders and hackers exploit flaws and weakness points in 
deployed systems through several sophisticated techniques that cannot be prevented by 
traditional measures, such as user authentication, access controls and firewalls. 
Consequently, automated detection and timely response systems are urgently needed to 
detect abnormal activities by monitoring network traffic and system events. Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS) 
are technologies that inspect traffic and diagnose system behaviour to provide improved 
attack protection.  
The current implementation of intrusion detection systems (commercial and open-
source) lacks the scalability to support the massive increase in network speed, the 
emergence of new protocols and services. Multi-giga networks have become a standard 
installation posing the NIDS to be susceptible to resource exhaustion attacks. The 
research focuses on two distinct problems for the NIDS: missing alerts due to packet 
loss as a result of NIDS performance limitations; and the huge volumes of generated 
alerts by the NIDS overwhelming the security analyst which makes event observation 
tedious.  
A methodology for analysing alerts using a proposed framework for alert correlation 
has been presented to provide the security operator with a global view of the security 
perspective. Missed alerts are recovered implicitly using a contextual technique to 
detect multi-stage attack scenarios. This is based on the assumption that the most 
serious intrusions consist of relevant steps that temporally ordered. The pre- and post- 
condition approach is used to identify the logical relations among low level alerts. The 
alerts are aggregated, verified using vulnerability modelling, and correlated to construct 
multi-stage attacks. A number of algorithms have been proposed in this research to 
support the functionality of our framework including: alert correlation, alert aggregation 
and graph reduction. These algorithms have been implemented in a tool called Multi-
stage Attack Recognition System (MARS) consisting of a collection of integrated 
components. The system has been evaluated using a series of experiments and using 
different data sets i.e. publicly available datasets and data sets collected using real-life 
experiments. The results show that our approach can effectively detect multi-stage 
attacks. The false positive rates are reduced due to implementation of the vulnerability 
and target host information.        
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Introduction 
This recent era has witnessed a massive growth in the use of computer network 
applications. More hosts are connected to the Internet to speed up business processes 
and to provide more accessibility. This has increased reliance on e-business paradigms 
providing dynamic and complex environments with interconnections of critical 
infrastructure elements. The inherently invisible nature of Internet usage, in most cases 
due to political reasons and the absence of legislation, has made these systems targets 
for hackers and intruders [1]. Traditionally, firewalls have been used as perimeter 
guards for organizational networks to filter incoming and outgoing traffic [2]. However, 
the number of sophisticated attack methods is growing, such as multi-vector, multi-
stage and insider attacks, in addition to data leakage threats as more sensitive data is 
stored in open-mode networks. Hence, an extra layer of defence is needed for deep 
packet inspection and context-aware detection. 
1.2  Security status 
In spite of the existence of security mechanisms, incidents of attacks are still occurring 
because attackers make use of flaws in implemented applications and services [3]. 
There are plenty of methods for bypassing traditional security systems, such as buffer 
overflow, application layer attacks to trick users, and insider threats. Most of these 
behaviours are considered legitimate because they do not violate the applied security 
policies, though they are in fact malicious. In addition, from a business point of view, a 
trade-off has to be made between strict security policies and productivity [4].  
To provide protection mechanisms against the new trends in intrusion techniques, 
advanced and intelligent intrusion detection and protection systems are required [5]. 
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Firewalls and software patches can no longer be regarded as reliable means of providing 
a defence against well-defined and novel attacks. Network traffic data has to be 
inspected and analysed in depth in order to detect malicious behaviour. Stateless 
analysis relying on packet-level observation does not improve the efficiency of the 
protection systems. Furthermore, different data sources and incorporated detection 
techniques have to be used in order to achieve higher level protective systems. 
In this respect, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) have been proposed as 
complementary security tools providing sensors to observe network traffic for any 
malicious activities. Several approaches with different capabilities have been developed 
to achieve this functionality, such as signature-based and anomaly-based mechanisms. 
Pre-defined attack patterns are supplied to signature-based approaches to detect any 
matching between these patterns and the received traffic data. In anomaly-based 
mechanisms, generated normal profiles are compared with the incoming activities to 
judge abnormalities. However, the common purpose of NIDSs is to detect potential 
intrusions in network traffic, generating security alarms. NIDSs can perform in 
detective mode or proactive mode, but immediate response may affect the usability of 
the protected systems, particularly if alarms are false.  
Recent advances in CPU processing power, memory and network speed have "stressed" 
the performance of NIDSs [6]. The difference between advances in networking speed 
and processing speed has created what has been called a performance gap, because 
communication speed has developed far in advance of processing speed [7]. This has 
imposed challenges for NIDSs, as they have to process multi-Giga traffic inline. Several 
methods have been developed for load balancing, distributed sensors [8] and parallel 
processing, but another challenge has emerged in the coordination of these sub-system 
units. 
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1.3  The limitations of NIDSs 
NIDSs can be considered a second line of defence in the protection of production 
networks, and they can cooperate with firewalls and antivirus systems to achieve 
maximal protection coverage. Both research communities and commercial vendors have 
been working for several years to improve the functionality of NIDSs. However, these 
systems still suffer from limitations that can generally be summarized as follow: 
1) High volume of generated low-level alerts [9], which makes it impractical for human 
analysts to pursue such an amount of information. Even worse, the quality of the 
observed data varies between certain intrusions and activities with a low degree of 
confidence. Typically, NIDSs produce alerts which are mapped to atomic detected 
events, but are not capable of determining to which incidents the detected alerts belong. 
The administrator has to analyse the data manually or use simple analysis tools based on 
statistical methods. Moreover, hostile actions are assumed to be infrequent compared to 
legitimate activities, so the analysis of a large amount of data in order to observe rare 
information is a cumbersome.  
2) A high rate of false positives is a major limitation of NIDSs and one that makes their 
effectiveness questionable. [10] states that more than 99% of the alerts generated by 
NIDSs are false positives. False positives are produced because the NIDS believes, 
based on its detection mechanism, that the detected activity is malicious. This weakness 
is mainly due to the fact that the system is unable to precisely determine the ultimate 
goal of the intrusion. Essentially, there is only a slight distinction between legitimate 
and malicious behaviour, as even malicious behaviour makes use of the facilities 
offered by the target system. For instance, in signature-based methods, there must be a 
balance between the level of specificity and the generality of a signature. A very 
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specific definition keeps the rate of false positives to a minimum, whereas general 
signatures broaden the detection space but increase the false positive rate.  
3) A high rate of false negatives is also another critical issue, where the NIDS is not 
able to detect malicious behaviour. That is due to the unavailability of pattern 
descriptions in signature-based methods or the fact that the behaviour is similar to a 
normal one in anomaly-based methods. However, skilful attackers use known attacks 
but combine them with available evasion techniques [11, 12] to deceive the NIDS and 
to pass undetected. Moreover, 0-day attacks are not identified, as they are unknown and 
their definitions are unavailable to the NIDS. 
4) The difficulty in handling a huge amount of traffic packets, diverse network 
protocols and sophisticated Web services. Deep inspection and comprehensive analysis 
have to be done for higher-degree detection and protection. And that requires massive 
processing capabilities and intelligent algorithms. The typical deployment of a NIDS is 
at the network edge, where the aggregation of organizational traffic passes. In inline 
mode, this has made the achievement of acceptable connectivity without any latency a 
challenge. Many approaches have been developed to cope with these problems, such as 
traffic splitting [13, 14] across a number of sensors to balance the load. Other 
techniques involve shifting from software-based to hardware-based solutions [15-17]. 
5) The sophistication and complexity of modern attacks exploiting new emerging 
services, such as Web application technologies [18]. Simple attacks to violate security 
policies are no longer used, particularly after years of security patches to protect core 
systems. Current trends in intrusion techniques are to employ hidden attacks that are 
difficult to be recognised by traditional security means. Multi steps of normal-type 
activities incorporate an attack and after breaking into the system, the intruder remains 
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silent for the longest possible time. Identifying this type of behaviour is not a 
straightforward matter without intensive observation and behavioural analysis. Most 
implementations of NIDSs, both commercial [19] and open source [20, 21], rely on 
stateless signature-based methodologies. Basic statistical approaches are implemented 
to detect anomalous behaviour using anomaly-based methods. Moreover, NIDSs need 
to be supplied with enough information from network traffic and from the end systems 
[12] to obtain the full picture of the protected systems. Such cooperation between 
security systems rarely exists and is still in a developmental phase. Efficient correlation 
techniques have to be implemented in order to differentiate between benign and 
malicious behaviour. 
6) Scalability to support the points mentioned above, as networks nowadays are 
changing in respect to bandwidth and diversity of services available. The 
implementation of NIDSs may be sufficient for a certain time, but they need adaptive 
mechanisms in order to react to different situations. 
7) Testing NIDSs to evaluate their operations is cumbersome [22]. There are no 
efficient approved methodologies to evaluate such systems due to the complexity of 
NIDS and the operational environments in which they are deployed. Ad hoc approaches 
have been developed and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
8) Statefulness analysis in order to build an accurate behaviour profile remains a 
stressing demand for NIDSs. For instance, Snort [23, 24] performs analyses on a 
connection basis only, so the need for higher levels of context analysis is crucial. This is 
based on the assumption that each occurring event may be connected with other events, 
and the correlation is useful in understanding the target of the event in question. Several 
NIDS claim they perform stateful analyses, but the concept of this type of analysis is 
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sometimes unclear. Stateful analysis does not only consist of performing TCP 
reassembly or IP de-fragmentation, but also the analysis of the semantic of multiple 
activities, including levels of connection, applications and services. 
9) Evasion techniques [11, 12, 25, 26] have been used to exploit the implementation 
ambiguities of protocols and services. Moreover, the gap between application 
developers and security experts has led to the production of programs with bugs 
exploited creatively by hackers. Malicious data distributed over fragmented packets to 
confuse detection systems or session slicing are examples of such evasion methods, or it 
can also take the form of obfuscation of Web application requests to break into 
vulnerable applications. 
1.4  Alert correlation systems 
Principally, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in general are useful only if their 
detection results are reviewed and analysed to derive current system security. Some 
difficulties affecting IDS operations have been stated, and to alleviate some of these 
limitations alert management systems have been proposed. Alert correlation systems as 
complementary tools deployed in a typical scenario separately from IDS, as the latter 
are performance sensitive [27]. The objective of these approaches is to receive alert 
streams from the IDS, create logical relationships between alerts, link each alert to its 
related contextual information, and provide a high-level view of the system's security 
situation. In prime, the receiving audit data is obtained from various IDS so it is used in 
alert correlation process. However, alert correlation can be also applied on individual 
IDSs to detect coordinated attacks and to reduce alarm volumes. It is worth mentioning 
that alert correlation is not an isolated process, and that several components are involved 
in achieving correlation, aggregation, alert reduction and alert verification.  
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It has been identified in the cyber security field that well-planned attacks consist of a 
number of stages conducted in a temporal order. True alerts belonging to intrusions 
generated by the IDS are not isolated; they also reflect the sequential pattern of the 
attacker. However, IDSs consider these alerts as individual events and report this to the 
administrator with a huge amount of alerts, most of them false positives or ones not 
critical to the protected system. A high-level view of these incidents can assist in 
recognizing the attacker’s plan and taking rapid action to protect the network. 
Moreover, IDSs, due to their limitations, cannot detect all variations of unseen attacks. 
However, alert correlation systems can predict the upcoming attack based on the 
pervious behaviours of attackers. Also, false alarms can be excluded because they are 
often of isolated and non-critical events. 
As a motivating example of a multi-stage attack, the Botnet attack scenario is 
considered as follows: the attacker performs scanning activities looking for a vulnerable 
host in a target network in order to install a backdoor. The IDS can detect the scanning 
behaviour, rating it as a low-risk activity, and also detects the shellcode installation but 
it is not as a part of the Botnet attack. Then the infected machine sends a connection 
request to the C&C (command-and-control) server in order to download the 
configuration file, which is typically encrypted. The IDS in this case can detect the URL 
of the C&C server as a blacklist. Note that the second phase does not necessarily need 
to be linked to the first phase, particularly if they occur far away from each other. The 
second stage can pass undetected using some obfuscation techniques; however, the 
server response containing some abnormal data in HTML format is detected. After that, 
maintenance and update activities are performed by downloading some binaries. The 
infected machine consequently performs a fast scan for other machines and sends a 
large number of DNS requests. Hence, if these stages are treated individually, they may 
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be considered isolated activities with low priority. Alert correlation systems process the 
resulting alerts to discover the connection between them based on causal relationships 
and to provide a global picture for the administrator.  
Alert correlation systems are intended to fill the semantic gap between high-level 
abstracted events and low-level elementary alerts. The security administrator’s 
requirements include: reduction of data redundancy, intelligent correlation of IDS alerts, 
recognition of attack scenarios, and a visualised attack scene. To achieve these tasks, 
different correlation mechanisms are employed, including alert similarities [28-30], 
attack scenario specifications [31], pre- and post-conditions [32-35], and data-mining 
techniques [36-38]. These mechanisms vary in their requirements and inner workings, 
but their common function is to build an abstracted knowledge about different attacks. 
Despite several efforts made to achieve the objectives of alert correlation systems, only 
a limited part of the correlation function has been addressed. Correlation tasks cannot be 
implemented alone, but require some other cooperative system components, such as 
aggregation, verification and data reduction. It has been mentioned that the main 
motivation behind the notion of alert correlation is to identify the connection between 
alerts. However this task, without removing data redundancy, will make it more 
complex and the information size will be increased considerably. In addition, the 
practice of correlation is processing-intensive and the typical deployment is connected 
to the IDS. It is impractical to rely on a single component for a complex function such 
as alert correlation; instead, a framework consisting of various components should be 
used. Each sub-system is responsible for certain tasks and all system parts are integrated 
in a systematic manner. 
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1.5  Motivation 
With the rapid advances in communication networks and the increase in the number of 
incidents of detected attacks [39], NIDSs have become a major component of security 
systems. However, NIDS have two major problems: first, missed attacks due to 
unknown attack patterns or because packets carrying attack evidence are dropped due to 
performance limitations. Second, the huge volume of irrelevant alerts overwhelming 
security analysts makes event observation tedious. This thesis has addressed these two 
practical problems through two phases:  
1) NIDS (software-based) evaluations in high-speed environments to characterise the 
problem of missed alerts caused by packet loss. 
2) Alert correlation systems to mitigate the two previous problems using a contextual 
recovery technique that provides the security analyst with a global view of the security 
perspective.  
The motivation behind this work inspired from the two phases above can be 
summarized as: 
a) Performance evaluation of NIDSs (software-based) in high-speed networks: The 
typical deployment of software-based NIDSs is installation on a dedicated server with 
minimum active services. This setup is quite susceptible to resource-exhaustion attacks, 
especially in high-speed environments. Sending a large amount of traffic or using 
computationally expensive techniques like fragmentation can compromise a NIDS or 
make it start dropping packets. Few efforts have been made to measure the performance 
of NIDSs, and most of the evaluation methodologies are based on moderate traffic flow 
[40]. This is because generating traffic in high volumes requires a sophisticated test-
bench, which is not always available to most researchers. A test-bench has been built in 
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our lab using various machines and switches to simulate real-life network traffic. In 
addition, the evaluation of NIDSs is elusive and there is no typical methodology to test, 
as few vendors [41] offer it and it is not available to researchers.  
b) Alerts missed by NIDSs: As mentioned above, NIDSs may miss some alerts due to 
unavailable attack descriptions or packet loss in Gig networks. The missing of such 
alerts is very dangerous, as serious attacks can pass undetected. Several works have 
been carried out to deal with this issue [27, 42] and to characterise NIDS performance. 
NIDS vendors recommend the application of conservative engine detection 
configurations to minimise resource consumption. This can affect the effectiveness of 
NIDSs as the detection space may be narrowed. Other efforts have been made to 
distribute traffic making use of balancers [13, 14, 43]; however, these may add extra 
complexities. The implementation of NIDS on hardware is potentially the optimal 
solution for this issue [16, 44, 45]. However, hardware is expensive, difficult to 
configure and tedious to maintain. In addition, the problem of missed alerts caused by a 
lack of signatures will not be alleviated. For this reason, recovery techniques are needed 
to reason about missed alerts, whether solely or contextually.  
c) Overwhelming administrators with irrelevant alerts: Typically, IDSs continuously 
generate vast amounts of alerts, and most of them are either false or low-level risk 
alerts. These data have to be analysed to obtain security status. This flood of 
information may end up hiding serious activities that could end up being overlooked. 
Simple analysis tools based on statistics provide certain details but do not reduce the 
resulting data. Hence, a mechanism needs to be devised to reduce alert flooding without 
losing critical details focusing on serious and coordinated activities.  
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d) False positives: It has been identified that approximately 99% of alerts reported by 
IDS are false positives [10, 46]. This is the result of the reduced quality in the 
description of current signatures and the imprecise determination of the borderline 
between legitimate and malicious activities. There are mainly three levels of solution to 
deal with this issue: 1) at the IDS sensor level, 2) at the protected system level, and 3) at 
the IDS log level. The first technique is to enhance the IDS detection algorithm to 
produce a very small number of false alerts. The main focus of these solutions is to 
build multiple special-purpose IDS [47, 48]. However, this could possibly affect the 
attack coverage and create compatibility and integration issues. The other two 
approaches [10, 29, 35, 49-51] are promising in terms of extending the IDS detection 
domain and focusing on attack-related alerts. Alerts are generated and then post-
processed to identify only important information believed to relate to true positives. 
Vulnerability and protected system information are obtained and supplied to alert 
correlation systems to identify whether the attack is successful or the alert is a false 
positive. In addition, the alert correlation system itself performs its functions to discover 
the relationships between the alerts and aggregate them, ignoring isolated alerts which 
are most likely false positives.  
e) Multi-stage attack recognition: It has been identified in practice [29, 35, 49] that 
most skilful attacker activities consist of multiple steps (attack scenarios) and occur in a 
certain time (attack window). An attack is performed using different vectors to gain 
access to the target system. IDS treat these steps individually, reporting isolated alerts 
while each step prepares for the next one to complete the intended attack. Identification 
of such a strategy can lead to the recognition of attack intentions, as well as the 
prediction of unknown attacks. 
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f) Slow-and-low attack detection: The new intrusion trend is to be slow [52], while the 
stages are distributed over a long period of time so as to avoid notice. Another feature is 
that it is performed with minimum noise, exploiting very small amounts of traffic in 
order to defeat any anomaly-based technique. Most alert correlation systems, 
particularly the ones implemented for real time [53], rely on the observation of 
incoming data during a pre-defined windows size. Memory requirements increase 
dramatically with the window size and the system becomes a target for state explosion 
attacks. The only available solution is to remove the detected states from memory in a 
periodic fashion. This leads to the loss of some of the attack stages if they are 
temporally diverged. All detected attack phases should be recorded, as the relationship 
may be discovered after a while.  
g) Alert correlation approaches: 
- Algorithms: The proposed algorithms vary between alert aggregation, data fusion, data 
reduction and alert correlation. The current trend is to create a cooperative system 
environment that provides complementary components to achieve practical solutions.  
Knowledge base modelling: The core of the correlation systems consists of the 
supported knowledge bases. Knowledge acquisition methods and the considered 
features are different, some of them being based on security expert analyses and others 
relying on pure statistical and machine learning approaches. Knowledge representation 
plays a major role in the effectiveness of the developed system. The supported data 
should be formalized in a systematic manner, taking into account specific and general 
concepts. 
Alert verification: One of the main causes of false positives is the knowledge gap 
between the IDS and the network it protects. The IDS is not capable of identifying the 
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target system's response after the attack. To bridge this gap, vulnerability, host and 
network details should be supplied to the correlation system to verify logged alerts. If an 
alert is assigned low priority, it can be used to extend the attack knowledge without 
having to consider it a critical element in the attack strategy. Instead of obtaining the 
target response, which adds more complexity, it is preferable to store an updated 
knowledge base about the required information. 
System implementation to provide a practical ground: The development of required 
algorithms for alert correlation functions becomes useless if these algorithms are not 
implemented. The evaluation of the system's effectiveness cannot be carried out without 
a practical tool. Most proposed approaches have been implemented in an ad hoc manner 
to show the main functionalities.  
Evaluation of alert correlation systems: Generally, the evaluation of IDSs is not an easy 
task due to the heterogeneous nature of such systems, and alert correlation systems 
inherit this property. Most evaluation methodologies only focus on a particular part of 
the system without considering other conditions. Moreover, some researchers validate 
their work with one or two datasets, some of which do not suit the case. For instance, 
some datasets consist of attack traffic only [54], which makes the test basic and simple. 
Others are not originally intended to test alert correlation algorithms. Therefore an 
intensive evaluation methodology with clear metrics is required, and it needs to be 
applied to different categories of datasets.  
1.6  Contribution 
1) Comprehensive performance evaluation of NIDS in a high-speed environment 
We have carried out a comprehensive performance evaluation of NIDSs to identify their 
limitations in high-speed environments.  We have designed and implemented a state-of-
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the-art, high-speed test lab so as to be able to replicate current and potential threats. This 
facility has been specifically designed to simulate realistic network traffic conditions 
comprising different scenarios of background and malicious network traffic. We then 
evaluated Snort [23], an open-source NIDS, on account of it being a de facto standard. 
Two broader approaches have been selected to determine the performance of Snort: 
host-based and virtual-based analyses. This is further supplemented by gauging the 
performance of the system on different operating system (OS) platforms.  
2) A proposed framework for alert correlation 
We have proposed a framework for alert correlation consisting of a collection of 
integrated components to utilize the capabilities of different approaches. This is to 
formalize a comprehensive solution for correlation, aggregation, data reduction and 
multi-stage attack recognition. We have presented a Multi-stage Attack Recognition 
System (MARS) as an alert correlation system to receive alerts from the IDS. The attack 
scenario is presented as evolving events over time bringing the attack strategy as a 
graph of connected aggregated phases. The graph explosions in other approaches have 
been avoided, which typically result in unmanageable attack graphs.  
3) Set of proposed algorithms for the framework components: 
- Alert correlation: We have developed an algorithm for alert correlation functions 
based on the partial satisfaction of the pre- and post-conditions of each attack. The 
logical connections are based on hierarchical multilayer specifications of attack 
capabilities. The correlation is performed for all elementary alerts before aggregation, 
and then any further correlations can be obtained implicitly for performance purposes.  
- Alert aggregation: To complement the alert correlation algorithm, an aggregation 
algorithm has been developed to eliminate data redundancy. The aggregation 
mechanism assigns a master alert for each group of similar alerts. Thus the main 
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objective of this algorithm is to minimise the number of nodes in the resulting attack 
graph. A pre-defined time threshold is used to determine aggregation probability.  
- Graph reduction: In cooperation with the aggregation algorithm, an algorithm has 
been also developed to reduce the number of graph links. An online graph-reduction 
algorithm is proposed for the deletion of transitive graph edges starting from root to leaf 
nodes. It is executed during the initial phase of correlation to eliminate graph 
complexity. A further graph reduction is performed by an offline algorithm starting 
from leaf to root nodes.  
- Event generation: The ultimate goal of the proposed system is to generate security 
events; hence an event-generation algorithm has been presented. An event refers to the 
description of an attack scenario reflecting a global view of intrusion. Each event has a 
title and two events can be combined if they are related to the same scenario. We have 
also provided facilities to interact with the detected events through administrative tools.  
- Prediction of undetected intrusion: Other approaches have dealt with broken scenarios 
caused by missed alerts by repairing them based on building a potentially large amount 
of links. However, the attack may be missed due to being a 0-day attack, where no 
pattern is known. An implicit mechanism has been proposed to estimate undetected 
activities using a generalized formalization of attack capabilities and intrusion 
categories. The missed attacks are not described specifically; instead a possible attack 
plan is predicted. 
4) Knowledge modelling:  
  Two knowledge bases have been proposed: internal and external. We have made a 
distinction of abstracted attack concepts and their capabilities from dynamic 
information, such as vulnerability and host details. In the internal base, capabilities have 
been modelled using a hierarchical method based on attack classes and inheritance 
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between these classes. The external base represents an extendable collection containing 
vulnerabilities, services, OSs and host information. 
5) Implementation of the proposed algorithms in a tool:  
In order to evaluate the proposed algorithms in a practical manner, we have 
implemented these algorithms and the knowledge bases in the MARS tool. The MARS 
core is an engine that is capable of analysing the receipt of alerts from IDS sensors and 
automatically constructing security events. The attack scenario is visualised in the form 
of nodes and edges and the administrator is able to navigate each element for further 
details. The resulting attack graph is kept as simple as possible, whilst at the same time 
providing rich information can be obtained by request.  
6) Comprehensive evaluation methodology to test the developed tool:  
We have evaluated our system using a collection of different datasets. A test-bench has 
been set up and we have conducted a series of experiments exploiting various situations. 
A set of evaluation criteria has been presented including functionality, accuracy and 
completeness, reduction, and performance tests. We have evaluated our approach not 
only on the basis of the number of correlated alerts, but also using the number of 
correlation instances for each alert in order to achieve precise results. 
1.7  Thesis outline  
Chapter 2 presents background information as an introduction to the topics of the thesis, 
namely intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and alert correlation systems. We start with a 
summary of the principle concepts of IDSs, discussing models, architectures and 
deployment scenarios. Then, state-of-the-art alert correlation and management 
approaches are reviewed, including similarity-based, pre- and post-conditions based, 
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and probabilistic approaches. The requirements of the design and implementation of a 
practical alert correlation system are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 lays out this study's initial research phase to carry out a performance 
evaluation of NIDSs. The evaluation methodologies of IDS performance have been 
investigated to provide a background to our preliminary testing. Extensive testing 
scenarios are implemented on a highly sophisticated test-bench using various platforms 
and configurations. A detailed performance investigation of Snort as a de facto IDS 
standard is given using different traffic conditions. The tests are conducted on host and 
virtual system configurations to explore the system response in different deployments. 
We also discuss packet dropping as an identified limitation of software-based IDS in 
high-speed environments. The chapter concludes with how the problem of missed 
attacks can be mitigated regardless of the reason with the use of alert correlation 
mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 describes the core concepts proposed in this thesis: the alert correlation 
framework and its algorithms. The underlying requires/provides model with our 
definitions of capabilities and concepts are presented. We explain in detail the design 
and representation of our knowledge bases and how IDS signatures are modelled. Then, 
a set of proposed algorithms are described including: alert correlation, alert aggregation, 
event combination, event generation, and graph reduction. Therefore, issues in relation 
to attacks missed by the IDS have been discussed and our approach for predicting the 
security status. 
In Chapter 5, the implementation and design specifications of the proposed framework 
are presented. We illustrate the MARS tool architecture, its integrated components and 
the system process flow.  
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In Chapter 6 the effectiveness of our implemented approach is demonstrated using a 
series of experiments. The evaluation methodology and testing criteria are discussed and 
the evaluation metrics are explained. We then continue to provide complete information 
about the datasets and experiment steps. We start with the DARPA [55] dataset 
evaluation for comparative purposes, incorporating the dataset description and analysis 
of obtained results. We then conduct two lab experiments reflecting real-life attacks to 
measure system functionality and performance. At the end of this chapter, a 
performance evaluation is presented comparing MARS and the IDS in respect to 
resource consumption. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis, reviewing our main observations and contributions. 
We conclude with a discussion of related research directions and promising avenues for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH 
2.1  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) 
The widespread use of corporate networks with sophisticated technologies, e.g. Web 
services, distributed databases and remote access, has raised concerns in terms of 
security issues. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are one of the major 
techniques used to protect such networks against well-planned penetration. 
Conventionally, to secure computer systems, network services and running applications, 
resort was made to the creation of protective ―shields‖. Security mechanisms such as 
firewalls [2], authentication mechanisms and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) have 
been developed in order to protect the systems of organizations. However, these security 
mechanisms have almost inevitable vulnerabilities and are usually insufficient in 
ensuring the complete security of the infrastructure. Attacks are continually being 
adapted to exploit the system’s weaknesses, often caused by careless design and 
implementation flaws. This accounts for the need for security technology that can 
monitor systems and identify security policy violations. This is called intrusion 
detection, and complements conventional security mechanisms [56].  
Understandably, intrusion is popularly defined as a malicious and externally or 
internally induced operational fault. Nowadays, computer intrusions and attacks are 
often regarded as synonymous. But more technically, an attack is an attempt to intrude 
(into what is supposedly a secure network), while an intrusion is actually the result of an 
attack that has been partially or completely successful [57]. ―Intrusions in the computer 
systems are usually caused by attackers accessing the systems from the Internet, or by 
authorized users of the systems who attempt to misuse the privileges given to them 
and/or to gain additional privileges for which they are not authorized‖ [57]. Hence, the 
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difference that intrusion is a consequence of attack, however, unsuccessful attack is not 
necessary to result in an intrusion. Therefore, throughout this thesis, both terms are used 
from the viewpoint of the defender, and thus preventing an attack is inclusive of 
stopping an intrusion.  
An IDS is a system for detecting and preventing such intrusions. A technical definition 
provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology [58] is that it is ―the 
process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and 
analyzing them for signs of intrusions, defined as attempts to compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a 
computer network‖. An IDS satisfies its reason for being by observing the network 
traffic or looking at OS events [59]. An IDS can be defined as ―a combination of 
software and/or hardware components that monitors computer systems and raises an 
alarm when an intrusion happens‖ [59]. 
Thus, the concept of a NIDS is to observe activities among network links to detect 
anomalous and misuse behaviour by acquiring information from traffic and inspecting 
data packets in an inline or offline fashion. Then, these systems notify administrators or 
respond to detected threats by blocking any malicious packets or sessions. Hence, 
proactive systems that identify the violation of security policies are called NIDSs, 
whereas reactive systems that respond and stop any misuse behaviour are called 
Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS). However, most of these systems can be 
switched between the two modes based on organizational needs. 
Despite both systems NIDS and NIPS perform the same analysis looking for signs of 
intrusion, they differ in how to provide protection for network environment. NIDS is a 
passive device watching the traversed packets from a monitoring port or SPAN port 
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(Switched Port Analyzer), matching the traffic to a set of configured rules, and 
triggering an alarm in case of suspicious activities. The ideal deployment of NIDS is to 
be connected to a monitoring port of a backbone switch as shown in Figure 2.1. A copy 
of network packets seen on any switch port is sent to the monitoring port to be analyzed 
by the NIDS. NIDS cannot block the connection and need the administrator response to 
deal with the detected events. NIPS have all features of the NIDS but it can block 
malicious traffic immediately by terminating the network connection, attacking user 
session, or by blocking the access to victim machines or services. Therefore, NIPS 
needs more tuning to keep the false positive rate to the minimum which affect the 
legitimate traffic. NIPS are typically deployed inline behind the firewall to limit the 
inspected traffic in order to improve the efficiency as shown in Figure 2.1.  
The Internet
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Router
Firewall
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NIDS Deployment
NIPS Deployment
 
Figure 2.1 NIDS and NIPS deployment. 
The notion of the IDS was first introduced in 1980 by James Anderson [60], who 
proposed an anomaly detection approach based on the distinction between the 
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characteristics of normal and anomalous behaviour. A threat model was presented that 
classified threats as external penetrations, internal penetrations and misfeasance. 
Denning [61] in 1987 introduced a general model for IDSs, which is the basis of many 
system prototypes have been developed since then. Denning’s model includes an 
identification of two different models of intrusion detection systems: 1) the misuse (or 
signature) model, when an attack is detected based on previous knowledge of its 
signature; and 2) the anomaly model, when an attacker is detected based on its abnormal 
behaviour. This notion, based on the assumption that the normal behaviour of users and 
systems can be characterised, enables automatic profiling. Debar [62] proposed the first 
IDS taxonomy based on different criteria:  
(1) Detection method: behaviour-based, knowledge-based. 
(2) Behaviour on detection: passive, active. 
(3) Audit source location: host log files, network packets. 
(4) Usage frequency: continues monitoring, periodic analysis. 
(5) Detection paradigm: state-based, transition-based. 
 
Figure 2.2  Axelsson’s classification of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). 
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Axelsson [46] proposed a generalisation model of IDSs as an alternative taxonomy, as 
shown in Figure 2.2. The classification is mainly based on detection principles and 
operational aspects  
Even though several methodologies have arisen to classify IDSs since 1980, these fall 
into three general approaches: 1) anomaly- (behaviour) based, 2) signature- 
(knowledge) based, and 3) hybrid systems (anomaly and signature). 
2.2  Intrusion Detection Systems: methodologies 
2.2.1  Anomaly-based detection 
 Anomaly-based detection methods are based on a deviation of abnormal activities from 
the normal or expected behaviour of the system. A set of characteristics of the system 
are observed and analyzed to create a model of normal behaviour using collections of 
information about the system over a particular time interval. IDSs can detect anomalies 
when they compare current behaviour to the normal system model in order to identify, 
report and block any violation. Moreover, anomaly-based methodologies are based on 
the assumption that any anomaly is an indication of a potential attack.  
Normal behaviour is learned by the system during an online/offline training phase 
(heuristic systems). Collected data from the learning stage is analysed, pre-processed 
and processed; then the normal model is built according to these observations. 
Therefore, audit data is inspected for any abnormal patterns deviating from the normal 
model baseline, and these are considered malicious. The effectiveness of these 
methodologies depends on the selected variables and parameters to build the model of 
the system profile [63]. These parameters vary from simple statistical data to 
comprehensive measures. Therefore, robustness of these systems is proportional to the 
amount and accuracy of measured data. In addition, these sorts of systems should be 
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adaptable due to the complex and changing nature of protected environments, such as 
communication networks. [64] summarizes the anomaly-based IDS process into three 
stages: 1) a parameterization stage to collect the observed instances of normal system 
behaviour; 2) a training stage to characterize the normal and abnormal models, which 
can be achieved either manually or automatically; and 3) a detection stage to detect any 
deviation exceeding a pre-defined threshold. These systems are theoretically able to 
detect novel and 0-day attacks [65]. However, their efficiency is strongly dependent on 
model construction and threshold selection. Several techniques are used to build 
anomaly-based systems. 
2.2.1.1  Statistical techniques 
The objective of statistical techniques is to observe the system's activities in order to 
determine its behaviour, and then to generate system profiles. Selected variables are 
sampled over a specific period of time to measure the normal behaviour of the system. 
The observed activities can be system logs, spatial and temporal characteristics of 
network traffic, or system calls. Two models are built: a model stored or programmed 
and a current model; and detection is based on the degree of abnormality in the 
comparison of the two models considering a threshold metric. The advantage of these 
approaches is that they do not require prior knowledge of the observed systems. 
However, one of the biggest drawbacks of these techniques is determining the threshold 
in order to achieve a balance between false positives and false negatives, which is 
difficult in the presence of different situations and requirements. In addition, intruders 
can deceive the protection system to send malicious data by training the target system 
itself.  
Haystack's prototype [66] was developed as one of the earliest statistical anomaly-based 
IDSs. The detection system considers a combination of two models: user behaviour and 
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generic group behaviour. It takes into account a range of normal behaviour events 
between two limits and each event has a score, with a high score indicating an anomaly. 
However, normal system features are extracted offline only. The early proposed 
techniques in this respect were based on univariate models such as [61]; however, the 
trend lately has become toward multivariate models that consider more than one single 
variables [67]. Using a combination of metrics rather than only one provides more 
accurate discrimination between the observed models.  
2.2.1.2  Expert systems 
Expert systems [68, 69]are knowledge-based and used to build the profile of a system or 
its users based on rules obtained from statistical measures of normal behaviour over a 
period of time. Primarily, these approaches are intended for data classification 
according to the extracted rules. In the first stage, training data is used to define certain 
variables and classes, and then classification rules are inferred and applied to audit data. 
The W&S (Wisdom & Sense) [70] expert system was proposed to detect anomalies in 
user behaviour. The IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert System) [69], developed at the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI), is a system that summarises user behaviour and 
calculates interrelated statistics, and then compares the current activities with the user 
profiles. The next generation of NIDES (Next-generation IDES) was designed to 
operate online to monitor system activities. The SPADE (Statistical Packet Anomaly 
Detection Engine) [71] is a Snort pre-processor plug-in, developed to use the concept of 
anomaly score to detect stealthy port scans. It consists of two sub-systems: an anomaly 
monitoring sensor and a correlation engine. An alarm is triggered if the assigned score 
of each event exceeds a specific threshold. The main advantage of these approaches is 
flexibility and accuracy; however, constructing the required knowledge is not an easy 
task and is a time-consuming process.  
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2.2.1.3  Machine learning 
Learning is a process to learn the dependency between two sets of information to 
generate an unknown input-output model based on a limited number of observations 
[72]. An accurate observation that describes the constructed model requires an accurate 
problem definition. Machine learning techniques have been used widely in computer 
systems to provide intelligence in the automatic process. The tasks of machine learning 
include: classification, acting and planning, and interpretation. IDSs can be identified as 
a classification problem (with two classes: normal and abnormal) [72]. Training data 
captured from the normal usage of the system are used to build the model and then 
classify behaviours as either normal or anomalous. These systems are either generative 
(profiling) to learn the normal behaviour and to detect intrusion deviating from the 
learned profile, or discriminative to learn the distinction between normal and abnormal 
activities [72]. 
Generally, learning methods can be classified into two broad categories: supervised and 
unsupervised learning systems. In supervised learning, training data (labelled data) is 
used to generate normal and abnormal behaviour. Each training pattern is weighted to 
construct a detection model and the weights are adaptive to obtain a feasible and 
accurate system. It is required to predict model behaviour variables for any input 
variables after the training phase. Formally, given variables (x,y), x   X, y  Y, the 
objective is to find a  function f :X→Y which represents the intrusion detection model. 
The degree of mismatch between X and Y represents the cost function of the prediction 
algorithm. 
On the other hand, in unsupervised learning (unlabeled data approach), anomalous data 
is not needed; instead, a normal model is constructed from normal system patterns. For 
anomaly detection systems, unsupervised methods are more effective for building the 
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model by observation without any prior knowledge of intrusive behaviour. However, 
machine learning is not limited to these approaches; semi-supervised learning, active 
learning and deep learning are widely used in researches. Examples of machine learning 
systems are Y-means, neural networks and support vector machines (SVMs) [73].  
Machine learning techniques for system calls analyses have been used for host-based 
IDSs to learn program behaviour so as to detect irregularity. Forrest et al. [74] 
discovered that sequences of system calls were very consistent and a normal model 
could be built and used to detect abnormal activities. Their work was based on 
similarity function to compare the human immune system and IDSs. [75] proposed 
multiple detection models for the system calls to be evaluated from different points of 
view. Weighted scores for events are accumulated to construct the detection model. 
Bayesian methodology has been conducted by several researchers due to its unique 
features. It is based on probabilistic relationships among events to find or predict the 
cause of actions by moving back in time. [76-78] used a Bayesian network to create 
models for anomaly detection. In addition, Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a 
technique used to reduce massive and multi-dimensional datasets to lower dimensions 
for analysis. Large and complex datasets are difficult to understand and process. A large 
number of correlated variables are transformed to a smaller number of uncorrelated 
variables. [79] proposed an anomaly-based detection system using PCA to reduce the 
audit data. [79-81] present a model that is suitable for high-speed processing, where the 
dataset is collected from system calls, shell commands and network traffic. Markov 
models are also used to detect anomalies based on sequence of events, where the system 
is examined at some particular time. [82] developed an anomaly detection system for 
systems calls based on Markov models. A hidden Markov model is also employed in 
anomaly-based systems where the system is assumed to be a Markov process but with 
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hidden parameters. [83, 84] used a hidden Markov chain to develop host-based 
detection systems. [85] developed several methods for network-based anomaly 
detection systems. In practice, these techniques generate flexible and adjustable 
systems, as they discover the interrelations between system variables. However, they 
rely on assumptions drawn about the observed system and require training data.  
2.2.1.4  Data-mining techniques  
Data-mining techniques have also been employed in anomaly detection systems in 
many researches to extract a knowledge model from a large number of patterns. 
Association rules from the system patterns are utilized to create features that construct 
the detection system. Two types of methods applied in data mining are 1) predictive 
methods involving certain variables to predict unknown variables; and 2) descriptive 
methods where human interpretation  are used to detect unknown patterns. Data-mining 
approaches are generally applied to three main tasks: classification, clustering and 
association. Classification is intended to extract class attributes from training data and 
learn the model using the training data, and then to use the constructed model to detect 
the anomalous events. An example of classification techniques are: inductive rule 
generation techniques, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms and neural networks. RIPPER 
[86] used inductive rule generation techniques to induce rules from data to classify audit 
data and detect intrusions. Dickerson et al. [87] developed the Fuzzy Intrusion 
Recognition Engine (FIRE) to derive rules for every observed event. Other approaches 
[88, 89] have used genetic algorithms to extract classification rules. 
In the clustering and outlier detection task, patterns in unlabeled multi-dimensional 
datasets and the number of dimensions equal to the number of attributes are identified. 
[90, 91] presented outlier detection techniques to create clusters and apply rules on audit 
data. The MINDS (Minnesota Intrusion Detection System) [92] is considered a 
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clustering-based anomaly detection system. Association rule discovery mechanisms are 
used to correlate events usually occurring at the same time. ADAM (Audit Data 
Analysis and Mining) [93] is an association rule and classification based anomaly 
detection. 
2.2.2  Signature-based detection 
Signature-based detection methods are knowledge-based techniques where well-defined 
attack patterns are used to detect malicious security violations. A novel attack has to be 
studied and analysed to identify its features and then generate its accurate signatures. 
The detection system observes and analyses activities amongst audit data, and the 
detection mechanism is based on the comparison between attack signatures and 
observed patterns. Signatures can be defined as a set of conditions characterizing the 
direct manifestation of intrusion activities in terms of system calls and network data 
[94], which is to say that when these conditions are met, a type of intrusion event is 
indicated. In networks, unauthorized behaviour is detected by sniffing packets and using 
the sniffed packets for analysis [95].  
This intrusive model is more accurate than the normal behaviour model and it does not 
need to observe the system's normal behaviours. In addition, it can be efficiently applied 
in heterogonous environments, while its detection process works independently from 
the normal system behaviour. The detection mechanism is based on a pattern-matching 
process performed on audit events. 
In these systems, the collection of signatures describing malicious activities is stored in 
a database similar to an anti-virus system. The observed events extracted from captured 
data, such as network traffic packets, are compared with the pattern database, and then 
an alarm is triggered in case of matching. The database has to be up-to-date and the 
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signatures have to be accurately defined to achieve an acceptable balance between false 
positives and false negatives. If the signature descriptions are very specific, this will 
result in false negatives and missed attacks. In contrast, if the signature descriptions are 
very general, a large number of false positives will be generated. Snort [23, 24] is the de 
facto standard for IDSs, which is categorized as a signature-based detection and 
prevention system. However, it employs protocol anomaly inspection as well as many 
commercial and open-source detection systems using Snort signatures. Snort will be 
explained in detail later in this chapter. 
Typically, these types of systems consist of two sub-systems: a sensor to collect data 
from its sources, and an engine to perform pattern matching. However, in an ideal 
scenario, signature systems are incorporated with a pre-processing mechanism such as 
protocol analysis to remove ambiguities from the collected data. The most expensive 
process in such systems is the pattern-matching process, particularly in high-speed 
environments. For this reason, many algorithms have been proposed in the research 
community to enhance the functionality of the pattern matcher [96-98].  
Software-based pattern matcher systems have been used for several years, but with the 
evolution of Gig networks these systems have become bottlenecks. Therefore other 
areas of research and certain commercial products are implementing hardware-based 
pattern-matcher systems to utilize their high-speed processing [17, 45, 99]. Generally, 
the most well-known algorithms for pattern matching are Boyer-Moore [100] for single 
pattern matching and Aho-Corasick [101] for multiple pattern matching. For hardware-
based solutions, FPGA (Field Programmable Array Gates) and TCAM (Ternary Content 
Addressable Memory) are implemented for their parallelism capabilities [102]. [44] 
found that 87% of Snort rules have patterns, so he proposed a hardware accelerator for 
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pattern matching. [99] proposed a high packet processing system using TCAM. An 
Extended TCAM was proposed by [103] to reduce data structures. 
Certain efforts have dealt with software-based solutions to enhance performance. [104] 
proposed a method to process each packet once it arrives without reassembly and to 
integrate pattern matching in protocol analysis to reduce execution time and memory 
use. [105] integrated pattern matching, normalization and protocol analysis in pro-to-
matching techniques to improve Snort functionality. 
Each signature-based and anomaly-based IDS has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The signature-based IDS is more practical and widely deployed because the intrusive 
model is easier to develop to meet security policies in heterogeneous environments. 
More precise definitions of signatures lead to more precise detection and reduced 
potential of missing attacks (false negatives). Comparatively, false positives in such 
systems are considered lower than in anomaly-based systems because the detection 
mechanism is based on matching patterns of activities to knowledge of attack patterns. 
In addition, alarms generated by these systems provide the administrator with detailed 
and precise information about the intrusion and the attack actions. On the other hand, 
signature-based systems cannot recognise 0-day attacks due to the absence of 
corresponding signature definitions. The system can also be evaded by altering 
signature patterns in a way that does not affect the ultimate goal of the attack, such as 
mutant exploits or polymorphic behaviour (self-modifying behaviour). Keeping up-to-
date with new vulnerabilities along with the maintenance burden are further drawbacks 
of these systems. 
In contrast, the anomaly-based system has the ability of detecting novel attacks without 
prior knowledge and without the need to create new signatures for each unforeseen 
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exploit. This can be efficient in the detection of Internet worms and similar stealthy 
attacks. Vulnerability updates are not required as a result of considering any suspicious 
activity as potentially malicious. On the other hand, anomaly-based systems suffer from 
difficulties in precisely characterising normal behaviour models in order to create 
baselines of detection. Determining the degree of deviation from the norm to provide 
reasonable detection accuracy is another obstacle. Moreover, these types of systems 
require a training phase including intensive analysis of the target environment. And any 
development fault in this phase can cause the generation of a large number of false 
positives. Furthermore, modern methodologies of attack tend to be slow-and-low, 
without creating a noticeable deviation from the normal model of the typical system, 
thus such malicious activities cannot be detected. Moreover certain emerging attacks, 
such as cross-site scripting (XSS) [106] and code injection, are categorised under the 
normal usage of any system, which makes them difficult to detect. The changing nature 
of network systems (burst networks) may result in high false alarms, even though the 
normal behaviour is well defined. Finally, the generated alarm reacting to abnormal 
activity does not give specific information to the administrator about the attack. 
In fact, neither of the two is the panacea. When used in conjunction with each other, 
then each of the two become a more viable and effective means of protecting network 
infrastructures [94]. The signature-based IDS still serves as a good outer layer of 
defence against known attacks in the same manner as firewalls. Anomaly-based IDSs 
are employed to further fortify the defence system and do not serve to function in lieu of 
signature-based IDSs [107]. Today, it is being observed that numerous antivirus 
packages include both signature-based and anomaly-based detection features, while 
only a handful of IDSs effect an incorporation of both approaches. 
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2.3  Hybrid IDSs 
The recent trend in the intrusion detection research community is to have the above 
approaches to interoperate efficiently and manipulate their positive features so as to 
achieve maximum levels of protection. Signature-based systems provide accuracy and 
less false positives, and anomaly-based systems offer recognition of novel attacks. 
Figure 2.3 shows the typical architecture of hybrid systems, where a signature-based 
sub-system such as Snort receives the incoming network data and performs monitoring 
using a protocol analysis unit and a pattern matching unit. If a malicious activity is 
detected, an alarm is triggered and there is no need to pass the captured data to the 
anomaly sub-system. Otherwise, the data is transferred to the anomaly sub-system for 
further observation. Therefore, only traffic supposed to be benign is forwarded to the 
receiving applications, and malicious activity is detected. Then the detected suspicious 
behaviour is further analysed by experts, and potentially a corresponding signature can 
be generated for future use.   
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Figure 2.3  Architecture of hybrid systems. 
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2.4  Snort 
Open-source software has gained tremendous popularity and acceptance amongst 
academia and the research community. Apart from being free of costs, there are several 
other qualities that have made them popular. Some of the advantages of open-source 
software are access to source code, detailed documentation, online forum support and 
rights to modify/use. Our research has focused on a widely accepted open-source 
software tool, Snort [20]. Snort has received great acceptance in the IDS market and has 
been widely recognized as the reliable open-source tool.  
Snort is capable of performing real-time traffic analyses and packet logging on the 
network. It performs protocol analysis and can detect a variety of network threats by 
using content/signature matching algorithms. Snort can be configured as a packet 
sniffer, packet logger and NIDS (detection mode and inline mode). 
- Sniffer mode: To receive traffic packets from the traffic wire and display them 
exactly the same as function of TCP dump. Snort uses a libpcap library for 
packet acquisition. 
- Packet logger: This is similar to the above, in addition to storing the data on a 
disk. 
- Network intrusion detection: The main task for Snort to perform is traffic 
analysis and pattern matching against signature collections. 
- Inline mode: (or network intrusion protection mode): To acquire traffic packets 
from iptables instead of libpcap. Attacking packets according to Snort rules are 
dropped instantly and only benign traffic will be forwarded. 
Snort was introduced in 1998 by Marty Roesch [20], and was considered a signature-
based IDS. Since its early versions launched in 1999, many development efforts have 
37 
 
been implemented to improve its capabilities. The current version is 2.8.6, and more 
than 8,000 certified rules are included. SnortSP 3.0 [23] is the beta version with new 
architecture introducing a new shell-based user interface. The Snort system consists of 
four sub-systems working sequentially, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 Snort sub-systems. 
Snort has five components: 1) a packet decoder, 2) a pre-processor, 3) a detection 
engine, 4) a logging and alerting system, and 5) an output model. Incoming packets are 
prepared for processing before being modified if required, e.g. de-fragmentation before 
sessions are then reassembled. Snort rules are applied in detection engines, where they 
are examined against signatures to detect recognised attack patterns. 
2.4.1 Pre-processor 
Pre-processors have been introduced to run before detection engines to improve Snort 
protection speed and efficiency. They are intended to perform traffic normalization to 
detect protocol anomaly behaviour. They are based on a target-based technique inspired 
from Patcek and Newsham's paper on evasion of attacks [11], and Vern Paxon and 
Umesh Shankar's paper [12] on traffic normalization. The heterogeneous nature of 
communication network infrastructures has posed ambiguities due to various 
interpretations of the RFCs [108]. The target-based analysis [23] involves identifying 
the actual target characterisation in order to provide the IDS with additional information 
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about the protected network so as to defend against attack evasions. Different OSs can 
behave in different ways in terms of handling network traffic, and the IDS must 
understand how these OSs are functioning. Intruders may manipulate these ambiguities 
in protocol implementations by fragmentation and session-splicing techniques. Pre-
processors in Snort consist of: 
- Packet de-fragmentation to reassemble traffic data spread over multiple packets. 
- Session reassembly to provide a stateful TCP analysis by using state records of 
previous TCP connections. 
- An application pre-processor to normalize ambiguities in application-level 
protocols, such as Telnet, HTTP, SMTP, FTP and RPC protocols. 
Dynamic pre-processors are plug-in pre-processors dynamically loaded and separately 
developed, and compiled without the need for full Snort compilation. 
2.4.2 Detection engine 
The main task of a detection engine is to perform the pattern-matching task. It receives 
the data from pre-processors and matches the packet header and content against Snort 
signature rules. Snort, being a signature-based IDS, uses rules to check for hostile 
packets in the network. Rules are sets of requirements used to generate an alert and have 
a particular syntax. For example, one rule that checks for peer-to-peer file sharing 
services looks for the string ―GET‖ in connection with the service running on any port 
other than TCP port 80. If a packet matches the rule, an alert is generated. Once an alert 
is triggered, it can be sent to multiple places, such as a log file or a database, or it 
generates a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) trap [109]. On successful 
detection of a hostile attempt, the detection engine sends an alert to a log file through a 
network connection into the required storage (output) [24]. Snort can also be used as an 
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Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) [24]. Snort 2.3.0 RC1 integrated this facility via 
Snort-inline into the official Snort project [23].  
The main objective of Snort and other NIDSs is to effectively analyze all packets 
passing through the network without any loss. The performance of the majority of 
running applications depends upon memory and processing power. In the context of 
NIDSs, this performance dependency includes NIC cards, I/O disk speed, and OS. In 
recent years, technologies have advanced in both hardware and software domains. 
Multi-core systems have been introduced to offer powerful processing functionality. 
However, these multi-processing implementations support applications using concurrent 
programming. The number of CPU cycles in such systems has increased to execute 
multiple tasks simultaneously. 
It has been identified that Snort does not support multithreading [24]. The detection 
engine component of Snort constitutes the critical part where the pattern matching 
function is performed. Recent VRT rule libraries contain more than 8,000 rules; this 
augments the need for an effective pattern matcher. Snort uses three different pattern 
matching algorithms: Aho-Corasick [101], modified Wu-Manber [110], and low-
memory key-word tire [24, 96]. Modifications have been made for these algorithms to 
provide various performance characteristics. We have conducted comparative memory 
usage and performance tests for different pattern-matching algorithms. The results are 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Pattern-matching algorithm performance (based on 1.5 GB pcap file). 
Algorithms (8,296 rules) Memory usage (MB) Packet processing time (seconds) 
Aho-Corasick (full) 640 620 
Aho-Corasick (sparse) 240 714 
Aho-Corasick (standard) 1,080 665 
Wu-Manber 130 635 
Wu-Manber (low) 75 655 
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In addition, Snort uses Perl Computable Regular Expressions (PCRE) [24] for precise 
and flexible protection capabilities. A dynamic engine is also used for complex 
detection functionalities where shared objects are dynamically loaded. Instead of 
plaintext rules, rules can be written in C language and compiled and loaded for fast 
processing and to deal with certain complicated attack vectors. Snort rules consist of 
rule headers and rule options. The structure of rule headers is shown in Figure 2.5 and 
multiple rule options are enclosed in parentheses. An example of a Snort rule is 
provided below: 
alert tcp 192.168.2.0/24 23 -> any any \ 
(content: "confidential"; msg: "Detected confidential";) 
Action Protocol Src. Address Port Direction Dest. Address Port 
Figure 2.5 Snort rule header. 
2.4.3 Snort with Artificial Intelligence (SnortAI) 
SnortAI [111] has been introduced to integrate Snort methodology with the intelligence 
of anomaly-detection methods represented by Artificial Intelligence plug-ins. Currently, 
portscan-AI pre-processors function with Snort version 2.8.3.2 and the development of 
other plug-ins, such as XSS-AI and SQL-AI pre-processors, is in the planning. 
2.5  Bro 
Bro [21] is also an open-source IDS to parse network traffic in real-time focusing on 
extracting application-level semantics and event observations. It was developed at ICST 
and LBNL [112] in 1996. The detection of a specific attack is implemented by 
comparing activities against a set of rules and policies. However, Bro does not look 
only at pre-defined signatures, but analyses network connections and correlates between 
events. Moreover, it uses regular expression matching and a DFA (Deterministic Finite 
Automaton) [113], where one active state is used at a time. 
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Bro system architecture consists of three main sub-systems: 1) a sniffer to capture 
traffic, 2) an event engine, and 3) a policy script interpreter. When network packets are 
captured, different levels of events are generated by the event engine (the core). Streams 
of produced events are transferred to the policy script interpreter to be processed. 
Polices are either supplied by the administrator or acquired from the connection context 
analysis. Events are handled by the event handler following rules specified by policy 
scripts. Policy scripts have to be written in Bro script language. However, Bro suffers 
from a shortage of good documentation, slow development and the need for writing 
complex scripts. 
2.6  Host-based vs. network-based IDSs 
IDSs can be categorised based on the source of gathered information for observation 
and analysis. Host-based IDSs were introduced before network-based IDSs to monitor 
the activities on a single host. These activities include file access and modifications and 
the detection is achieved by checking file integrity, kernel activities such as system 
calls, and root privilege behaviour. Furthermore, connection attempts can be observed 
such as suspicious port connections and failed logon attempts, as well as application-
level interaction. Records of information are collected and analysed against any 
intrusion attempt. Examples of such systems are: tripwire [114] – a software for security 
and data integrity, and OSSEC[115] – an open-source host-based IDS. 
In contrast, network-based IDSs (NIDSs) monitor local network activities by analyzing 
inbound and outbound traffic in real-time. All traffic packets – captured from network 
interface on a promiscuous mode – are reassembled and analyzed using different 
mechanisms. Certain network-based attacks, such as distributed denial of service 
(DDoS), Botnet and worms, cannot be detected by host-based IDSs. Thus, NIDSs are 
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efficient because they protect the network elements, including host machines, largely 
without having to rely on frequent OS patches and user awareness. They also reduce the 
cumbersome task of installing and updating protection software on every single host. 
The main concerns about such systems are when they become a bottleneck for network 
communications, particularly with the massive speed of modern switches. The other 
concern is the difference in understanding of the received data between the NIDS and 
the end application. Also, application-level attacks, which need application-layer 
inspections, have posed another challenge for such systems. The research trends in this 
area are to enhance NIDSs to be more intelligent in understanding attacker behaviour. 
This is achieved by incorporating certain functionalities implemented in host-based 
tools.  
2.7  Alert correlation 
The widespread deployment of IDSs, both network-based and host-based, has imposed 
a demand for sophisticated alert management systems. Simple analyses including 
statistical information about IDS alarms are not helpful in the detection of connections 
between alerts, in reducing alarm-data size and in distinguishing false alarms. A high-
level view of system security status is required by analysing low-level alerts produced 
by IDSs to characterize attack actions. Alert correlation techniques provide the facility 
to observe beyond the receipt of IDS alarms themselves. It has been identified that real 
intrusion consists of multiple and coordinated steps that are logically connected. In 
addition, the huge amount of elementary alerts received constantly can cause the human 
administrator to ignore them if they consist mostly of false positives.  
Alert correlation has been an active research area for many years and the concept has 
been explored in several efforts. Approaches have been developed for Network 
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Monitoring Systems (NMSs) to diagnose faults in complex communication networks, 
and have also been applied to some extent in alert correlation. However, the nature of 
network faults is different from adversarial behaviour, as the later is more dynamic and 
complex. In NMSs, the objective is to find out the fault location, whereas in the 
correlation of IDS alerts, the goal is to discover the attacking strategy. 
In recent years, alert clustering and correlation techniques have been employed to 
provide a global view of attacking behaviour by analyzing low-level alerts produced by 
the IDS sensors. The main objective of alert correlation is to build an abstract modelling 
of alerts by generalizing the detected events, instead of the current specific modelling. 
The constructed inference will progress even in cases of unforeseen attacks. Previous 
research efforts in the field of alert correlation have mainly concentrated on a particular 
aspect of the problem domain. It is not possible to provide an efficient alert correlation 
system in a single phase or study the system components as isolated elements. Overall 
functionality is only achieved by the integration of the system's modules and all the 
system parts should be evaluated together.  
Different approaches have been utilized to build the correlation models and can be 
categorized into four main disciplines: 1) similarity-based approaches, 2) scenario-based 
approaches, 3) pre- and post-condition approaches, and 4) probabilistic approaches.  
2.7.1  Similarity-based approaches  
In similarity-based techniques, certain selected features (e.g. source IP address, 
destination IP address, port number and attack class) are used to compute the similarity 
degree. Some approaches rely on exact similarity between two alerts to be grouped, e.g. 
the same source and destination IP address, whilst others utilize a similarity function. 
This function represents similarity confidence and is based on a defined threshold. Two 
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alerts are considered similar if they satisfy the defined confidence degree and occur 
within a defined sliding window time. The similarity confidence is calculated using the 
overall similarity between alerts based on their attributes. In principle, these techniques 
are mainly applied to alert fusion, alert clustering and alert aggregation. The Alert 
clustering process plays an important role in alarm reduction and as well as reducing 
false positive rates. Data mining, artificial intelligence, machine learning and clustering 
using association-rules techniques are widely implemented in this respect.  
[50] has proposed an algorithm for alert aggregation and correlation which is 
implemented in the Tivoli Enterprise Console (TEC). It is a tool for risk management to 
address the problems of alarm flooding and discovery of attack context. It has two 
different components: one to remove duplicated instances of alerts using rules saved in 
a configuration file, and the other to assign alerts to their associated attack scenario. An 
exact similarity of three common attributes (attack class, source address and destination 
address) are used to group alerts. It is useful for some initial alert processing but is not 
capable of detecting complex scenarios. It is also vulnerable for attack flooding and the 
use of different IP addresses for the same attack. However, their alert model has been 
revised and is now the de facto standard format for intrusion detection alerts, which is 
the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [116]. An alert correlation 
framework was presented by [51] using exact feature similarity. Two out of ten of the 
proposed components are implemented. Thread reconstruction is used to cluster alerts 
with equal source and destination IP addresses within a window size. This is to 
represent the activity of attacking a single host from a single attacker. Another 
component called focus reconstruction is used to show a single attacker targeting 
multiple machines.  
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In other respects, approximate features similarity is used by [28], who presented a 
probabilistic approach to provide a unified mathematical framework that performs a 
partial matching of features. Features are extracted and minimum similarities are 
computed and weighted. A similarity metric is employed using EMERLAND 
architecture [28] in three phases. In the first phase, an attack thread concept and 
similarity metric (sensor, attack class, source and destination) are used to aggregate low-
level events. The second phase involves the aggregation of alerts generated from 
multiple sensors ignoring sensor field information. Then the third phase provides a 
higher aggregation level by relaxing the similarity requirements using attack class.  
 Although these methods are useful for alert fusion and statistical purposes, they fail to 
discover the causal connections between alerts. Moreover, it is hard to find a 
justification for calculating the overall similarity function using a weighted measure and 
sliding window time.  
Additionally, a conceptual alarm clustering technique was proposed by [10] to discover 
root causes of different alarms. The aim was to reduce the volume of the alarms to a 
manageable size. A generalization hierarchy structure of attributes was utilized to define 
similarities between alerts and to support root cause analyses. The similarity function is 
computed using the proximity between alerts and the features' taxonomy [10]. In 
essence, the generalisation concept is promising, but not in certain features, such as IP 
addresses if spoofed ones are considered. The concept of generalisation has been 
utilized but for attack class classification and capabilities modelling. 
2.7.2  Scenario-based approaches 
Scenario-based or pre-defined scenario approaches utilize the concept of the real attack 
consisting of a series of steps to achieve the attacker's ultimate goal. Attacks occur 
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typically in groups of actions (multi-stage attacks) represented by IDS alerts. Each 
attack scenario is specified by its corresponding steps, which are required for it to be 
successful. Attack scenario modelling is essentially based on rules stored in a 
knowledge base that states attack stages. The knowledge rules are built either manually 
by experts or using machine learning approaches. The knowledge base is generally 
intended to characterize the casual relationships between observed attack activities. In 
manual knowledge acquisition, formal detection models using attack languages [33, 
117, 118] are used to construct attack libraries. On the other hand, in machine learning 
approaches, correlation rules can be obtained using a training stage and labelled data. 
LAMBDA [33] is an intrusion specification language to describe the conditions and 
effects of an intrusion in connection to the variable state of the target system. 
Descriptions of the relationships between attack steps are constructed based on three 
components. The first component is termed the state description, which is to specify the 
conditions of the target system that are required for the attack to be successful. The 
other components are termed transition description and event combining, to state the 
conditions in order to combine two events into a single scenario. ADele [118] was 
presented at the same time of development as LAMBDA. However, it is a procedural 
approach rather than the declarative mechanisms utilized in LAMBDA. A database of 
known attack scenarios is modelled in a high-level description. Similarly, STATL [117] 
language is a formal language to describe scenario patterns in terms of states and 
transitions. Hence, a sequence of events conducted by the attacker can be described to 
express a multi-stage attack. However, these approaches need a manual description of 
potential attacker behaviour, and if a single step is missed the whole behaviour goes 
undetected.  
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Besides, [119] used predictive data-mining techniques to learn correlation algorithms 
from labelled scenarios. The training data is obtained from real scenario examples and 
labelled manually. A user-defined threshold is used to determine the highest probability 
score, stating whether the incoming alert corresponds to a particular scenario or 
otherwise to initialize a new one. [120] applied chronicle formalism to alert correlation 
to provide fewer alarms of higher quality. The proposed approach is based on known 
sequences of malicious scenarios and temporal logic formalism. The chronicle model 
incorporates a formal data model M2D2 [120], which is also proposed by the authors to 
federate the context information required for alert correlation systems. In practice, these 
approaches involve data labelling, which is labour intensive and error prone. 
Furthermore, the training data which can be relied on and which reflects real scenarios 
is not available. 
2.7.3  Pre- and post-condition approaches  
The basis for these approaches is the assumption that real attacks involving related 
stages can be represented by alerts as a system diagnoses. The objective is recognition 
of attack scenarios, and potentially the identification of unknown attack steps. Domain 
knowledge of intrusion pre- and post-conditions is used to detect alert correlation even 
with the existence of partial condition formalisation. Two alerts can be logically 
correlated if some of the post-conditions for the first one match some of the pre-
conditions of the later one. It can be said that these techniques are a special case of 
scenario-based approaches; however, complete scenario description is not required. 
Hence, if some steps are missing due to not be detected by the IDS, the correlation 
system can perform a correlation to detect the so-called attack sub-goal. This provides 
more tolerant techniques than the hard-coded scenario templates used in scenario-based 
methods.  
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The provides/requires model was initially proposed by [121] to characterize the causal 
relationships among alerts using JIGSAW language [121]. Attack scenarios are 
modelled in terms of capabilities and concepts. Concepts are abstractions of attacks, 
and capabilities are the required and provided conditions associated with each attack 
concept. The correlation task is performed if a match is detected between the conditions 
of two alerts ordered temporally. Hence, each received alert is modelled to a concept 
with its related required and provided capabilities. Instead of representing attack 
scenarios as series of states, they are considered as sets of concepts and capabilities. 
Even though it is limited to known attacks, the formalization of concepts and 
capabilities can be generalized in a hierarchical manner to uncover unknown atomic 
activity. Several efforts have been proposed based on this model in the literature, but 
they have used various definitions and knowledge representations [35, 38, 49]. We have 
used this model as the basis of our correlation framework because of its extensibility 
and flexibility.  
[49] proposed the Cooperative Intrusion Detection (CID) framework based on pre- and 
post-conditions. Explicit correlation of events based on security experts is used to 
express the logical or topological links between events. The framework consists of five 
components: 1) alert management, 2) clustering, 3) merging, 4) correlation, and 5) 
intent recognition. Alert clustering and merging functions are performed using a 
similarity function, and intent recognition is not implemented. The attack is specified in 
the language of LAMBDA [33] and partial matching techniques are adopted to 
construct attack scenarios. In addition to explicit correlation, semi-explicit correlation is 
used to overcome the possibly missing attack descriptions. Moreover, the authors of 
[34, 35] have proposed an alert correlation framework based on the prerequisites and 
consequences of individual detected alerts. A Hyper-alert Type Dictionary knowledge 
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database contains rules that describe the conditions where prior actions prepare for later 
ones. The attack strategy is represented as a Directed Attack Graph (DAG) with 
constraints on the attack attributes considering the temporal order of the occurring 
alerts. The nodes of the DAG represent attacks and the edges represent causal and 
temporal relations. Similarities between these strategies are measured to reduce the 
redundancy. A technique of hypothesizing and reasoning about missed attacks by IDSs 
is presented to repair broken scenarios. This is done by matching instances of 
prerequisites and consequences of similar attack nodes. The main objective of these 
authors' work is the reduction of the huge number of redundant alerts and to report a 
high-level view for the administrator. However, the proposed system is useful as a 
forensic tool where it performs offline analysis. In addition, building the knowledge 
database containing rules of the applied conditions is burdensome. However, the authors 
have not provided a mechanism to build the Hyper-alert Type Dictionary. Moreover, the 
generated graph is huge, even with medium-sized datasets. 
In spite of the fact that pre- and post-condition approaches have alleviated some of the 
recognised drawbacks of scenario-based approaches, they also share the difficulty of 
defining the required knowledge. Pre- and post-conditions have to be modelled for 
every known attack and this is typically done manually by security experts. The quality 
of correlation results is highly dependent on how attack elements, attack implications, 
attack domains and the target system response are expressed. Attack concepts have to be 
formalized in a certain way to provide maximum coverage with less false positives. 
Furthermore, some implementations of these techniques consider uncorrelated alerts as 
false positives, and that is not the case if the actual related description is missing. 
Moreover, knowledge representation of pre- and post-conditions in most works is done 
in an ad hoc manner.  
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2.7.4  Probabilistic approaches  
These approaches are referred to as statistical analysis models, where alerts are 
correlated if they are statistically related. They are inspired from anomaly-based IDSs, 
where prior knowledge is not required. In this category, relationships between incurred 
events are computed statistically, providing automatic knowledge acquisition. In 
general, implementation of these approaches is performed using machine learning 
techniques. [29] proposed a combination of statistical and knowledge-base correlation 
techniques. Three algorithms are integrated based on the assumption that some attack 
stages have statistical and temporal relationships even though direct reasoning links are 
non-existent. A Bayesian-based correlation engine is used to identify the direct relations 
amongst alerts based on prior knowledge. In contrast to previous approaches, 
knowledge of attack steps is used as a constraint to the probabilistic inference. An 
engine based on Causal Discovery Theory is developed to discover the statistical of 
one-way dependence among alerts. In addition, a Granger Causality based algorithm is 
used by applying statistical and temporal correlation to identify mutual dependency. 
However, the problem of the selection of a time window for temporal correlation is still 
an unresolved problem. Attackers can exploit the slow-and-low attack to avoid 
detection. Attack prediction also relies on prior knowledge, and so 0-day attacks are not 
detected.  
Recently, [37, 122-124] employed different data-mining algorithms for real-time 
correlation to discover multi-stage attacks. An offline attack graph is constructed using 
manual or automatic knowledge acquisition and then attack scenarios are recognized by 
correlating the collected alerts in real-time. The incoming step of an attack can be 
predicted after the detection of few attack steps in progress. In [122], an association rule 
mining algorithm is used to generate the attack graph from different attack classes based 
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on historical data. Candidate attack sequences are determined using a sliding window. 
In [124], an AprioriAll algorithm, which is a sequential pattern-matching technique, is 
used to generate correlation rules based on temporal and content constraints. [124] 
adopted a classical sequential mining method GSP (generalised sequential patterns) 
[125] to find the maximal alerts sequence and then to discover the attack strategy. The 
limitation of their work is the use of only attack class and temporal data as features. 
Nevertheless, although these approaches do not require the construction of scenario 
rules by experts, a training dataset is needed. The dataset has to be collected and 
validated in order to obtain high-quality correlations. Therefore the required efforts to 
maintain a dataset are similar to the manual labour required to construct rules in other 
approaches. In addition, the false positives issue is another concern has to be taken in 
account; thus, these approaches can be utilized to support other techniques.  
2.8  Alert verification 
Generally, alert verification mechanisms are intended to distinguish successful from 
failed attacks. In typical deployments, the IDS device performs its detection producing a 
number of irrelevant alerts that have no effect on the target machine. That is because the 
host is not running the corresponding service or the service is not vulnerable. This 
knowledge gap between the IDS device and the protected system creates the issue of 
false positives [12]. The alert verification and vulnerability analysis problem has been 
investigated in several efforts at the IDS level [23, 126, 127]. Snort developers have 
brought up this point and have extended Snort to include facilities for adding 
configurable information about the target system. Target-based analysis has been 
introduced in Snort.2.8 [23] to model the targets rather than just the protocols. However, 
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this mechanism is limited to configurations based on information from OSs and these 
details have to be updated manually.  
To deal with this issue, different techniques have been presented according to the 
context requirements. For instance, one direction is to compare a configuration file for 
the protected machines against the conditions required for the attack to be successful. 
The gathering of system configurations can be performed automatically and updated 
periodically using vulnerability scanners such as Nessus [128]. Other techniques are 
based on the analysis of the target system response after the attack occurs. This is 
typically performed as a further investigation required for forensics purposes.  
[129] proposed M-Correlator to analyse and prioritize a stream of alerts and to verify 
relevant security incidents. The system is based on a knowledge base that contains a 
description for the protected network (topology and vulnerability) collected by the 
Nmap [130] tool. Three stages have been considered: 1) low-priority alerts are 
eliminated without preventing the IDS from generating them; 2) alerts are ranked using 
a relevance score based on a comparisons between topology and vulnerability 
information; and 3) alert priority is calculated according the significance of the target 
machine or service. 
It should be noted that alert verification functionality should be employed as a 
lightweight process to avoid affecting overall system performance. Automatic and 
periodic knowledge acquisition is required to update stored data. This mechanism 
should be implemented as a complementary function to the IDS, and not integrated into 
the IDS itself. The reason behind this is to maximise the input data to the correlation 
system for deeper and more accurate analysis. Attack attempts should be recorded even 
if they are not successful because it may uncover some undetected activities.  
53 
 
2.9  Alert correlation system requirements 
Although past techniques have dealt with reducing the massive number of collected data 
by NIDSs, there are many limitations. First, the analysis of attack strategy recognition is 
too complex, especially if the task is broadened to the prediction of unknown steps. 
Knowledge-based approaches are more accurate due to rule-matching mechanisms 
which are built based on expert knowledge, but they require more effort to provide 
precise rules. Statistical and temporal analysis techniques are unable to detect causal 
relations among events, but they do not require prior defined rules. The adoption of 
such systems in real-time is still an open question, where most proposed systems have 
been tested in an offline fashion or in a low-volume traffic environment. The huge 
number of detected events leads to graph explosion, as in [34, 35]. Moreover, missed 
attacks by the IDS can result in separate scenarios related to the same attack. Attackers 
also exploit the attack sliding window used in most approaches by performing slow-
and-low attacks. 
Alert correlation modelling has to provide a type of intelligence for attack strategy 
recognition. A framework consists of several components needed to make use of the 
capabilities of different approaches. Attack strategy recognition cannot be implemented 
in a single stage or by using a single component. In order to achieve this task, the 
correlation approach must consider: 
• Real-time (or at least near real-time) correlation that inspects the incoming alerts 
and correlates them to the older ones. However, it is a challenging task, particularly if 
we consider the scalability, the huge amount of alerts and the speed of the current 
implementation of communication networks. [35] developed the TIAA system that 
performs the correlation in memory using a nested-loop mechanism, and [131] proposed 
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a queue graph mechanism. However, they have not provided any evaluation in high-
speed networks to assess the system's scalability. 
• Recognition of missed attack by the IDS, which will cause a division of a 
scenario or graph into separate ones. The correlation system has to be able to correlate 
isolated scenarios using implicit correlation. This mechanism can also be used to predict 
unknown attacks by hypothesizing about the expected step, which can consist of 
variations of known attacks.  
• Slow-and-low attacks conducted by skilful attackers to avoid detection. Most of 
the implemented systems use a sliding window to avoid graph explosion, and hence 
very old events are ignored. However, determination of the value of the sliding window 
is also critical in order to provide a higher detection rate. Ignoring old events can result 
in the success of a dangerous intrusion attempt.  
• Alert verification, where not all alerts are critical and where they have different 
effects on the system. This mechanism will reduce the huge number of correlated alerts 
by focusing on the significant ones. 
• The configuration of the protected system can be incorporated in order to reduce 
false positives and to provide more meaningful and accurate results. Host response can 
also be involved to shift the focus to the critical events. 
2.10  Conclusion 
In this chapter, an overview of past and recent works in the field of IDSs and alert 
correlation techniques have been provided. A number of IDSs approaches have been 
discussed providing a historical summary to show the evolution achieved since this 
technology started. The two main IDSs methodologies have been investigated in details 
throughout this chapter presenting their advantages and disadvantages. We have also 
discussed the opportunity to exploit the capabilities of each approach by developing a 
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cooperative technique to employ both signature-based and anomaly-based IDSs. 
Moreover, host-based IDSs can be used to support the functionality of network-based 
IDS by providing further details about the protected system.  
Alert correlation approaches have been employed to analyse alerts produced by IDSs to 
facilitate the detection of multi-stage attack. These mechanisms are used to reduce the 
huge amount of IDSs alarms and false positives. Different methodologies have been 
described in this respect including scenario-based, pre- and post-condition, and 
statistical methods. Then, we have stated the main requirements for alert correlation 
systems that have to be satisfied in order to develop a practical detection system.                   
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CHAPTER 3: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF NETWORK 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (NIDS) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are designed for the security needs of networks. 
Existing Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are found to be limited in 
performance and utility, especially once subjected to heavy traffic conditions. An 
optimal methodology for the evaluation of NIDSs does not exist due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the operational environments. One aspect of NIDS evaluation is 
performance evaluation to measure the scalability of such systems in high-traffic 
environments. It has been observed that NIDS become less effective even when 
presented with a bandwidth of a few hundred megabits per second. 
In this chapter, we have endeavoured to identify the causes leading to the unsatisfactory 
performance of NIDS. In this regard, an extensive performance evaluation of an open-
source intrusion detection system (Snort) has been conducted. This has been done on a 
highly sophisticated test-bench with different traffic conditions. Host-based analysis and 
virtual-based analysis approaches have been selected to determine the performance of 
Snort. The performance of the system has been evaluated on different OS platforms 
(Windows, Linux and Free BSD) utilizing multi-core hardware. Our test methodology is 
also based on the concept of stressing the system and degrading its performance in 
terms of its packet-handling capacity. This has been achieved by: normal traffic 
generation, fuzzing, traffic saturation, parallel dissimilar attacks, manipulation of 
background traffic (e.g. fragmentation), packet sequence disturbance, and illegal packet 
insertion. Our results identified the performance limitations of Snort on both host and 
virtual platforms. We have also identified the factors responsible for the limited 
57 
 
performance of the system. Finally, we have discussed the factors involved in the 
limitation of IDSs performance.  
3.2  NIDS evaluation 
The design of a comprehensive approach to test and evaluate NIDS has been a debatable 
issue for many years. This is as a result of the nature of these systems running in 
heterogeneous environments and employing different detection methodologies. Host-
based IDSs have testing requirements that are different from network-based IDS, and 
NIDSs themselves vary based on the employed operational techniques. However, 
several efforts in the literature review have been proposed to test and evaluate the 
performance and accuracy of these systems. Authors in [132] have presented a review 
of IDS evaluation methodologies by rendering available measurable characteristics of 
IDS testing. They have summarized criteria for IDS evaluation as follows: 
1- Detection coverage: This measurement indicates the detection abilities of IDSs to 
recognise all known as well as potentially unknown attacks. IDS capabilities are 
measured by the maximum number of detected events – for instance, in signature-
based methods, by performing a comparison between the number of signatures and 
known intrusive events. It is difficult to compare the different signature databases of 
various IDSs. In addition, a single database containing all known attacks does not 
exist. However, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [39] is a 
repository of publicly known vulnerabilities to enable information exchange between 
research and commercial products. However, the same vulnerability can be exploited 
by a set of attacks, and the value of detection varies from one environment to 
another. 
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2- False positive and false negative rates: While the detection capability is vital for 
IDSs, the false positive rate is also important, because overwhelming the system with 
a huge number of false alarms is impractical. False alarms can be produced by 
benign traffic such as network monitoring tools or by a signature that is not well 
defined. Various environments imply different network standards and different 
protocols and services, which cause difficulties in measuring the false positive rate. 
On the other hand, false negatives are caused by inability of NIDS to detect true 
attacks which are more serious than false positives. False negatives can be caused by 
improper written signatures, unpublicized vulnerability information, NIDS device is 
overloaded and cannot properly process all data, or poor NIDS device management. 
Reduction of false positives is not necessarily introducing false negatives if the 
implemented mechanism does not affect the detection coverage. Moreover, it is 
imperative to achieve a balance between false positives and false negatives. False 
positives affect productivity and false negatives affect security. Hence, it is essential 
to properly quantify risk and the NIDS role in risk reduction. False positives can be 
suppressed by different techniques: configuring the IDS to rely on the operational 
environment by tuning the signatures to only watch for specific services and 
operating systems, placing the NIDS behind the firewall, and alert analysis systems. 
The later one is the most secure and reliable technique that does not introduce in 
raise in false negatives rate. All signatures are enabled and the NIDS in configured 
with the maximum detection coverage. Alert correlation systems are the typical 
implementation of these techniques.  
3- Detection rate: This measurement represents the detection accuracy; in other words, 
the IDS triggers a true alarm for the correct attack. In comparative evaluations, all 
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tested IDSs have to be configured in the same way and run in the same environment 
in order to obtain an accurate testing. 
4- Resistance to attacks: Smart attackers can exploit weaknesses in the IDS itself to 
avoid detection with the use of several methods. They can stress the system by high-
volume normal traffic to force the IDS to drop packets, or mutant crafted traffic 
packets can be injected to confuse signature-based systems and as a result, a huge 
number of false positives are generated. 
5- High-volume traffic handling: The IDS's ability to handle higher traffic volumes is a 
critical issue in IDS evaluation. Sending a large amount of traffic – or even worse, 
high traffic with fragmentation, which is computationally expensive – can lead the 
IDS to collapse or at least drop packets. If the IDS starts to drop packets, this means 
that intrusive data can be passed to the protected system. Hardware-based NIDSs are 
more scalable than software-based systems for higher traffic. 
6- Event correlation abilities: This is related to the context-based protection system, 
where the IDS is able to correlate information gathered from different sources. This 
information is valuable for building a state record for every event, and that allows the 
IDS to understand complex attacks such as multi-stage and hidden attacks.  
7- Detection of novel attacks: This measurement is to determine IDS's ability to detect 
unknown or never-seen attacks. It suits anomaly-based approaches, which are 
capable of recognising novel attacks, but not signature-based approaches. 
3.3  Background traffic 
Despite having the criteria for the evaluation of IDS, the need for attack and realistic 
background traffic information remains in great demand. There are several approaches 
for obtaining attack and background traffic data. First, the most common and useful 
methodology is to build a test bed consisting of a number of connected machines and 
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other elements of a typical network infrastructure. This will simulate the real network 
despite the use of a limited number of hosts. The minimum number of hosts is three 
machines: 1) an attacker machine, containing a collection of exploit scripts or attacking 
tools, 2) a victim machine running vulnerable services, and 3) a monitoring machine 
running the IDS under testing. After the installation of the test bed, three kinds of traffic 
are required: normal traffic, background traffic and malicious traffic. The first type can 
be real traffic obtained from a production environment, or synthetic traffic generated by 
traffic generators [133-136], whether software-based or hardware-based. Malicious 
traffic is injected into the background network traffic, and this can be obtained from 
automated systems such as Metsploit [26] or the manual use of attack scripts. The 
advantage of this approach is the ease of traffic generation, the ability to repeat the test 
many times, and the fact that the traffic can be recorded and distributed publicly. On the 
other hand, this method is expensive and time consuming, particularly if commercial 
traffic generators [135, 136] are considered, as they perform better than the few, not 
well documented open-source software ones. Moreover, the use of a limited number of 
hosts implies less running services, less implemented protocols and the absence of huge 
number of concurrent connections. Synthetic traffic is generated based on random 
variables, and some IDSs consider this type of traffic abnormal and may ignore it.  
Second, real traffic obtained from a production network infrastructure can be used for 
IDS evaluation to offer a more realistic approach. The IDS system is connected to a tap 
or a mirrored port on the edge of a network. This method is less common for reasons of 
privacy and due to the difficulty in identifying potential unlabeled attacks. Some traffic 
generators such as Harpoon [137] have been developed as intelligent generators by 
obtaining real traffic characteristics from live networks.  
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Third, real traffic can be modified to remove all sensitive data and used for testing of 
IDS systems, which is called sanitised traffic. However, the main task for the IDS is to 
inspect content and attacks usually residing in packet payload, so this is not the optimal 
approach for testing IDSs, but can be suitable for other network components. 
The first well-documented IDS evaluation methodology to be introduced was the 
DARPA evaluation 1998 (UNIX dataset) developed in the labs of MIT [55], followed 
by another dataset in 1999 (Windows NT dataset). Data used in their experiments are 
labelled and distributed publicly. DARPA datasets have been criticised for not being 
updated since 1999, for some of the attack types used having become obsolete, and for 
not covering new emerging attacks [22]. The Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information 
Assurance Test-bed (LARIAT) [138] is another evaluation methodology providing a 
tool for simulation and testing. DEFCON [54] is the worldwide hacker and security 
expert conference and competition. Malicious traffic can be obtained from DEFCON 
CTF (Capture The Flag), which contains a huge number of attacking traffic used for 
IDS testing. NSS Labs [41] is a commercial group that provides a comprehensive 
methodology for the evaluation of NIDSs. Their approach includes security 
effectiveness, performance, resistance to evasion techniques, stateful operation, latency, 
reliability and usability [41]. Background traffic is generated from hardware-based 
traffic generators such as Spirent SmartBit [136]. Malicious traffic is obtained from 
automatic tools such as Metasploit [26] and CANVAS [139], or manually defined 
attacks. 
Other efforts have been made to test signature-based IDSs by analysing the collection of 
attack signatures and then generating mutant patterns to hide the actual attacks. The 
authors in [25] have developed a cross-testing approach to generate synthetic events to 
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test IDS ability and identify real attacks from modified ones similar to the signatures. 
[140] addressed the need for publicly well-documented datasets for IDS testing. He 
presents a set of tools that generate malicious traffic using a virtual network 
infrastructure. Different platforms were used to create attack traces against various OSs 
and violating different system services. [141] proposed a framework for offline and 
online testing to evaluate NIDS resistance to evasion techniques. A comparative 
evaluation methodology was presented to test Snort and Bro by generating ambiguities 
in traffic traces. 
3.4 Motivation 
A typical scenario of employing a NIDS in a network is its implementation on the 
server with minimum active services. This setup is quite susceptible to insider attacks, 
especially in high-speed environments. The current NIDSs are also threatened by 
resource crunch attempts such as DDoS, which has increased from a few megabits in 
the year 2000 to 40 Gbps in 2008 [142]. The performance criteria of NIDSs demand 
that every single packet (header, payload) passing through the network needs to be 
evaluated with the same link speed; however, the massive increase in network speed has 
generated many concerns. Sending a large amount of traffic or using computationally 
expensive techniques like fragmentation can compromise a NIDS or make it to start 
dropping packets. 
NIDSs can be implemented as software-based or hardware-based. Software-based 
NIDSs are more configurable, easy to update and need less maintenance; however, their 
performance is quite slow. On the other hand, hardware-based NIDSs can handle a 
larger volume of traffic, but they are expensive, require more maintenance and are hard 
to update. The choice between the two is a trade-off between cost and performance. 
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This has created the need to evaluate the current software-based systems. This is 
especially so in current-day high-speed conditions using different implementation 
scenarios.  
We have identified that quite few efforts have been made to measure the performance of 
NIDSs. Most of the evaluation methodologies are based on testing in moderate traffic 
conditions. Furthermore, some of these approaches have used previously saved datasets 
rather than real traffic. These seem unrealistic, as actual system performance was 
gauged under limited conditions with non-realistic network flow. The results obtained 
under these conditions could not portray the actual performance output. We have 
endeavoured to evaluate the system against realistic network conditions, providing the 
application with different tiers of hardware support in order to analyze its performance 
more practically. The recent development of multi-core systems has also added a few 
more opportunities for deploying a software-based system; these shall also be 
investigated in this chapter.  
Our aim in this chapter is to provide answers to the following questions: 
 Is it possible to deploy a current software-based NIDS such as Snort at a rate above 
500 Mbps using commodity hardware? Also to identify the limits of incoming 
traffic, a system can handle effectively in terms of packet loss. 
 Does the use of different OSs (normal desktop, server), hardware capabilities 
(single, multi-core) and configurations (host, virtual) affect NIDS performance? 
 Identification of mechanisms to improve NIDS performance in high-speed traffic 
before shifting to hardware solutions. 
It is essential that the NIDS is capable to process packets traverse the protected network 
with speed of the communication link [6, 13, 14]. When the network traffic load 
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becomes higher than the peak processing throughput the NIDS can sustain, the CPU 
becomes saturated, and the Operating System inevitably starts dropping packets before 
delivering them to the NIDS, impeding its detection ability [15-17]. Since these packets 
are not inspected, if they are part of an attack or other malicious activity, then that event 
will be missed[27, 45].  
Assuming a uniform distribution of packets across the network traffic, any packet loss 
results in a proportional loss in NIDS effectiveness [11]. This relationship has been 
widely identified in NIDS research [143-146]. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship 
between packet loss and missed alert rate which consequently cause missing attacks and 
affect the NIDS precision. The scatter plot shows a direct and nearly a linear 
relationship between the two parameters. The number of missed alerts approaches zero 
if the packet loss percentage becomes small. The network traffic used in this experiment 
consists of 530,000 packets containing 521 attacks (1000 packets/alert).  
 
Figure 3.1 Relationship between packet loss & missing alerts 
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Our research has focused on signature-based IDSs with an emphasis on evaluating their 
performance in high-speed traffic conditions. Snort has been selected as a test platform 
because of its popularity and status as a de facto IDS standard. We are confident that the 
results obtained in this research would be equally applicable to other IDSs available on 
the market. The test environments selected for the research have a significant edge over 
[40], and our results develop a new understanding of IDS performance limitations. 
3.5 Evaluation Methodology 
Our evaluation methodology is based on the concept of analyzing the system capacity in 
terms of its packet-handling capability by implementing it into different hardware 
configurations and testing platforms. This has been achieved by establishing three 
different test-benches, where every test-bench has been assigned a specific evaluation 
task. Test-bench 1 implements the Snort on mid-range commodity hardware (limited 
processing power and system memory). The results obtained on this platform describe 
the efficacy of NIDS implementation at this level. Test-benches 2 and 3 utilize high-
range commodity hardware built on an Intel Xeon Dual Quad-Core processor using 4.0 
GB RAM. These test-benches analyzed the system performance on host and virtual 
configurations respectively. The system capability has been also analyzed by observing 
its response to known attacks in Test-bench 1; however, this criterion has not been 
considered for other test-benches due to lack of space. Table 3.1 summarizes the three 
test benches and the parameters set for each test bench.  
In the initial phase of the research, the aim was to measure the performance of Snort 
installed on normal machine and using host and virtual configuration. Both normal and 
attack traffic are injected in the testing network to evaluate the detection coverage. The 
obtained results from test bench 1 have showed a proportional relationship between 
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capability of packet processing and detection coverage. The inability of Snort to handle 
all received packets online is a direct cause to the low rate in detection capacity. 
Consequently, the focus has been shifted from evaluating the detection coverage to the 
capacity of packet handling. For this reason, in test bench 2 and test bench 3 , attack 
traffic is not considered because missing a packet carrying attack evidence leads to 
missing the corresponding alert. In addition, to provide a precise measurement of 
detection coverage of any IDS, it is necessary to insure that all other related factors have 
no effect.   
Table 3.1  Summary of test benches. 
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Test bench 1 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Test bench 2 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Test bench 3 No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Snort IDS has been selected for our testing for being an open source and the de facto 
standard for IDS/IPS. It is the most widely deployed intrusion detection and prevention 
technology worldwide. It has the most numerous and active community in the open 
source NIDS field today. In addition, several commercial products use Snort as their 
core technology and Snort signatures are included in many industry security systems. 
As a network device, Snort has been developed to be a lightweight system and fast in 
order to keep up with increasing network bandwidths. Moreover, Snort is flexible and 
can be used in different ways from a simple network sniffer to true gateway IDS. It is 
configurable, its signatures can be customized and developed easily, and its inner 
working can be modified according to the operation environment. In contrast, other 
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open sources IDS platforms such as Bro, lack of an up-to-date set of signatures and lack 
of full support and product documentation. 
3.6  Test-bench 1 
The network is composed of six machines using a Pro-Curve Series 2900 switch [147], 
as shown in Figure 3.2. The test-bench comprises a number of high-performance PCs 
running open-source tools to generate background traffic, run attack signatures and 
monitor network performance.  
Win XP SP2
Win XP SP2Win XP SP2
Win XP SP2
Linux 2.6
Linux 2.6 Linux 2.6
Attacking Hosts Receiving Hosts  
Traffic Generation Hosts
Virtual Platforms
Linux 2.6
 
Figure 3.2  Test Bench-1. 
3.6.1 Hardware description 
The hardware description of the network is shown in Table 3.2. The network 
components are described as follows: 
Traffic generators 
Two machines are configured to generate network traffic on Windows XP SP 2 and 
Linux 2.6, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.2. The distribution of network traffic is 
TCP (70%), UDP (20%) and ICMP (10%).  
Attacking host 
Two machines are configured to generate attacks/exploits on Windows XP SP 2 and 
Linux 2.6, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
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IDS machine (Snort) 
In the test-bench, Snort is operated on both host and virtual machines for both Windows 
and Linux platforms. This has been done to analyze the performance of Snort using the 
limited resources of a virtual machine as well as with the full processing capability of a 
host computer. Snort version 2.8.3 [23] has been selected for evaluation. 
Table 3.2 Network Description – Test-bench 1. 
Machine Type Hardware Description  Tools Used 
Network traffic/ back ground 
traffic generator (Win XP SP2)  
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet). 
Traffic Generators: NetCPS [148], 
Tfgen[149], Http Traffic Gen [150], 
LAN Traffic Version 2 [134] and D-
ITG Version 2.6 [133]  
Network traffic/ back ground 
traffic generator (Linux 2.6)  
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbpss RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet). 
Traffic Generators: D-ITG Version 
2.6 [133] and hping Version 2 [151]  
Attack Machine 
•  Win XP SP2 
•  Linux 2.6  
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet). 
Attacking tool: Metasploit 
framework [26]  
IDS Machines 
•  Snort – Win XP SP2  
•  Snort – Linux 2.6   
   
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet). 
•  IDS:Snort [23], Traffic Monitor: 
Bandwidth Monitor [152] on 
Win XP SP2  
•  IDS:Snort and Traffic Monitor: 
nload [153] on Linux 2.6.  
Switch ProCurve Series 2900 , 10 Gbps switch with 24x1 Gbps ports and 2x10 Gbps 3CR17762-91-UK 
ports. 
 
 Snort was also tested for its accuracy on the different OS platforms (Windows and 
Linux). The platforms were tested by injecting a mixture of heavy network traffic and 
scripted attacks through the Snort host. Snort.conf file in its default configuration was 
selected for evaluation. The performance of Snort was also evaluated under the 
following variant conditions: 
  Generating attacks from different OS hosts. 
  Varying traffic payload, protocol and attack traffic in different scenarios, as shown 
in Table 3.3.  
  Subjecting it to hardware constraints of virtual machine configurations. 
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Table 3.3  Test-bench 1 scenarios. 
Scenario
Network Traffic
(PC 1)
Network Traffic
(PC 2)
Attack
Machine
(Metasploit)
IDS Machine 
(Snort)
Alpha Host Windows Host Windows Host Linux 2.6 Virtual Windows
Bravo Host Windows Host Windows Host Linux 2.6 Virtual Linux 2.6
Charlie Host Windows Host Windows Host Linux 2.6 Host Windows
Delta Host Windows Host Windows Host Linux 2.6 Host Linux 2.6
Echo Host Windows Host Windows Host Win Host Linux 2.6
 
3.6.2  Results 
Snort was evaluated on the basis of network traffic ranging from 100 Mbps to 1.0 Gbps 
(divided into five different test scenarios). The other parameters selected for evaluation 
include network utilization, CPU usage and Snort CPU usage. Snort performance in 
terms of packets analyzed, packets dropped, alerts/logs and detection statuses have also 
been considered for critical evaluation. 
3.6.2.1 Scenario Alpha 
Snort was configured to run using the performance-limiting configuration of a Windows 
XP SP 2 virtual machine. It was subjected to heavy background traffic and attack 
exploits (from a well-resourced Linux host). The results obtained are shown in Figure 
3.3. They demonstrate that the performance of Snort deteriorates markedly as network 
traffic load increases.  
3.6.2.2 Scenario Bravo  
Snort was configured to run using the performance-limiting configuration of a Linux 
virtual machine and the attacker was a well-resourced Linux host. The results obtained, 
as shown in Figure 3.4, identify similar performance limitations as found in Scenario 
Alpha. However, an improvement can be observed when Snort runs on the same OS as 
that of the attacking host.  
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Attack Platform: Host Linux 2.6 vs Snort Platform: Virtual Windows
Parameter 100 – 200 Mbps 500 – 700 Mbps 800 Mbps – 1.0 Gbps
Network Utilization 12 % 56% 90%
CPU Usage 50 – 70% 90 – 100% 95 – 100%
Snort CPU Usage 40 – 50% 80 – 90% 90%
Packets Analysed 72.5% 66% 38 %
Packets Dropped 27.5% 34% 62 %
Alerts & Logged 83% 62% 28%
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Figure 3.3 Results – Scenario Alpha. 
Attack Platform: Host Linux 2.6 vs Snort Platform: Virtual Linux 2.6
Parameter 100 – 200 Mbps 500 – 700 Mbps 800 Mbps – 1.0 Gbps
Network Utilization 12 % 54 % 90%
CPU Usage 50 – 70% 88 - 95% 90 – 100%
Snort CPU Usage 40 – 50% 75 - 85% 90-95%
Packets Analysed 75 % 62 % 45%
Packets Dropped 25 % 38 % 55 %
Alerts & Logged 85% 64 % 36 %
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Figure 3.4 Results – Scenario Bravo. 
3.6.2.3  Scenario Charlie  
Snort was configured to run using a well-resourced Windows platform with the attacker 
on a Linux host. The results obtained are shown in Figure 3.5. Snort performance 
declines as a result of being run on a different OS platform to that of the attacker. 
However, an improvement can be observed in comparison to the equivalent virtual 
scenario. 
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Attack Platform: Host Linux 2.6 vs Snort Platform: Host Windows
Parameter 100 – 200 Mbps 500 – 700 Mbps 800 Mbps – 1.0 Gbps
Network Utilization 13% 53% 90%
CPU Usage 20 – 30% 30 - 35% 35 – 40%
Snort CPU Usage 15 – 20% 20 - 25% 25-30%
Packets Analysed 98.2 % 38 % 27 %
Packets Dropped 1.8 % 62 % 73 %
Alerts & Logged 100% 47 % 24 %
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Figure 3.5  Results – Scenario Charlie. 
3.6.2.4   Scenario Delta 
Snort and the attacker were both configured using a well-resourced Linux platform as 
host. The results obtained are shown in Figure 3.6. Comparatively, an improved 
performance for Snort can be observed in this scenario, as both attacker and Snort are 
using the same OS (Linux).  
Attack Platform: Host Linux 2.6 vs Snort Platform: Host Linux 2.6
Parameter 100 – 200 Mbps 500 – 700 Mbps 800 Mbps – 1.0 Gbps
Network Utilization 21% 55% 95%
CPU Usage 18 – 25% 29 - 36% 38 – 43%
Snort CPU Usage 15 – 20% 22 - 27% 29-36%
Packets Analysed 98.5% 47 % 39 %
Packets Dropped 1.5% 53 % 61 %
Alerts & Logged 100% 67 % 33 %
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Figure 3.3 Results – Scenario Delta. 
3.6.2.5  Scenario Echo 
Snort is configured to run on a well-resourced Linux platform and the attacker on a 
Windows host. The results obtained are shown in Figure 3.7. Similar results were 
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obtained to those in Scenario Charlie, where the OS platform used Snort and attacker are 
reversed.  
Attack Platform: Host Windows vs Snort Platform: Host Linux 2.6
Parameter 100 – 200 Mbps 500 – 700 Mbps 800 Mbps – 1.0 Gbps
Network Utilization 15% 54 % 96%
CPU Usage 25 – 30% 32 - 35% 38 – 45 %
Snort CPU Usage 18 – 22% 22 - 26% 27-35%
Packets Analysed 99 % 42 % 35 %
Packets Dropped 1 % 58 % 65 %
Alerts & Logged 100% 65 % 35 %
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Figure 3.7  Results – Scenario Echo. 
3.7  Test-bench 2 
Snort has been implemented on a fully resourceful host machine built on a dual quad-
core processor using 4.0 Gb RAM. The configuration of the network machines are 
shown in Table 3.4.  
Table.3.4 Network description – Test-bench 2 and Test-bench 3. 
Machine Type Hardware Description  Tools Used 
Network traffic/ back ground 
traffic generator 
 (Win XP SP2)  
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet), L2 Cache 2 x 
4.0 MB, FSB 1066 MHz.  
Traffic Generators: NetCPS [148], 
Tfgen [149], Http Traffic Gen [150], 
LAN Traffic Version 2 [134] and D-
ITG Version 2.6 [133]  
Network traffic/ back ground 
traffic generator 
(Linux 2.6)  
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, Network Card 
(Broadcom NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet), L2 Cache 2 x 
4.0 MB, FSB 1066 MHz.  
Traffic Generators: D-ITG Version 
2.6 [133] and hping Version 2 [151]  
IDS Machine  Dell Precision T5400, Intel Xeon Dual Quad-Core 2.0 
GHz, 4 GB RAM, L2 cache 2x6 MB, FSB 1066 MHz,  
PCIe, Network Interface Card, 10 Gbps Chelsio, HD: 
1000 GB, Buffer 32 MB, SATA.  
IDS: Snort[23]  
Receiving Hosts 
•  Win XP SP2  
•  Linux 2.6   
   
Dell Precision T3400, Intel Quad-Core, Q6600 2.40 GHz. 
2 GB RAM,  PCIe, 1.0 Gbps RJ45, NIC 10 Gbps Chelsio 
on Win XP SP2 host and Linux 2.6 host has Broadcom 
NetXtremo Gigabit Ethernet.  
•  Win XP SP2 – LAN Traffic 
Generator  
•  Linux 2.6 – D-ITG Traffic 
Generator  
Switch ProCurve Series 2900 , 10 Gbps Switch with 24x1 Gbps ports and 2x10 Gbps 3CR17762-91-UK 
ports. 
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Figure 3.8 describes the test-bench where Snort been respectively evaluated on the fully 
resourceful platforms built on Windows Server 2008, Linux Server 2.6 and Free BSD 
7.0. The system's performance is gauged in terms of its packet-handling capacity of the 
application built on respective platforms for different types of network traffic. 
Win XP SP2
Win XP SP2
Win XP SP2
Linux 2.6
Free BSD 7.0
Linux 2.6
Receiving Hosts  
Traffic Generation Hosts
Respective Snort Hosts 
Linux 2.6
 
Figure 3.8 Test-bench 2 – Host configuration 
3.7.1 Evaluation methodology 
 Different packet sizes (128, 256, 512, 1024 and 1514 bytes) were generated, and 
Snort’s performance at the following traffic loads was evaluated: 750Mbps, 1.0 
Gbps, 1.5 Gbps and 2.0 Gbps, respectively. 
 Varying traffic payload: UDP and mixed TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. 
 Snort’s performance characteristics were evaluated – packets received, packets 
analysed, packets dropped and CPU usage – at various packet sizes and bandwidth 
levels. 
 Duration of test: 1, 5 and 10 minutes, where the average value of the results 
obtained has been taken. 
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3.7.2  Results 
The response of the IDS (Snort), i.e. dropped packets, on UDP traffic injected in various 
packet sizes and bandwidths is shown in Table 3.5; each scenario is discussed in the 
following paragraphs:  
Table 3.5 Host-based configuration results (Packets dropped(%)) – UDP traffic. 
traffic OS 128B 256B 512B 1024B 1514B 
 
750 
MB 
FreeBsd 15.4 9.45 3.29 6.64 6.26 
Linux 56.91 52.67 27.83 6.72 6.4 
Windows 51.76 50.62 25.32 6.83 6.35 
 
1 G 
FreeBsd 52.6 32.15 28.4 25.04 24.89 
Linux 72.7 69.04 65.88 55.26 53.35 
Windows 68.05 66.82 61.97 53.6 52.9 
 
1.5 G 
FreeBsd 66.7 62.03 46.22 41.6 40.8 
Linux 77.6 71.5 67.32 57.1 55.5 
Windows 80.6 74.7 70.23 68.31 64.6 
 
2 G 
FreeBsd 74.07 69.8 65.3 50.54 49.4 
Linux 78.04 75.8 69.6 59.3 57.3 
Windows 93.5 91.0 88.85 77.5 70.8  
3.7.2.1  UDP traffic 
i.  UDP traffic – 750 Mbps. The Performance of all OSs linearly improved from 
smaller packet sizes (128 Bytes) to larger ones (1514 Bytes); however, Free BSD shows 
a significant edge over the others in all ranges of packet sizes, as shown in Figure 3.9.  
 
Figure 3.9  Results: packet dropped, UDP traffic – 750 Mbps. 
ii.  UDP traffic– 1.0 Gbps. Increase in the bandwidth shows a decline in the 
performance of the system, resulting in more packet loss. A considerably uniform 
response has been observed in all categories of packet sizes from all platforms tested. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
128B 256B 512B 1024B 1514B
FreeBsd
Linux
Windows
75 
 
This scenario also showed a comparatively improved (though not ideal) performance for 
Free BSD as shown in Figure 3.10 . 
 
Figure 3.10  Results: packets dropped, UDP traffic – 1.0 Gbps. 
iii.  UDP traffic – 1.5 Gbps. A further increase in the traffic bandwidth resulted in 
higher packet loss by the system. Approximately similar performances were observed 
for all packet sizes, the response indicating that Free BSD performed better, followed by 
Linux, and then by Windows in last place as shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11  Results: packets dropped, UDP traffic – 1.5 Gbps. 
iv.  UDP traffic – 2.0 Gbps. At 2.0 Gbps of traffic input, the performance of Windows 
seemed totally compromised at 128 Bytes of packet sizes. The platform lost virtually all 
the input traffic and performed no evaluation. The performance gradually increases for 
higher packet sizes, in a similar pattern as that observed for the lower traffic bandwidths 
as shown in Figure 3.12. This, however, displayed a highly compromised performance 
for all platforms, identifying strong limitations in handling input traffic reaching 2.0 
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Gbps. In practice, system built on Free BSD, Linux and Windows platforms once 
subjected to 2.0 Gbps of input traffic suffer heavy packet loss. 
 
Figure 3.12  Results: packets dropped, UDP Traffic – 2.0 Gbps 
3.7.2.2  Mixed traffic 
The mixture of TCP (70%), UDP (20%) and ICMP (10%) traffic was generated 
replicating realistic network flow as follows: 
 Generating random packet sizes and observing system response – packet handling 
capacity. 
 Traffic bandwidth limited to 1.0 Gbps – supporting commodity hardware on account 
of system implementation as a test-bench. 
 Recording packet drop statistics for all three Snort platforms built on Free BSD, 
Linux and Windows respectively.  
The main reason to conduct this test is to ascertain the performance of a system under 
realistic network conditions. The results here also followed quite similar patterns of 
system response. Table 3.6 describes the results obtained. Free BSD showed quite good 
performance in terms of handling mixed traffic for the bandwidth of 1.0 Gbps on a 
multi-core implementation. 
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Table 3.6  Host-based configuration results – mixed traffic 
Operating System Dropped Packets% 
FreeBSD 21.7 
Linux 27.2 
Windows 26.3  
3.8 Test-bench 3 
Virtualization is a framework for abstracting the resources of a computer into multiple 
execution platforms by creating multiple machines on a single computer. Each machine 
operates on the allocated hardware and can afford multiple instances of applications 
[154]. This concept has been successfully incepted within the industry/business 
community. The mechanics of system virtualization for the implementation of network 
security tools have been considered appropriate by academics in the field of information 
security [155]. 
The concept has been developed to address issues relating to the reliability, security, 
costs and complexity of the network/systems. It has successfully been used for the 
processing of legacy applications, ensuring load balancing requirements, resource 
sharing and tasking among virtual machines by using autonomic computing techniques. 
The technique has also shown merits in the situation where an application failure on one 
machine does not affect the other. In addition, ease of isolation allows multiple OS 
platforms to be built on one machine running variable instances of applications. This 
has made the concept quite fascinating for the research community [156]. The test-
bench is distributed into three parts and configured around a ProCurve series 2900 
switch, as shown in Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13  Test-bench 3 – Virtual configuration. 
The basic idea of the evaluation process revolves around packet capturing and 
evaluation by virtual platforms and Snort. Two machines for traffic generation have 
been selected: Linux 2.6 and Windows XP SP2 platforms. Similarly, the traffic 
reception machines were also deployed to fulfil network requirements. Details of the 
traffic generation tools are shown in Table 3.4. 
The virtual platform running Snort has been configured on a dual quad-core processor. 
The machine hardware details are listed in Table 3.4. The system is built on the 
Windows 2008 Server platform and three separate virtual platforms have been created 
Windows XP SP2, Linux 2.6 and Free BSD 7.1. Snort is running simultaneously on all 
the virtual machines and similar traffic loads and types are injected onto all platforms.  
3.8.1  Evaluation methodology 
In order to ascertain the capability of Snort to handle high-speed network traffic on  
virtual platforms, we proceeded as follows: 
 Parallel Snort sessions were run on all virtual machines. 
 The machines were injected with similar traffic-load characteristics (UDP and TCP 
traffic) for 10 minutes.  
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 Different packet sizes (128, 256, 512, 1024 and 1460 bytes) were generated and 
Snort’s performance at the following traffic loads was evaluated: 100 Mbps, 250 
Mbps, 500 Mbps, 750 Mbps, 1.0 Gbps and 2.0 Gbps, respectively. 
 Snort’s performance characteristics were evaluated – packets received, packets 
analysed, packets dropped, and CPU usage at various packet sizes and bandwidth 
levels. 
 Packets received were compared at both the host OS and the virtual platforms 
running the Snort applications.  
 During the course of the tests, no changes were made in OS implementation, 
specifically Linux using NAPI- MMMP
1
 and Free BSD using PF-RING -BPF
2
 [156]. 
3.8.2  Results  
The results are distributed over UDP and TCP traffic types respectively. It was observed 
that the total packets transmitted from the traffic-generating PCs was equivalent to the 
number of packets received at the host machine/OS running virtual platforms, as shown 
in Table 3.7; however this was not the case once the system was found
3
non-responsive.  
Table 3.7  Packets received at host OS. 
Bandwidth 128 Bytes 256 Bytes 512 Bytes 1024 Bytes 1460 Bytes
100 MB 60 35.82 17.77 10.56 6.96
250 MB 178.1 94.14 48.00 18.34 20.22
500 MB 358.3 148.29 92.56 46.2 39.00
750 MB System Non Responsive 144.72 91.56 45.23
1.0 GB System Non Responsive 167.40 78.00
2.0 GB System Non Responsive
Total Packets Received at OS (Millions) – UDP 
Total Packets Received at OS (Millions) – TCP 
Bandwidth 50 Connections 100 Connections 200 Connections
100 MB 10 26.7 21.60
250 MB 31.86 39.763 48.69
500 MB 67.90 108.56 84.098
750 MB 80.29 113.72 124.58
1.0 GB 102.51 118.144 148.982
2.0 GB 147.54 170.994 221.28
 
                                                          
1 Modified device driver packet handling procedures. 
2 Berkley Packet Filter. 
3 In non-responsive situations we consider 100% packet loss. 
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3.8.2.1 UDP traffic 
The results below are described in relation to packet size, bandwidth (i.e. traffic load), 
and the virtual OS platform running the Snort application:  
i.  Snort response for packet sizes of 128 and 256 Bytes 
 Linux shows quite good performance for these packet sizes up to 250 Mbps of 
traffic load; its performance declined at higher bandwidth levels, as shown in 
Figure 3.14. The system was found non-responsive at traffic loads of 750 Mbps 
and above.  
 Windows shows good performance for 128 Bytes packet sizes at 100 Mbps 
loading only. Its performance is compromised at higher loading levels, as shown 
in Figure 3.14. The system was also found non-responsive at traffic loads of 750 
Mbps and above. 
 Free BSD performs slightly better than Windows, as shown in Figure 3.14. The 
system was also found non-responsive at traffic loads of 750 Mbps and above.  
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Figure 3.14  Snort packets received (%) – UDP traffic (128 Bytes & 256 Bytes). 
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ii.  Snort response for packet sizes of 512 and 1024 Bytes 
 Linux shows quite good performance for traffic loads of up to 500 Mbps for all 
packet sizes, as shown in Figure 3.15. However, the Linux system was found 
non-responsive at traffic loads of 1.0 Gbps and above for 512 Byte packet sizes, 
and at 2.0 Gbps for packet sizes of 1024 Bytes.  
 Windows also performed satisfactorily at traffic loads of 250 Mbps and 500 
Mbps for packet sizes of 512 Bytes and 1024 Bytes respectively, as shown in 
Figure 3.15. The system found non-responsive at traffic loads of 1.0 Gbps and 
above for packet sizes of 512 Bytes, and 2.0 Gbps for packet sizes of 1024 
Bytes.  
 Free BSD responds a bit better than Windows, as shown in Figure 3.15. The 
system was found non-responsive at traffic loads greater than 1.0 Gbps for 
packet sizes of 512 Bytes, and 2.0 Gbps for packet sizes of 1024 Bytes.  
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Figure 3.15  Snort packets received (%) – UDP traffic (512 Bytes & 1024 Bytes) 
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iii. Snort response for packet sizes of 1460 Bytes 
 Linux shows significantly better performance for packet sizes of 1460 Bytes for 
traffic loads up to 1.0 Gbps. However, the system found non-responsive at 2.0 
Gbps of loading, as shown in Figure 3.16.  
 Windows also showed good performance up to 750 Mbps of loading. The 
system was found non-responsive at 2.0 Gbps traffic loads, as shown in Figure 
3.16.  
 Free BSD responded a bit better than Windows. The system was found non-
responsive at 2.0 GB traffic loads, as shown in Figure 3.16.  
3.8.2.2  TCP traffic 
The results of 512 Byte packet sizes have been included in this section due to lack of 
space. The results have been accumulated on the basis of successful connections (50, 
100 and 200 respectively). Packets received at the host platform/OS are shown in Table 
3.7. 
i. Snort response for 50 connections – 512 Bytes 
 Linux exhibits quite good performance up to 750 Mbps of loading; however, its 
performance declined at higher traffic loads, as shown in Figure 3.16.  
 Windows was acceptable up to 250 Mbps of loading but its performance was 
reduced for higher traffic loads, as shown in Figure 3.16. 
 Free BSD performed a bit better than Windows, as shown in Figure 3.16.  
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Figure  3.16  Snort packets Rx (%) – UDP (1460 Bytes) and TCP (50 connections). 
ii. Snort response for 100/200 connections – 512 Bytes  
 Linux exhibited quite good performance up to 250 Mbps of loading with 
minimum packet loss. However, its response linearly declined for higher traffic 
loads, as shown in Figure 3.17. 
 Windows also exhibited a similar performance level up to 250 Mbps loading 
levels, but its performance declined for higher traffic loads, as shown in Figure 
3.17. 
 Free BSD performs a bit better than Windows, as shown in Figure 3.17. 
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Figure 3.17  Snort packets received (%) – TCP Traffic (100 & 200 connections). 
3.9  Analysis 
3.9.1  Test-bench 1 
As expected, Snort's performance was found to be dependent on its supporting hardware 
components (CPU, memory, NIC etc.). In the virtual scenarios, Snort was found to be 
less accurate for all categories of background traffic. Conversely, the performance of 
Snort improved when run natively on its host machine by utilizing all of the available 
hardware resources.  
Resource constraints in the virtual machine have affected the overall performance of 
Snort, resulting in a high number of packets dropped and a reduction of alerts logged. 
The statistics for percentages of dropped packets are shown in Figure 3.18. 
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Figure 3.18  Packets dropped. 
 Background traffic plays a significant role in the performance of Snort. The 
higher the traffic, the lower Snort's performance. The impact of background 
traffic can be ascertained by analyzing the statistics of alerts generated in 
different categories, as shown in Figure 3.19. 
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Figure 3.19  Alerts and logs (success rate). 
 Traffic within the range of 100–400 Mbps has no significant impact on Snort's 
performance when run natively on host machines. However, its performance 
declines in a virtual setup. Snort was found to be accurate in all scenarios.  
86 
 
 A slight increase in background traffic, in the range of 500–700 Mbps, causes 
deterioration in Snort's performance. This degradation is approximately the same 
in all scenarios.  
 With high background traffic levels, ranging from 800 Mbps–1.0 Gbps, Snort 
starts bleeding. The number of alerts and log entries suffers significant 
reduction, thus identifying an evident limitation in Snort’s detection capability. 
 In general, Snort was found to be inaccurate when handling traffic levels above 
500 Mbps. There was also a significant performance decline when the traffic 
load exceeded 500 Mbps. 
 Snort was found to be more effective in the configuration where both attacker 
and host are on the same OS. 
 Snort's performance is significantly reduced in the 1.0 Gbps scenarios.  
 System performance in relation to packet capture capabilities was also found to 
be dependent on CPU usage. The higher the CPU usage, the lower the number 
of packets captured for analysis by the Snort application. Packets received at the 
virtual platform for evaluation by Snort are significantly less than the packets 
captured at the host platform. However, lower amounts of packets received by 
virtual platforms result in improved packet analysis statistics by Snort. For 
example, in the Windows virtual platform, Snort analyzed 38% of the total 
packets received at system level, whereas in the host Windows configuration, 
this value was reduced to 27%. The better packet analysis percentage produced 
by the virtual platform is due to the fact that Snort analyzed a considerably 
lower amount of packets, whereas the packets captured for analysis at host level 
were significantly more. Thus, it can by no means be concluded that the virtual 
platform performed better than the fully resourced host. 
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 The performance of Snort on a Linux platform was observed to be 
comparatively better than that of Windows. The results shown in Figure 3.20 are 
based on the scenarios in which the Snort and attacker are on well-resourced 
host machines.  
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Figure 3.20  Comparison – Snort on Linux and Win. 
3.9.2  Test-bench 2 
The shaded cells in Table 3.4 indicate the case of the I/O disk bottleneck, when the 
queue for I/O reading and writing exceeds an acceptable limit and the hosting machine 
is no longer able to process all the traffic (as discussed in detail below). The overall 
assessment of system performance indicates following: 
 Snort running on Free BSD has achieved the greatest performance in 
comparison to other OSs for all traffic volumes and packet sizes. 
 Windows and Linux showed quite similar performances in all scenarios.  
 Small sizes of UDP packets are computationally expensive and the performance 
of Snort declines in proportion to the increase in traffic bandwidth.  
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 Considering 1024 Bytes as an average packet size for normal real-life traffic, the 
raw processing rate of the Snort application showed acceptable performance up 
to a bandwidth of 750 Mbps for all OSs and 1.0 Gbps for Free BSD.  
 The CPU and memory usage of the system for packet sizes of 1024 Bytes (UDP 
traffic) have been recorded, as shown in Figure 3.21. It has been observed that 
more than 60% of the hardware strength is available for traffic ranging from 100 
Mbps to 2.0 Gbps.  
 
Figure 3.21  CPU and memory usage. 
3.9.3  Test-bench 3 
We have identified two basic factors that contribute to the packet-drop limitation in 
virtual platforms running NIDS in high-speed environments.  
 OS and application incompatibility  
 The results have identified different packet capture performance levels by the 
respective OS platforms. The packets received by virtual platforms are actually the 
packets received by the Snort application. Overall Linux performed quite well in 
comparison to Windows and Free BSD for both UDP and TCP traffic.  The results lead 
to the following conclusions: 
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i.  UDP Traffic 
 All platforms respond well for packet sizes greater than 512 Bytes. 
 For packet sizes of 128 Bytes and 256 Bytes, Linux performs significantly better 
than others; however its performance declines above 250 Mbps loading. Windows 
and Free BSD performed well for 128 Bytes at 100 Mbps trffic-load only. 
 All OS platforms hanged at packet sizes of 128 Bytes and 256 Bytes above 500 
Mbps of traffic-load. 
 There were practically no measurable results from all the platforms at 2.0 Gbps 
loading for all packet sizes. 
 The overall performance standing measured was Linux, followed by Free BSD, with 
Windows in last position. 
ii. TCP Traffic 
 The systems remain alive for all packet sizes and number of connections for traffic-
loads upto 2.0 Gbps.   
 The performance of the systems linearly declined in response to increases in the 
number of connections and traffic-load.   
 Linux outperforms Windows and Free BSD in all the tested scenarios.   
iii. Evaluating OS packet handling competency 
In order to reach a definite conclusion concerning OS incompatibility as regards the 
virtualization of NIDS in high-speed networks environments, the research has been 
extended to conduct some additional tests. These tests comprised of three virtual 
machines built on the same OS platform (Free BSD). The Snort application was 
activated on all platforms and similar tests were conducted as described in section 3.8.1.   
90 
 
In the first scenario, with Free BSD configured on three parallel virtual platforms 
similar performance metrics were observed. As such the performance of Free BSD was 
found to be quite similar to the previously executed test-bench scenario and only a small 
amount of variation was observed. In the second two-machine scenario, an 
improvement in performance was observed; however performance levels declined at 
higher traffic-loads. Due to a paucity of space the results of 512 Bytes of packet size for 
UDP Traffic have been only included as shown in Figure 3.22. The graph shows the 
average performance of systems in each scenario.  
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Figure.3.22 Snort Packet Received (%) – Free BSD on Three/ Two virtual platforms 
The performance of Free BSD in the two scenarios has identified a direct link between 
packet capturing ability of the system and the use of hardware resource sharing. The 
results shows that two platforms perform significantly well in comparison to the use of 
three virtual machines. Thus, it can be concluded that the packet capturing performance 
for NIDS when run as multiple virtual instances is limited due to the impact of hardware 
resource sharing and there is no direct relationship to OS itself. Similar tests were also 
conducted on Linux and Windows platforms; due to space restrictions the results have 
not been included. Both platforms behaved in a similar pattern as that of Free BSD thus 
confirming the drawn conclusion.   
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Hardware incompatibility in virtualization   
The dynamics of virtualization requires the host OS and the virtual machine software 
(VMware Server) to be stored in the physical memory (RAM) of the host machine. The 
virtual machines (Windows XP SP 2, Linux 2.6 and Free BSD 7.0) running on a 
VMware Server have been respectively allocated virtual RAM and disk space on the 
physical hard drive of the host machine. The processes/applications running on the 
virtual machines use these simulated virtual RAMs and hard disks for the various 
operations shown in Figure 3.23. 
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Figure.3.23  Virtualization concept. 
Our test-bench has multiple instances of Snort and packet-capture libraries running on 
different virtual platforms each with a different OS. The packets captured by each 
virtual machine are less than the packets received by the NIC, thus identifying packet 
loss. The basic cause of packet loss at each OS, apart from the losses incurred by Snort 
during evaluation, is the bottleneck caused by a low disk data transfer rate. The disk I/O 
statistics as shown in Figure 3.24 reflect the hardware limitations in handling multiple 
read/write operations. At 300 MB/sec of traffic load, the disk I/O capacity touches 
100%, thus its performance at higher loads can be easily ascertained.  
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The memory and storage for each virtual machine has actually been allocated on the 
physical storage resources (i.e. hard disk) of the host machine. Packets received by the 
NIC without any loss are transferred to the hard-disk buffer at the PCI rate (4/8 Gbps). 
From this buffer, these packets are required to be written to the disk at the buffer-to-host 
transfer rate of 300 MB/sec (SATA Hard Drive) [157]; thus a huge gap between the 
disk-transfer rate and the incoming traffic load exists. In addition, when traffic is fed to 
all virtual machines simultaneously (in parallel mode), the disk is physically only able 
to write to one location at a time. Thus any disk-write instance to a virtual machine will 
cause packet drops on another. There are also some additional packet losses due to 
context switching within the hard disk.  
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Figure.3.24  Statistics the I/O system (SATA 300) hard drive. 
In order to augment our analytical stance showing that hardware is one of the major 
bottlenecks for the efficacy of the virtualization concept for NIDS in high-speed 
networks, the disk queue length counter has been utilized as shown in Figure 3.25. In 
normal circumstances, the average disk queue length should be three or less (its ideal 
value) [158]. However, in our test network it is observed to be always greater than the 
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ideal value for the traffic ranges measured at 2.0 Gbps [159].  
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Figure.3.25  Disk queue (SATA 300) hard drive. 
3.10  Discussion of Snort performance 
3.10.1  Packet processing 
Network IDSs and other network monitoring systems are packet-based systems that 
require packet acquisition from the network wire. A good packet capturing response by 
the NIDS towards variant traffic reduces the probability of a system becoming 
compromised. Factors that affect the packet capturing performance of a NIDS in a 
Gigabit Ethernet environment include i) host configuration (hardware and software) 
parameters and ii) application-specific parameters (NIDS). 
Processing packets can result in a bottleneck for such systems, particularly with high-
speed traffic. When these systems become unable to process incoming packets inline, 
the packets are dropped in order to release system resources (e.g. buffer). The serial 
packet processing paradigm of Snort implies that a single packet can be processed at a 
time. The other packets are queued in a buffer, and if the waiting time exceeds a 
threshold, Snort starts dropping packets for performance reasons. If Snort runs in 
passive mode, it causes attacks to be missed and violates the coverage requirement. 
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Furthermore, Snort performs a stateful analysis for packet processing (e.g. TCP 
reassembly), and if a packet is dropped, this impacts resource utilisation (e.g. CPU and 
memory).  
3.10.2  Multi-core processing 
Multi-processing has been introduced using a combination of two or more cores 
(processors) integrated into a single chip (integrated circuit) to improve performance. 
However, most legacy applications do not utilise this higher capability because they 
have been developed for a single processor even if they are run on multi-core systems. 
The core of Snort, for example, has been developed based on a uniprocessor 
architecture [24]. In order to exploit current optimization, these applications have to be 
redesigned to support multithreading. A packet-processing mechanism is one of the 
critical processes that needs to be enhanced with the existence of multi-core processors. 
[143] proposed pipelining and flow-pining approaches to improve packet processing in 
Snort by exploiting multi-core processors. He has shown that running Snort on a multi-
core processor does not add any improvement in performance. Modifications on Snort 
have been implemented to allow multithreading mechanisms. The parallelism concept 
has been employed to spread Snort functions over four cores, which achieves 
considerable enhancement. [144] also presented strategies for parallel packet processing 
on multi-core systems by making Snort multithreaded. Several methods have been 
implemented by separating threads (e.g. a thread is allocated for packet processing and 
another one for event handling). However, this mechanism has an impact on CPU cache 
performance and imposes an extra overhead.  
3.10.3  PCI bus and disk input/ output (I/O) operations 
PCI bus architecture directly influences the operational efficiency of memory and 
storage devices. Current system architectures identify two bottlenecks in packet-
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capturing accuracy: bus traffic load and disk throughput. When writing to a disk, packet 
capture libraries pass data to the system bus twice, once from the network interface card 
to memory, and a second time from memory to disk. Thus the actual traffic load 
available to the PCI bus is half that of the traffic load [145]. Data-intensive applications 
and the huge amounts of data required to be stored in enterprise networks demand 
highly efficient I/O operations to avoid performance bottlenecks. The invention of 
multi-core processors has enhanced the capability of systems to support multiple virtual 
machines, yet system performance in relation to disk I/O operations remains limited.  
3.10.4  Packet loss in NIDSs 
Packet loss in high-speed networks is one of the fundamental problems in the 
implementation of NIDSs. Effectiveness of intrusion detection relies on analysis of the 
received packets and any loss results in attacks missed. Numerous efforts have been 
made to address the issues relating to packet loss in high-speed networks. A number of 
techniques focus on securing a balance between the detection capacity of the system and 
the input traffic. A few substantially competent techniques make use of load-balancing 
concepts. These involve the use of a traffic-splitting mechanism where input traffic is 
distributed across the set of detection engines for evaluation and filtering to block the 
traffic destined for unpublished ports. [13] explored a parallel architecture to increase 
the system capacity by splitting traffic into manageable sized slices. The parallel 
architecture for stateful detection described in [146] also bases its logic on splitting the 
traffic and distributing it to detection sensors in a round-robin fashion. 
However, attacks can be also missed due to the nonexistence of related signatures. It has 
been observed early in this chapter the relationship between the percentage of packet 
losses and missed attacks. Hence,  a different approach has been adopted to deal with 
missed attacks in a generic approach. We base our mechanism on the correlation 
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concept to obtain a global security perspective instead of avoidance strategies. This is 
based on assumptions that real attack attempts in typical scenarios consist of coherent 
stages. A framework for alert correlation will be introduced in Chapter 4 to reduce the 
impact of packet loss and missed attacks.  
3.11  Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on ways of determining the efficacy of the widely deployed 
open-source NIDSs, namely Snort, in high-speed network environments. The current 
development in hardware technologies has opened broad prospects for legacy 
applications, particularly software-based ones deployed at network edges. Multi-core 
systems are available and widely used to offer intensive computational opportunities.  
The test scenarios employed involve the evaluation of the application under different 
traffic conditions, and observing the response of the system to known attack signatures. 
The results obtained have shown a number of significant limitations to Snort, on both 
host and virtual configurations. We have confirmed that the underlying host hardware 
plays a prominent role in determining overall system performance. We have further 
shown that performance is further degraded as the number of virtual instances of NIDSs 
is increased, irrespective of the virtual OS used. 
This hardware dependency is exacerbated when running Snort as a virtual machine, and 
it is to be anticipated that running a large number of Snort instances would lead to major 
degradations in performance and detection levels. In general, any limitations in system 
configuration would result in poor performance of the NIDS. The results obtained have 
shown a number of significant limitations in the use of virtual NIDSs, where both 
packet-handling and processing capabilities at different traffic loads were used as the 
primary criteria for defining system performance. Furthermore, It has been 
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demonstrated a number of significant differences in the performance characteristics of 
the three different virtual OS environments in which Snort was run. 
In the pursuit of our objective, the performance of Snort has been analyzed under 
realistic network conditions in contrast to simulated testing environments. The results 
obtained identify a strong dependency from Snort on the host-machine configuration. It 
can be ascertained that Snort is not suitable for all network implementations with high 
volumes of traffic, e.g. more than 750 Mbps.  
It has also been identified the impact of packet loss caused by performance degradation 
upon the overall effectiveness of NIDSs. We intend to introduce a dual solution for both 
packet loss and missed attacks using alert correlation, as will be shown in the following 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4: A REASONING FRAMEWORK FOR ALERT 
CORRELATION 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In an intrusion detection context, none of the main detection approaches (signature-
based and anomaly-based) are fully satisfactory. False positives (detected non-attacks) 
and false negatives (non-detected attacks) are the major limitations of such systems. The 
generated alerts are elementary and in huge numbers. In addition, It has been identified 
in Chapter 3 that even though the attack signature is defined in the attack database, it 
can be missed in high-speed environments. This has made the issue more complicated, 
reducing the attack detection rate. A promising approach is to incorporate a collection of 
security detection systems to increase the detection coverage whilst at the same time 
suppressing the volume of false positives. Hence, alert correlation techniques are used 
to provide a complementary analysis to link elementary alerts and provide a more global 
intrusion view. On the other hand, alerts generated by a single IDS also overwhelm the 
administrator and contain a high percentage of insignificant or irrelevant information. It 
has been widely recognised that real cyber attacks consists of phases that are temporally 
ordered and logically connected. In this thesis, the focus is on the correlation function of 
the alerts sourced from the same IDS. The objective is to discover the logical 
relationships between atomic alerts potentially incorporated in multi-stage attacks. An 
alert correlation and aggregation framework is presented based on requires/provides 
model [121]. 
This chapter explains the fundamental concepts of the proposed alert correlation 
framework. The correlation process is essentially modularized based on an extension of 
the properties and characteristics of the requires/provides model [121]. The description 
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of the knowledge base modelling is based on the capability concept to abstract alerts 
sets to their pre- and post-conditions. Capability conditions formalization is also 
explained, which is mainly based on a proposed hierarchical abstraction of attack 
classes. Algorithms of alert correlation, alert aggregation and graph reduction are 
presented. And finally, the prediction of undetected attack action is discussed.  
4.2  Multi-stage Attack Recognition System (MARS) framework 
The MARS framework is a logical framework supported by various components for 
alert correlation, aggregation, reduction and multi-stage attack recognition, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. Despite the differences between alert correlation approaches, they require 
some common modelling. A knowledge-base that contains attack characteristics is 
either abstracted or using actual attack details. Information acquisition for a knowledge 
base is based on the model employed (e.g. expert systems, artificial intelligence). The 
main drawback of the previous approaches is that they do not provide knowledge 
representation in a systematic way. For instance, requires/provides is a general alarm 
management model that has been used widely in the alert correlation field, but most of 
the proposed paradigms are based on ad hoc methods of knowledge representation. In 
our framework, knowledge elements are designed using a formal knowledge 
formalization exploiting available information provided by IDSs, vulnerability scanners 
and environment configurations. It also allows interactive communication between the 
administrator and the core system engine. Generated events reflecting the detected 
security situation are produced after a series of processing functions to reduce the data 
size. The implementation of the MARS framework will be discussed in Chapter 5. In 
this chapter, the underlying principles of the proposed framework are introduced. 
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Figure 4.1 Multi-stage Attack Recognition System (MARS) framework. 
Figure 4.1 gives a graphical representation of the framework components that 
implemented in MARS system. The first task is performed on all received alerts from 
the IDS sensor e.g. Snort. Alert Collection contains normalized alerts presented in a 
standardized format that are understood by all correlation components. Also, a pre-
processing function is carried out to normalize all required alert attributes such as time 
stamp, source, and destination addresses. The final results of this process are stored in 
Alert Collection which represents the main data input for the MARS engine. MARS 
engine consists of four components: 1) Alert Verification 2) Correlation 3) Aggregation 
and 4) Event generation. The task of Alert Verification component is to take a single 
alert and determine the success of the attack that corresponds to this alert. Failed attack 
should be assigned as a low level of importance. However, these failed attacks are not 
ignored and saved in the database which can be used as evidence to support other 
correlation instances. The Aggregation component is responsible for combining a series 
of alerts that refer to attacks related to the same activity. IDS sensor produces number of 
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alerts corresponding to the same attack which are conducted at the same time. Similar 
alerts are aggregated and a representative alert is assigned based on a temporal 
relationship. These aggregated alerts are saved in the aggregation collection and are 
used to generate multi-stage attack events. The main task of the Correlation component 
is identifying the logical connection between received alerts based on the used 
correlation algorithm. If any link between two alerts is recognized, they are correlated 
and stored in a temporary collection and then transferred to the correlation collection 
after performing the aggregation process. The task of the Event Generation component 
is identifying and constructing multi-stage attack patterns which are composed of a 
sequence of individual alerts. A new event is generated if at least two alerts are 
correlated and then the generated events are stored in the Events collection.  
Two knowledge bases are used by MARS engine to support the correlation process: 1) 
Capabilities Knowledge base and 2) Vulnerabilities knowledge base. The capabilities 
database contains modelled attacks and the relationships between different attacks based 
on pre and post conditions of each modelled attack. Snort signatures are used in the 
current implementation and this can be extended to include attack definitions from other 
sources. Vulnerabilities database contains network and host configuration of the 
protected system in addition to the detected vulnerability information by the available 
scanner.  
The initial task executed by the MARS engine is obtaining alerts from the alert 
collection and then creating encoded capabilities corresponding to each alert. Alerts 
attributes and the information supplied by the used capabilities knowledge base are used 
to build the encoded capabilities collection. Thus, the encoded data is utilized to 
produce the initial correlation information and then it is stored in the Temporary 
Correlated Alerts collection. This collection contains atomic logical connections 
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between alerts which are consequently aggregated to obtain the aggregated collection. 
The generated events (Multi-stage attack instances) are constructed based on the 
aggregated alerts in order to minimize the resulting graph. 
4.3 Requires/provides model 
This model is a general attack model that has been proposed by [121] and is inspired 
from network management systems to deal with network faults. A cyber attack is 
described according to two components: 1) capabilities, and 2) concepts. The idea 
behind this model is that multi-stage intrusions consist of a sequence of steps performed 
by an attacker, and that the later steps are prepared by the early ones. The target system 
information collected from scanning or port mapping are advantages acquired and used 
in order to choose which exploit can be successful. Attacks are modelled in terms of 
abstract concepts and each concept requires certain capabilities (conditions) to occur 
and provides others to be used by another concept. Capabilities are defined as general 
descriptions of the conditions required or provided by each stage of the intrusion i.e. the 
system state that must be satisfied in order to launch an attack. For instance, a 
successful Trojan injection requires particular services to be running in the target system 
and the presence of certain vulnerabilities. 
Formally, capabilities are a higher level of intrusion abstraction that specifies the system 
state after each attack attempt.  The attacker uses the capabilities acquired through some 
of its early actions to generate certain new capabilities. The system state is incorporated 
in attack scenarios if instances of concepts have matched ―required‖ and ―provided‖ 
conditions.  
The capability model proposed by[160] is also based on a requires/provides model for 
logical alert correlation, though the authors used different properties of capabilities. An 
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attack model was presented to build blocks of capabilities in a multi-layer fashion and 
with more expressive definition. [35, 49] have employed a requires/provides model 
using the concept of predicates, which are similar to capabilities. 
Both models mentioned above are reasoning models that aim to discover the causal 
relationships between elementary alerts. Attacker states are abstracted to describe the 
gained privileges and what level of access is obtained. Moreover, the system states are 
modelled into a higher level of abstraction to specify the impact of the attack. 
Relationships between these states are defined to generate rules that determine the 
dependency between alerts.  
Requires/provides model has been selected because it fits our purpose to correlate alerts 
in the same intrusion. It has some advantages over other models: 
1- Ability to uncover the causal relationships between alerts and it is not restricted to 
known attack scenarios. 
2- Ability to characterize complex scenarios or to generalize to unknown attacks. 
3- Attack is represented as a set of capabilities that provides support for the abstract 
attack concepts. 
4- Flexibility and extensibility as the abstract attack concept are defined locally. 
5- It does not require a priori knowledge of a particular scenario.  
6- Numerous attacks can be described implicitly and unknown attack can be defined by 
generalisation. 
Our approach is a variation of the requires/provides model, but differs in the following 
aspects: 
 Different definitions for capabilities and concepts are employed to overcome the 
limitations expressed in other approaches. The work in [121] used a very detailed 
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specification language called JIGSAW to describe attack scenarios. A complete 
satisfaction of ―required‖ and ―provided‖ conditions is necessary to correlate two 
alerts, which will fail in case of broken scenarios. However, the authors in [35] 
have adopted a partial satisfaction technique which is also implemented into our 
framework. The main concern with their approach is the high rate of false 
positives, and the possibility of a huge graph being created. We have managed to 
overcome this limitation by using certain techniques: hierarchical multi-layer 
capabilities, accumulated aggregation, alert verification and alert maintenance. 
  A near real-time processing approach for correlation, aggregation and event 
generation. The security officer can monitor the attack progress which is displayed 
as an intrusion graph. An event is triggered once at the minimum of two alerts 
being correlated, and any additional related alert based on its attributes will join 
the same event. 
 Online and offline graph reduction algorithms during the correlation process in 
addition to alert aggregation in order to provide a smaller manageable graph. 
 We have modelled IDS signatures as abstracted attack concepts instead of defining 
new concepts locally. In requires/provides models, IDS signatures are considered 
complementary external concepts.  
 Separation of the concepts and their capabilities from other dynamic information. 
Two different types of capabilities have been used: internal and external. The first 
type denotes abstract attack modelling consisting of IDS signatures and associated 
capabilities. The second type refers to dynamic details, including system 
configuration, services and vulnerabilities. This provides more flexibility to the 
model whilst at the same time allowing utilization of other knowledge resources. 
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 A capability modelling has been made using a hierarchical methodology based on 
attack classes and inheritance between these classes.  
Our approach is based on the assumption that the attack scenario consists of a sequence 
of related actions and that early stages can incorporate later ones. The link between 
these stages is determined using five factors: 
1- Temporal relationships (e.g. alert timestamps). 
2- Spatial relationships (e.g. source IP addresses, destination IP addresses and port 
numbers). 
3- Pre- and post-conditions of each attack. 
4- Vulnerability assessment of the target system. 
5- Target system configuration. 
Capabilities are formalized in term of pre- and post-conditions by grouping conditions 
that share similar characteristics into a broad definition. Knowledge about elementary 
alerts is mapped to instantiate the attacker and the system states according to their 
temporal characteristics: 
- Pre-conditions: are logical capabilities that characterize the system state to be 
satisfied in order to launch an attack. These capabilities are derived from the 
attack description. A hierarchical approach is adopted based on an attack 
classification to provide coarse-grained definitions of different alerts related to the 
same behaviour. 
- Post-conditions: are logical capabilities that characterize the system state after 
the attack succeeds. In other words, specifications of the effects of intrusions on 
the system, such as the knowledge gained and the access level of the attacker. 
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Moreover, attack classification incorporates the definitions of these capabilities in 
a hierarchical manner. 
To formulize the capability sets as pre- and post-conditions of higher quality, certain 
requirements must be satisfied: 
1- Capabilities must be expressive in order to achieve a true logical relationship. 
2- Avoidance of ambiguity in defining capabilities. 
3- Use of multi-layers of abstraction to achieve scalability. 
4- Reduction of the number of elements in the capability sets without affecting 
attack coverage. 
5- Inference rules should be separated from the capability set. 
6- The set should also be constant and independent of variable information such as 
vulnerability and system-configuration knowledge.  
Hence, capabilities are formulized based on two criteria: 
1) Level of abstraction 
1- Generic capabilities which illustrate a broad aspect of a certain attacks, such as 
access, local access and remote access. 
2- Capabilities which illustrate a lower level of attack abstraction, but not a specific 
one, such as server buffer overflow or client upload file. 
3- Specific capabilities for each single alert in IDSs, such as TFTP Get. 
2) Properties of the system and the attacker state 
1- Access level of the attacker (remote, local, user or administrator). 
2- Impact of the intrusion upon the victim machine, such as DOS and 
implementation of the system commands. 
3- Knowledge gained by the attacker, such as disclosure of host or of service. 
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The elements in the two criteria above are mutually inclusive; for instance, disclosure of 
host is considered as a generic capability and at the same time is a system state 
description. In addition, attack classification, which will be presented in the next 
section, is also involved in defining capabilities. 
Examples: generic capabilities are mainly a description of the intrusion's general 
objective, such as: 
- Disclosure of host 
- Disclosure of running service  
- Disclosure of port number 
- Access  
- Read or write files 
However, a buffer overflow attack is a general attack that can target the server, the Web 
server and the client, and the required and provided conditions are not the same for each 
category. The capability client access attempt is a specific capability for client attacks, 
because some attacks are client specific, such as ActiveX attacks. Snort documentation 
contains a description for each signature, including the attack class type, the affected 
system, and the impact of the attack. This information is valuable in defining attack 
capabilities if other sources of intrusion analysis are considered. Appendix I contains an 
example of a Snort signature description. 
4.4  Knowledge-base modelling 
Two knowledge bases are used, one for attack concepts and the other for vulnerability 
details. In the attack knowledge base, IDS signatures (e.g. Snort)  are modelled to the 
attack abstractions and their defined capabilities. The knowledge library specifies the 
relationship between low-level alerts and the attack abstraction. Thus, a knowledge base 
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can be considered a broad template and each element can be instantiated to instances of 
specific conditions. A generalization mechanism has been used to specify a higher level 
of specification of attack concepts and capabilities. 
The proposed model for the attack knowledge base consists of three sets:  
1) Capability C: This specifies a higher level of abstraction of the ―required‖ and 
―provided‖ conditions of the intrusion model. Intrusion attempts are expressed in terms 
of a set of ―required‖ or ―provided‖ conditions, and vulnerability constraints of a given 
alert where: 
- Required conditions R are a set of pre-conditions specified in the form of 
capabilities with variable arguments. 
- Provided conditions P is a set of post-conditions specified in the form of 
capabilities with variable arguments. 
- Vulnerability V is a description of the state of the target host or network with 
variable arguments. 
2) Attack concept AC specifies the constructor of a given attack and its related 
capabilities. ―required‖ and ―provided‖ conditions for each attack are coded in a 
language of capabilities. 
3) Arguments [r1 ,r2 ,…ri ]→r are a set of associated attributes such as source IP addresses, 
destination IP addresses and port numbers. 
 Definition 4.1: Attack concept AC is an abstraction of elementary alerts generated by 
the IDS, defined by a set of arguments, required conditions and provided conditions. 
Definition 4.2: An attack instance ai is defined as a set of instances of attack concept AC 
by substituting the associated values in arguments tuple considering the time constraints 
(start-time and end-time).  
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Definition 4.3: Given an attack concept AC, the R(AC), P(AC) and V(AC) sets are the 
sets of all capabilities C. Given an attack instance a, the R(a), P(a) and V(a) sets are the 
capabilities by mapping the values to the corresponding arguments in AC considering 
the time constraints. 
4.4.1  Attack classification  
Several attempts have been made to propose a different attack taxonomy or ontology; 
however, they are diverse and there is no common methodology for the categorization 
of security intrusions. The majority of the proposed classifications are entirely based on 
the analysis of published vulnerabilities. For instance, NIDS vendors such as Snort use 
attack classes that describe the attacker's methods in exploiting these vulnerabilities. We 
have obtained our classification based on:  
 Vulnerability analysis 
 Generalized description of the target system (server, client, Web, etc.) 
Elementary alerts generated by NIDS sensors are mapped to generalized descriptions of 
intrusion in a hierarchical representation. The classification is built in the form of a 
graph with nodes and edges. The nodes specify the attack class and the edges denote the 
inheritance relationship between attack classes. The classes are mutually exclusive and 
each alert belongs to only a single class horizontally, but to different classes vertically 
based on the inheritance relationship. This structural abstraction mechanism is to 
minimise redundancy and maximize diversity. Hence, even though some alerts are new 
and unknown, they can be predicted from the results of situation analyses. If an attack is 
in progress consisting of certain elementary alerts, these atomic alerts are mapped to a 
general attack description. For any suspicious or unknown actions not detected by the 
IDS, the probability of their being related to the detected attack is very high. The level 
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of the abstraction progresses from general to specific in a top-down design of the 
classification graph as shown in Figure 4.2. 
                        
                                         Figure.4.2 Abstraction levels of attack classification. 
 
 
 
Figure.4.3 Attack classification. 
High-level generic attack
Generic attack
.
.
.
Specific
attack
- a -  
- b -  
  
#   High - level generic attack  
categories   
1   Server attack   
2   Client attack   
3   Web attack   
4   Malicious software activity    
5   Suspicious behaviour   
6   Policy violation   
7   Other   
#   Generic attack categories   
1   Buffer overflow   
2   Brute   
3   Download   
4   Information Gathering   
5   Implementation of the system commands   
6   Landing behaviour   
7   Bypass authentication   
8   Bypass authorization   
9   Upload   
10   DOS   
10   Cross - site scripting   
11   File modification   
12   File Inclusion   
13   Penetration testing   
14   SQL  injection   
15   Webshell install   
16   DDOS client activity   
17   Webshell activity   
18   Rouge software   
19   Trojan   
20   Attack response   
21   Session Hijacking   
22   Scanning    
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In Figure 4.3 (a), the high-level generic attack classes are shown and each class can be 
linked to one or more other generic class in Figure 4.3 (b). For instance, the buffer 
overflow class can be classified under server, client or Web classes, as this type of 
attack can target different types of systems. However, some other classes are only 
categorized as specific system classes, such as DDoS client activity, which is a client-
specific attack. Hence, each alert generated by the IDS will be categorized top-down in 
a hierarchical manner. Figure 4.4 shows three examples of how sub-classes inherit 
attack features from upper classes and how alerts are classified based on these 
relationships. In Figure 4.4 (a), the lower class denotes the exact Snort signature TFTP 
Get, id:1444, while this signature is classified as TFTP buffer overflow. Similarly, in 
Figure 4.4 (b), any IDS signature of type of ACTIVEX attack can be classified under this 
class which is in turn classified as a client buffer overflow. Figure 4.4 (c) shows that a 
stored procedure attack is described as a Web PHP injection attack. It should be noted 
that these are only abstract classes and do not denote instances of actual attacks. 
       Server attack                                Client attack                           Web attack 
 
Buffer overflow attack                   Buffer overflow attack               SQL injection 
 
TFTP buffer overflow                      ACTIVEX attack                     PHP injection 
 
      TFTP Get                                                                                     Stored Procedure 
          -a-                                                      -b-                                           -c-  
 
Figure.4.4  Examples of attack class inheritance. 
4.4.2  Knowledge-base representation 
A capability set consists of all the derived elements of capabilities encoded to integer 
numbers. All alerts are represented in the form of three sections: 
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1- IDS signature ID to describe the attack by its elementary alert. 
2- Pre-conditions set which consists of n capabilities where n>=0. 
3- Post-conditions set which consists of n capabilities where n>=0. 
The knowledge library of the alerts and their corresponding capabilities are defined into 
the form shown below: 
sid:xxxx;pre:k1(n);pre:k2(n);………pre:ki(n); pos:l1(n);pos:l2(n);…..pos:lj, where 
xxxx is the signature ID number, pre denotes pre-conditions, pos denotes post-
conditions, k is the capability unique number, and n is a variable argument to 
specify the attack attributes as follow: 
1: source IP address 
2: source port 
3: destination IP address 
4: destination port  
4.4.3  Alert modelling 
IDS alerts are the basic units that represent the occurrence of intrusion as a time series. 
Essential attack knowledge is derived from signature fields triggered by the IDS in case 
of any security violation. It should be noted that the alert generated by the IDS is not 
necessarily connected to a security attack, as sometimes a legitimate activity can cause 
some alarms. Moreover, the information in the signature does not contain any sign of 
whether the attack succeeded or not. However, the abstraction of these alerts to 
capabilities in respect to temporal and spatial details can give a true view of the security 
perspective. 
Each received alert is mapped to its pre- and post-conditions. It is assumed that the alert 
is generated because some conditions have to be satisfied and that it will cause some 
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impact on the target system. The relationship between different alerts is identified by 
matching these conditions, as shown in Figure 4.5.  
 
  
 
  
Figure 4.5  Matching of alert pre-and post-conditions in the correlation function. 
In Figure 4.5, Alert 1 has some pre-conditions and post-conditions and one of its post-
conditions match the pre-conditions of Alert 2 and Alert3, hence they are correlated. In 
addition, the temporal order of Alert 2 and Alert 3 is taken in account. For example, the 
following alerts (Snort-generated signatures) are obtained from DARPA LLDDOS.1.0 
[161] to clarify the correlation concept considering the following Snort signature: 
RPC sadmind UDP PING 
This signature is generated as result of attempts to test if the sadmind demon is running. 
A sadmind RPC service is used to perform administrative activities remotely. The 
impact of the signature includes disclosure of the running service and system access 
attempt:  
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 
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This signature is generated due to the use of a portmap GETPORT request to discover 
the port number of the RPC service, and consequently which port is used by the 
sadmind service.  
RPC sadmind UDP NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE CLIENT_DOMAIN overflow attempt 
This signature is generated as a result of an attempt to exploit a buffer overflow to 
obtain a root access. 
RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 
This signature is generated due to the use of root credentials and is an indication of 
potential arbitrary command executions with root privilege. 
RSERVICES rsh root 
This signature is generated due to an attempt to login as a root user using rsh, and this is 
an indication of full control of the attacker. 
Table 4.1 Examples of pre- and post-conditions. 
# Signature Pre-conditions Post-conditions 
1 RPC sadmind UDP PING Disclosure of host Disclosure of running service 
System access 
2 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP Disclosure of host 
 
Disclosure of port number 
Disclosure of running service 
System access 
Remote Access 
3 RPC sadmind UDP NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE 
CLIENT_DOMAIN overflow attempt 
 
Disclosure of host 
Disclosure of port number 
Disclosure of running service 
 
System access 
Remote access 
Admin access 
 
4 RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt 
UDP 
Disclosure of host 
Disclosure of port number 
Disclosure of running service 
System access 
Remote access 
 
Remote access 
Admin access 
 
 
From Table 4.1, it can be seen that the signatures have some pre- and post-condition and 
if a match between these conditions is detected the two alerts are linked as a part of the 
attack scenario, as shown in Figure 4.6. The two signatures share at least one common 
capability, disclosure of running service, hence they are correlated. It should be noted 
that the correlation process does not simply consist of matching these capabilities – 
there are other factors involved, as explained in the rest of this chapter. 
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Figure 4.6  Correlation of two alerts. 
4.5  Vulnerability modelling 
Several efforts have been made to correlate IDS signatures with vulnerability 
information. The aim is to reduce the false positives, which can be a major drawback of 
such systems. Moreover, these verification mechanisms are incorporated in the IDS to 
provide a higher quality of alerts, and hence more confidence. The origin of the problem 
of false positives is that IDSs have no information about the systems they protect. 
Therefore they are not certain about the success of the attack, simply because the 
vulnerabilities of the target system are not available. Two trends have emerged in 
overcoming the false positives issue in IDS performance: 
1- Tuning the IDS based on knowledge of the internal policy of the protected 
environment to operate with a lower number of signatures [47,48]. Knowledge of 
network configuration, running services and installed applications is used to 
disable all the unrelated signatures of the IDS. The advantage of this technique is 
that the IDS performance is improved significantly. However, some of the 
information on the activities of the attacker, which may be useful in tracking its 
behaviour, will be discarded. It should also be noted that real cyber attackers 
(persistent attackers) try to break into systems using different methods, and these 
attempts may be not in connection with a particular vulnerability. Moreover, some 
dangerous attacks in cyber crime do not require any system vulnerability, such as 
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DDoS. In addition, this approach requires intensive and updated vulnerability 
assessment.  
2- The other trend is not suppressing the IDS detection coverage, but instead 
aggregating, correlating and verifying the generated alerts in a systematic way 
[10,29,49]. Summarized data of occurring events are displayed to the security 
manager according to their priorities and criticalness. If further details are 
required to support a specific situation, they can be retrieved by request. A 
repository of collected information is maintained to support the decision of the 
IDS management system. Vulnerability scanners are the main candidate to supply 
this type of data in a periodical manner.  
In accordance with the nature of the developed correlation systems, which require full 
description of any activity in the protected environment, the second mechanism is 
adopted in our research. In the previous sections, the attacks are generalized to obtain a 
global view of the security situation. This generalization may increase the false positive 
rate; hence, a suppression technique is needed to reduce the false positive rate without 
losing any details. This suppression mechanism does not imply any reduction in the IDS 
coverage, but the consideration of only success attacks. 
Snort signatures are supported by two useful fields: 
 Vulnerability reference, referring to the major vulnerability standards such as 
CVE [39], bugtraq [162], and Nessus [128]. 
 Service to denote a list of the affected services, such as telnet, ftp and 
MSSQL. 
A vulnerability knowledge base is maintained to store the vulnerability situation of each 
element of the protected network based on the collecting agent (e.g. Nessus). The 
scanner will also gather the network configuration details such as IP addresses of live 
117 
 
hosts and running services, so manual configuration is not considered. In this respect, 
vulnerability information is considered as external capabilities.  
The scope of vulnerability testing is limited to only investigate the presence of the 
vulnerability and the affected service. An extension can be carried out to consider the 
target host response; however, there are performance issues (e.g. communication 
overheads). Nessus is used to extract the following information, which can be used to 
support the vulnerability component: 
- IP addresses of all hosts connected to the target network. 
- Operating systems and their versions. 
- Open ports and running services. 
- Related vulnerability references (e.g. CVE). 
When an alert is received from the IDS, its message contains the vulnerability reference 
and the affected system. Therefore, a logical formula is obtained by searching the 
vulnerability knowledge to find any matches, as follow: 
- If the reference is found and the associated service is running, then the 
vulnerability is true with high priority. 
-  If the reference is found and the associated service is not running, then the 
vulnerability is true with low priority. 
- If the reference is not found, then the vulnerability is unknown. 
The complete algorithm of alert verification using vulnerability knowledge is shown in 
Figure 4.7. 
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Algorithm :Alert verification 
Input: elementary alerts generated by IDS  A(IP,SV,VR) 
           Host vulnerability information generated by scanner VN(IP,OS,SV,VR) 
Output: Vulnerable host VH(IP,V,P) 
Methods: 
             // IP: IP address,  SV: service, VR: vulnerability, OS operating system 
             for i←0 to length[VN]  
                do  
                    if A.IP = VN[i].IP  get VN(IP,OS,SV,VR) 
                    in case of 
                             A.VR=VN.VR and A.SV=VN.SV then VH.V←true , VH.P←high 
                             A.VR=VN.VR and A.SV≠VN.SV then VH.V←true ,VH.P←low 
                             A.VR≠VN.VR then VH.V←false , VH.P←unknown 
 
Figure 4.7 Alert verification algorithm. 
4.6   Alert correlation algorithm 
The principle objective of the proposed framework is to identify the causal relationships 
between a series of attacker actions that are temporally ordered. The concept of alert 
correlation should not be confused with alert aggregation or alert fusion, as the latter 
group alerts based on clustering regardless of their temporal relations in some 
approaches. Alert correlation is the process of identifying a sequence of distinguished 
alerts that fall in the same generalized attack pattern. Figure 4.8 shows the relationship 
between alert correlation and alert aggregation. Correlation functions are performed 
across the x-axis and aggregation functions along the y-axis. In this regard, we do not 
need to define explicitly the attack scenario, and instead the logical rules are generated 
using the pre- and post-conditions of each activity. Attributes provided by elementary 
alerts are used to define instances of alerts. Instances of system conditions are 
instantiated with time constraints, and correlation rules are created.  
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Figure 4.8 Relationships between alert correlation and aggregation. 
Definition 4.4 Given a pair of attack instances a : a1, a2 ordered temporally in the 
following time slots respectively: 
a1: ts1 and te1  
a2: ts2 and te2  
where ts is the start time, and te is the end time. 
a1 is correlated with for a2 if: 
1- There exists at least one common capability C in R(a2), and P(a1). 
2- Satisfaction of V(a2) constraints. 
3- P(a1).te1 ≤ R(a2).ts2  
The proposed correlation approach consists of a series of complementary phases 
discussed in the following sections. A complete description of the related algorithms is 
given to show the system's functioning.  
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4.6.1  Initialization of instances of pre- and post-conditions 
The objective of this procedure is to create instances of pre- and post-conditions for 
each alert received. Encoded conditions are in the form of corresponding capabilities 
based on the arguments obtained from the in-memory knowledge dictionary. Pre-
condition details of previous processed alerts are deleted because they are no longer 
used. In other words, the remaining possible causal links of any alert are ignored as the 
time constraints are not satisfied.  
Consider alert a1 detected between the times t1 and t2, and another alert a2 observed 
between t3 and t4, where t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t4. Even though a2 has some post-conditions that 
match a1 pre-conditions, they will not be correlated as a1 is detected before a2.  
A matching between the signatures IDs in the knowledge library and those of the 
sequence of the received raw alert is performed. Therefore, lists of pre- and post-
condition identifiers are obtained. The argument of each condition is identified and the 
encoded capabilities information is stored in corresponding collections in the database. 
Figure 4.9 shows the implemented algorithm of the creation of pre- and post-conditions 
details.  
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Algorithm: Pre and Post conditions initialization 
Inputs: Sequence of raw alerts R, knowledge lib KLB 
Output: Encoded Capability EC 
Methods: 
                //KLB an object of knowledge library  
               // PreC :collection of Pre conditions Pre, PosC : collection of Post conditions  Pos      
              for i←1 to length[PreC]  
                    do DELETE (PreC, Pre) 
              for i←1 to length[R]  
                do 
                    if  KLB.id= R.sigId 
                        get KLB.id, KLB.id.Pre(arg), KLB.id.Pos(arg) 
               for i←1 to length[KLB] 
                 do 
                     In case of  
                          arg=1 
                                     INSERT (PreC, EC(srcIPAddress)) 
                                     INSERT (PosC, EC(srcIPAddress))            
                         arg=2 
                                     INSERT (PreC, EC(srcPort)) 
                                     INSERT (PosC, EC(srcPort))            
                         arg=3 
                                     INSERT (PreC, EC(destIPAddress)) 
                                     INSERT (PosC, EC(destIPAddress))            
                         arg=4 
                                     INSERT (PreC, EC(destPort)) 
                                     INSERT (PosC, EC(destPort))   
 
Figure 4.9  Algorithm of initialization of pre- and post-conditions. 
4.6.2  Knowledge initialization 
A complete knowledge is initialized in memory when the MARS server starts. The total 
memory space of a knowledge base of 15,000 signatures does not exceed a few 
kilobytes. The initialization process incorporates parsing of the knowledge text file 
(instead of a text file, an XML representation can be used for faster processing). A 
122 
 
dictionary data structure is created to store knowledge details. The initialization 
algorithm is shown in Figure 4.10.  
 
Algorithm: Knowledge Dictionary Initialization 
Inputs: Text Knowledge TK 
Output: Knowledge Dictionary KD 
Methods: 
                create KD as a Dictionary 
               // KD.id  is the Id number of each entry= Snort SigId 
              // KD.id.Pre is the list of preconditions associated with SigId   
              // KD.id.Pos is the list of postconditions associated with SigId   
              // create KL as array of TK lines  
               KL ← SPLIT TK in lines separated by (;) 
               for i←0 to length[KL]  
                    do 
                         In case of KL[i]  
                            start with (―sid‖) then KD.id ←KL[i].id) 
                            start with (―pre‖)  
                                      then 
                                               KLI←SPLIT KL[i] separated by (,) 
                                                j←0 
                                               for j←0 to length[KLI]    
                                                     KD.id.Pre(arg) ←KLI[j](arg) 
                            start with (―pos‖)  
                                      then 
                                                KLI←SPLIT KL[i] separated by (,) 
                                                j←0 
                                               for j←0 to length[KLI]    
                                                       KD.id.Pos(arg) ←KLI[j](arg) 
 
Figure 4.10  Algorithm of knowledge initialization. 
4.6.3  Correlation algorithm 
The encoded capabilities stored in a collection of pre- and post-conditions are used to 
create the initial correlation graph, called a temporary correlated collection. In this 
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collection, all correlated elementary alerts are stored for further processing, reflecting 
atomic correlations. The size of the information in temporary collections may be huge, 
and hence graph reduction and alert aggregation functionality are performed to obtain 
the final graph. The correlation process is based on the satisfaction of: 
- Causal relationship based on pre- and post-conditions of each detected alert. 
- Temporal and spatial constrains such as IP address, port and detected time. 
- Service configuration and vulnerability details. 
Each correlated alert must belong to what we have called in this research generated 
events. Complete details of events are stored in a separate collection designated 
InfallEventsC. Initially, an in-memory hash table called a correlated map is created, and 
then the details are transferred to a temporary correlated collection. The detected event 
takes the earliest start time and the latest end time among the start and end times of all 
corresponding alerts. An event is detected if at least two correlated alerts are detected. 
However, every new event is evaluated if it can be combined with other detected events 
on the basis of common characteristics. If there is a casual link between previous 
aggregated alerts and one of the detected alerts associated with the new event, the two 
events can be combined. In case of a connection between two events, the original event 
will become a master event and the new one will be considered a slave event during the 
process until they become a single accumulated event. The resulting event title is a 
concatenation of the intrusion category names of each group of events, as shown in 
Figure 4.11, where Attack A, B, and C are general descriptions of the attack. 
 
a1 a2 an 
Attack A 
b1 b2 
Attack B 
bn c1 c2 
Attack C 
cn 
Event Title:        Attack A → attack B → Attack C 
                                              Figure.4.11  Construction of an event title. 
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Algorithm: Alert Correlation 
Inputs: Encoded Capabilities EC , Vulnerability VH(IP,V,P) 
Output: Correlated alerts 
Methods:  // Temporary Correlated Collection TempCorrelated 
                 // Pre conditions  Collection PreC ,  Post conditions Collection PosC             
               DELETE all rows in  TempCorrelated 
               get lastAnalysisId,  lastEventId   
               set   CorrelatedAlerts←  
                   SELECT AlertId from PreC, PosC 
                         WHERE PreC.AlertId = PosC.AlertId 
                             AND  PreC.IPaddress = PosC.IPaddress 
                              AND  PreC.Port = PosC.Port 
                              AND PosC.endTime≤ PreC.startTime  
                              AND  VH.V is true 
                    If length[CorrelatedAlerts] >0 
                      analysiId ← analysiId+1 
                         /cMap: Correlated Map  :hash table 
                          cMap ←null 
                                     for i←0 to length[correlatedAlerts] 
                                         do 
                                       // the first alert will be the causing alert causingA 
                                      // the second alert will be the caused alert causedA 
                                      INSERT (cMap, causingA[i]) 
                                      INSERT (cMap, causedA[i]) 
                newEvent←lastEvent+1 
                      for j←0 to length[cMap] 
                              do 
                          INSERT (TempCorrelated, cMap[j]. causingA) 
                          INSERT (TempCorrelated, cMap[j]. causedA) 
                          INSERT (TempCorrelated, cMap[j]. newEvent)  
                 newEvent.startTime← MIN(cMap.startTime) 
                  newEvent.endTime← MAX(cMap.startTime)     
                  // InfallEvent Collection inafallEventC 
                 INSERT (inafallEventC, newEvent.fields) 
               combineInfallEvent 
 
Figure 4.12  Alert correlation algorithm. 
125 
 
Once all received alerts are processed and each alert is assigned to a specific intrusion 
event, the original alert collection is updated in order to perform alert aggregation. The 
algorithms of alert correlation and event generation are shown in Figures 4.12-4.13.  
Algorithm: combineInfallEvent 
SET canBeCombinedEvents← 
                     SELECT  infallEventId from infallEventC and aggregatedC 
                     WHERE infallEventC.infallEventId= aggregatedC. infallEventId 
                    AND  infallEvent.AlertId IN   
                          (SELECT  causingAlertId from TempCorrelated 
                              WHERE TempCorrelated.infallEventId= newInfallEventId  ) 
                              UNION  
                        (SELECT   causedAlertId from TempCorrelated 
                               WHERE TempCorrelated.infallEventId= newInfallEventId  )     
              If length[canBeCombinedEvents] >0 then 
                  // update the existing event 
                  updateCorrelated(canBeCombinedEvents[1..n], newEventId) 
                else 
               // create a new record in infallEventCollection 
                        INSERT (infallEventC, newInfallevent)  
    updateInfallEvent(newInfallEventId) 
 
Figure 4.13  Algorithm of two combined events 
 
4.7 Alert aggregation 
A common problem among alert correlation systems is the huge amount of atomic alerts 
generated by an IDS and possibly by several IDSs. An IDS may trigger a large quantity 
of the same alerts at close time intervals that are related to the same security violation. 
Alert aggregation is proposed to remove duplicated alerts, e.g. the same alerts 
corresponding to the same signature description or attack class. A pre-defined window 
is used to determine whether two alerts are close enough to be aggregated into a single 
alert. In addition, our aggregation approach is based on graph reduction techniques that 
remove duplication in vertex set and migrating connecting edges to the nominated node. 
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The resulting graph will only contain alerts that are in fact representing different 
security events. 
Definition 4.5: Given a cyclic directed graph G(V,E) where V is the vertex set and E is 
the edges set, the in-degree of a vertex is the number of edges entering it. A vertex with 
zero in-degree values indicates a vertex with no edges entering it (e.g. root nodes).  
In the attack graph, the node’s in-degree is the number of how many times the alert 
appears in caused alert group. The aggregation algorithm begins with defining the in-
degree value of each node which is not aggregated in the graph. A list of zero in-degree 
values are identified to represent the first layer of the graph nodes; in other words, the 
alerts that are not caused by others. The zero in-degree list will contain groups of similar 
alerts occur at different times. Each group is treated as follows: 
1- Nominate a master alert, which is the first alert in the temporally sorted list.  
2- The aggregation process for the other alerts in the same group is based on: 
- Similarity of signature IDs; this can be generalized to consider attack classes 
for a coarse granularity.  
- Equality of source and destination IP addresses of the parties involved. 
- The time difference between the detection of the two alerts does not exceed a 
defined value, e.g. 1 second. 
3- If the above conditions are satisfied, the processed alert is added to the 
aggregated alerts corresponding to its master alert. 
4- Change all the relationships between the aggregated alert and other alerts in the 
whole graph by replacing it with its master alert. Hence, the master alert will 
represent the aggregated alerts without losing the causal connections in the 
primary correlated collection. 
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5- Since all aggregated alerts are represented by a single alert, the corresponding 
time should cover the actual detection time for any further correlation. Thus, the 
start time of the master alert is the earliest time among the aggregated start 
times, and the end time is the latest one.  
6- Remove the aggregated alert from the graph; however, the original information 
is not ignored as the graph can be disaggregated when required. Each master 
alert has its own counter of related aggregated alerts and graph layer. 
After aggregating each group, the first graph layer, zero in-degree of all aggregated 
groups, is decremented by 1 to obtain the next layer. This is an opposite method to 
creating zero in-degree values. The second level will also have zero in-degree nodes and 
the same procedure is executed in an iterated fashion until all the graph nodes are 
treated. The algorithms shown in Figures 4.14-4.17 are describing the complete steps of 
the aggregation process.  
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Algorithm: AggregationAnalyzer 
Input: Temporary Correlated Alerts 
Output: Aggregated alerts collection 
Declaration: Graph : NameValueCollection,  Indegree: hashtable,  
                      aggregatedAlertList:ArrayList , allRawAlerts: Hashtable   
Methods: 
Create a queue aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection 
Get zeroIndegreeAlertsList 
Layer← 1    // the first level in the graph , initial alerts not caused by other alerts 
aggregateZeroIndegreeAlertsId(zeroIndegreeAlertsList, 
aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection, Layer) 
if  length [aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection]>0 
       then  
        zeroIndegreeAlertsList←null 
        Count← length [aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection] 
              for i←1 to Count 
                 do  // count denote how many groups have been aggregated 
             sameAlertType← DEQUEUE  aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection 
                    n←0 
                    while AlertId=sameAlertType[n]  
                         do 
                       if NOT (Graph[AlertId].values=null) 
                            get Graph[AlertId].values 
                                  for m←1 to length[Graph.values] 
                                   do 
                                 Indegree(values.AlertId) ←  Indegree(values.AlertId)-1 
                                 if Indegree(values.AlertId)=0 then  
                                           INSERT (zeroIndegreeAlertList, values.AlertId) 
                             n←n+1 
i←i+1   
      Layer←Layer+1  
if  length[aggregateZeroIndegreeAlertsId]>0 
     then 
         aggregateZeroIndegreeAlertsId(zeroIndegreeAlertsList,                
aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection, Layer) 
                                                Figure.4.14 Aggregation analysis algorithm. 
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Function:AggregateZeroIndegreeAlertsId (zeroIndegreeAlertsList, 
                                  aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection, Layer) 
if length[zeroIndegreeAlertsList]=1 
    then    // in case of a single zero indegree node 
                 aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlerts:Array[] 
                 INSERT (aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlerts,zeroIndegreeAlertsList[0]) 
                 ENQUEUE (aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection, 
                                                             aggregatedZeroIndgreeAlerts) 
                  saveAggrAlert(zeroIndegreeAlertsList[0],1,Layer) 
                  UpdateRawAlertCollection(zeroIndegreeAlertsList[0], 
                                                                    zeroIndegreeAlertsList[0]) 
       else    // in case of zero indegree contains more than one element 
              for i←0 to length[zeroIndegreeAlertsList] 
                    do 
                         if zeroIndegreeAlertsList[i]<0  // has been already aggregated 
                             continue 
                                aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlerts:Array[] 
                                INSERT (aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlerts, zeroIndegreeAlertsList[i])   
                                 IndexalertId← zeroIndegreeAlertsList[i] 
                                appointedRawAlert: RawAlert   // nominated as a master alert 
                                allRawAlerts←null                            
                      if allRawAlerts contains IndexalertId 
                           then 
                               appointedRawAlert=allRawAlert[IndexalertId] 
                          else  // create a new one 
                                 appointedRawAlert← new RawAlert[IndexalertId] 
                                 ADD (allRawAlerts, appointedRawAlert) 
                                 UpdateRawAlertCollection(appointedRawAlert, 
                                   appointedRawAlert) 
rawCollectionCount: integer 
                   // internal loop 
                        for j←i+1 to length[zeroIndegreeAlertsList] 
                              if zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j]<0 
                                  continue 
                                  Figure.4.15  Aggregation of zero in-degree alerts algorithm. 
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                            // new alert in the same aggregated group 
                              indexRawAlert:RawAlert 
                              internalAlertId :int 
                               if allRawAlerts contains  zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j] 
                                  then 
                                         indexRawAlert←allRawAlerts[internalAlertId] 
                                    else 
                                         indexRawAlert←new RawAlert[zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j]) 
                                         ADD (allRawAlerts, indexRawAlert) 
                                        if appointedRawAlert.sigId =indexRawAlert.sigId  
                                            AND appointedRawAlert.srcIPAddress=  
                                                                            indexRawAlert.srcIPAddress  
                                            AND appointedRawAlert.desIPAddress = 
                                                                            indexRawAlert. desIPAddress 
                                    AND DIFF (appointedRawAlert.endTime, 
                                                                  indexRawAlert.endTime)≤1 
                        then 
                                INSERT (aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlerts, zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j]) 
// relationships will be shifted to the new master alert  
                  if NOT(Graph.zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j])=null 
                      then 
                              values← get Grpah.zeroIndegreeAlertsList[j] 
                 for k←0 to length[values] 
                      do 
                              INSERT (Graph.values, indexAlertId) 
                             // remove the aggregated alert from the Grpah 
                              DELETE (Graph.values , zeroIndegreeAlertsList[k]) 
                            // add the aggregated alert to the aggregated list 
                             INSERT (aggregatedAlertIdList, zeroIndegreeAlertsList[k]) 
                           // make this Id as a negative value in the zero indegree  
                            zeroIndegreeAlertsList[k] ← zeroIndegreeAlertsList[k] × (-1) 
                           // increase the alert count for the associated master alert 
                           rawCollectionCount ← rawCollectionCount+1 
                          Figure.4.16 Aggregation of zero in-degree alerts algorithm (continued). 
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                             // the aggregated group of alerts takes the start time of the earliest alert  
                             // and the end time at the latest end time   
                          if appointedRawAlert.startTime > indexRawAlert.startTime 
                               then 
                                    appointedRawAlert.startTime← indexRawAlert.startTime 
                           if appointedRawAlert.endTime < indexRawAlert.endTime 
                               then 
                                     appointedRawAlert.endTime← indexRawAlert.endTime 
                                // delete the post conditions of the aggregated alert 
                                DELETE  (postConditionTable, indexRawAlert) 
                                ENQUEUE (aggregatedZeroIndegreeAlertsCollection, 
                                                        aggregatedZeroIndgreeAlerts) 
                   Figure.4.17  Aggregation of zero in-degree alerts algorithm (continued). 
 
4.8  Graph reduction 
In order to reduce the complexity of the resulting graph, data redundancy should be 
eliminated. The graph consists of nodes representing aggregated alerts and edges 
representing the casual relationships. The number of nodes is not affected while the 
number of edges is minimised without affecting reachability. Hence, the target is to find 
a minimal DAG with the least number of arcs and which is equivalent to the original 
DAG. Consider the case shown in Figure 4.18, with four alerts: a, b, c, and d. If Alert a 
is causing Alert b and b is causing c, there is no need for the transitive edge between a 
and c, and similarly the edges between a-d and b-d. The removal of the transitive 
optional edges does not have any effect on connectivity between the original nodes. 
 
 
 
 
a b c d 
 
Figure 4.18 Transitive edges in graph. 
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This is based on the assumption that the relationships between nodes can propagate and 
the removed edges are considered optional.  
Definition 4.6: given a DAG G=(V,E), V=X is the vertex set, E=R is the set of arcs of 
the graph, let n=#V, V={1,….,n}, the reduced graph G′(V,E′) is a DAG with the 
following properties: 
(1) The vertex set (#V) of G(V,E) is equal to the vertex set (#V) of G′(V,E′). 
(2) The directed paths between the vertex in G(V,E) and G′(V,E′) are similar. 
(3) G′(V,E′) has the smallest number of edges E′=R′ between vertex sets without 
affecting the connectivity, R′<=R. 
Two algorithms have been developed: online graph reduction for edge deletion on the 
left side of the graph, and offline graph reduction for edge deletion on the right side of 
the graph. The online algorithm removes the transitive edges at the real-time when 
every node joins the graph. This procedure is performed at the first stage of correlation 
and before alert aggregation in order to minimise the system's processing time. The 
offline algorithm results in a further graph reduction if any redundant connection exists 
after the graph is built, starting from the leaf nodes to the root nodes. To clarify the idea, 
consider the alerts correlated by the system in the initial stage shown in Figure 4.19 
below:  
 
Figure 4.19  Example of graph reduction. 
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There are five nodes and eight edges connecting these nodes to represent the causal 
relationship. In Figure 4.19 (a), the number of the representing nodes n is half the 
number connecting arcs #V. The edges 1→5 and 2→5 can be deleted because they are 
redundant and the description of the intrusion sequence will not be affected. In the 
proposed reduction algorithm, each node has two lists of children and parents, and the 
aim is to remove the duplicates in these lists as shown in the following two algorithms 
displayed in Figures 4.20-4.23 
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Algorithm: OnlineGraphReducer 
Input: Correlated Graph 
Output: Reduced Correlated Graph 
Declaration: GraphNode: <id, value> 
                      Parents , Childs,Roots: List of GraphNodes 
                      Ancestors: Dictionary of GrpahNodes<GraphNode,List of  GraphNode> 
                      NodeSet,: Dictionary of GrpahNodes<int, GraphNode) 
                      node1, node2 : GrpahNode 
Methods: 
// perform for each edge, if the n is the nodes number, the edge will be n/2  
for i←0 to length[nodes]/2 
       do 
        // the node on the left side, causing alert  
         node1id←nodes[i] 
        //the node on the right, caused alert 
         node2id←nodes[i+1] 
        node1←null  
       //nodeSet is the resulting set after reduction  
        if nodeSet contains node1id 
         then   
                // if it is already added to the nodeSet 
                node1←nodeSet[node1id] 
          else 
              //otherwise create a new GraphNode and ancestors list for node1  
               node1← new GraphNode(node1id) ; 
              ancestors[node1] ←new List of GraphNode 
           //node2 is processed similarly 
         Node2←null 
        if nodeSet contains node2id 
           then   
                  // if it is already added to the nodeSet 
                Node2←nodeSet[node2id] 
          else 
              //otherwise create a new GraphNode and ancestors list for node2  
 
Figure 4.20 Online reduction algorithm. 
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node2← new GraphNode(node2id) ; 
              ancestors[node2] ←new List of GraphNode 
//check all parents of node2, if one exists in node1’s parents, remove it from  
node2’s parents to avoid duplicates (transitive relationships) 
for k←0 to length[node2.parents] 
       do 
             if ancestors[node1] contains node2.parents[j] 
               then 
                      DELETE (node2, node2.parents[j])      
//add node2 as a child of node1 
INSERT (node1.child,node2) 
//add node1 to node2’s ancestors if it is not already existent  
if  NOT (ancestors[node2] contains node1) 
   then 
          INSERT (ancestors[node2], node1); 
// add all ancestors of node1 to ancestors of node2 
for j←0 to length[node1.ancestors] 
       do 
            n: GraphNode 
            n←node1.ancestors        
           if NOT (node2.ancestors contains n)    
           INSERT (node2.ancestors,n)       
 // if node2 is a root node remove it from roots because it is not root anymore  
//after being  a child of another node 
if node2 roots then DELETE (roots, node2) 
// if node1 is not already in roots add it to roots 
if  length[node1.parents]=0 AND NOT (node1roots) 
  then 
         INSERT (roots, node1) 
 
Figure 4.21 Online reduction algorithm (continued). 
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Algorithm: OfflineGraphReducer 
Input: Correlated Graph 
Output: Reduced Correlated Graph 
Declaration:  
 GraphNode: <id, value> 
 Parents , Childs, Roots, n, grandson: List of GraphNodes 
 indirectedOffSprings : Dictionary of GrpahNodes<GraphNode,List of  GraphNode> 
Methods: 
for i←0 to length[roots] 
       do 
           // if the root node is already existent in sons group return the group   
           if n indirectedOffSprings 
              then  return indirectedOffSprings.n 
// if the root node does not have any child create a new list 
if  length[n.child] =0  
   then 
          return new list of GraphNode   
 for i←0 to length[n.child] 
       do 
          //check the sons of the sons of each node in roots 
           for j←0 to length[n.child[i].child] 
              do 
                    if grandson  n.child[i].child     
                      then 
                             // if this son is not a member of the sons group add it 
                            if NOT grandson  indirectedOffSprings 
                            INSERT (currentIndirectedOffSprings, grandson) 
              indirectedOffSprings.n=currentIndirectedOffSprings 
for k←0 to length[indirectedOffSprings] 
       do 
           if n indirectedOffSprings 
              then 
                    // remove duplicates in sons of the nodes on the same sequence 
 
Figure 4.22 Offline reduction algorithm. 
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                 l←0 
                    while l<length[n.child]   
                          do 
                              if n.child[l]  indirectedOffSprings.n 
                                   then 
                                         DELETE (n.child,n.child[l]) 
                                    else 
                                           l← l +1 
  
Figure 4.23  Offline reduction algorithm (continued). 
4.9   Prediction of undetected intrusion 
Beyond the correlation function's primary role of reducing information complexity, it 
may also handle unobserved attack activities and estimate the attacker's planned path to 
achieve its goal. Intrusion activity is considered a planning activity, because the 
planning actions are explained by their pre-conditions and effects. In this sense, 
correlation functionality is used in discovering unobserved alerts (false negatives) and 
predicting intrusion intention. Missed alerts have been one of the major limitations of 
IDSs, particularly signature-based ones, and this is caused by three reasons: 
-The intrusion action is unknown (e.g. 0-day attack), and the IDS has no knowledge 
of the attack. 
-The attacker performs certain evasion techniques to deceive signature-based IDSs, 
which may only be other variations of known existing attacks.  
-In high-speed network environments, as is the case in current systems, the IDS is 
unable to keep up with the received traffic. As has been observed in Chapter 3, IDSs 
drop traffic packets when they are overloaded. 
In an alert correlation context, missed alerts can result in broken attack scenarios, 
dividing the attack graph into different sub-graphs. Furthermore, unobserved attacking 
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sequences can lead to an incomplete graph if the IDS misses some alerts comprising late 
attack stages. Hence, the objective of the attacker will be uncertain for the observer. In 
such cases, alert correlation generally uses abduction techniques [49] to estimate the 
missing data and the intruder's intention in partial attack sequences. 
4.9.1  Alerts missed by IDSs 
Several efforts have been presented to overcome the limitation of alerts missed by IDSs. 
Most of them focus on how to repair the broken scenario by constructing all possible 
actions using attack libraries [35, 131]. Consider Attack 1 and Attack 2 in Figure 4.24, 
where Attack 1 consists of three alerts (a1, a2 and a3) and Attack 2 involves two alerts 
(a5 and a6). The two attacks actually belong to the same intrusion sequence. The IDS 
misses alert a4, causing two separate attack scenarios. In order to reason about the 
missing middle alert and connect the two attacks, certain virtual nodes are created along 
the attack path between a3 and a5. In our correlation approach, the causal link between 
the nodes is based on the equality constrains of the capabilities in the pre-conditions of 
node a5 and any possible node with similar capabilities in its post-conditions. Similarly, 
a match between capabilities defined in the post-conditions of a4 and capabilities 
defined in the pre-conditions of any possible nodes, is determined to link these nodes to 
a3.  
 
a1 a2 a3 a5 a6 
a41 
a42 
a43 
a4i 
Attack1 Attack2 
Figure.4.24  Reasoning about missed alerts. 
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Definition 4.7: a sequence of actions a1,a2,......,an comprising an attack plan and two 
sub-sequences of observed actions a1,a2,.....,ak and al, al+1,....., an are linked virtually 
as candidates of the same attack scenario if: 
a.  There is at least one action node (virtual node) sharing at least one capability 
in the post-conditions of ak and pre-conditions of al 
b.  Satisfaction of temporal, spatial and vulnerability constrains.  
The missed alerts can be more than a single action node, so all possible matched nodes 
are searched forwards starting from ak and backwards starting from al. The algorithm 
progresses until a match is identified to link the two attacks. The virtual nodes can be a 
series of nodes in a sequence starting from the last action node in the first half of the 
broken attack scenario to the first action node of the consequent other half. However, 
the number of estimated nodes can be large and this will add more complexity to the 
resulting graph.  
In fact, the repair of broken-scenario approaches may add more complications. A 
considerable amount of processing power is consumed and this is critical for online 
applications. The idea of attack generalization presented in section 4.4 can give the 
administrator a general view of the actual attack without having to rely on identifying 
the exact missed alerts. We have adopted the idea of reasoning about missed alerts by 
generally giving the attack category instead of a potentially infinite number of virtual 
alerts. Some of the reasons behind this are: 
1- As stated earlier in this section, alerts can be missed as a result of one of two 
reasons: unknown attacks or missed attacks due to performance issues. The 
second category can be estimated using virtual nodes and edges based on a 
knowledge library. However, if the attack is a 0-day or a new variation of a 
known attack, the specific reasoning about unobserved alerts will not give the 
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details of the exact intended attack actions. Hence, virtual nodes do not represent 
the actual alerts but similar alerts, which can mislead the administrator by 
producing false positives.  
2- Based on the initial assumptions of this thesis, coordinated attacks consist of a 
number of steps that are not isolated. The absence of some of these irrelevant 
steps, which are usually much less compared to the related steps observed, does 
not affect the correlation approach. Once again, the generalized formalisation of 
capabilities can assist in building the attack graph even with the use of 
incomplete attack knowledge. For instance, consider the attack stages associated 
with the scenario shown in Figure 4.25. The link shown in red denotes a 
generalized capability in the capabilities set. To be more specific, assuming the 
attack steps are for SQL injection (SQLI) stages, all alerts involved in this attack 
share the SQL injection capability, coloured in red. The other capabilities coded 
in different colours are specific to certain other conditions. Hence, even if alert 
a3 is missing or not covered by the operating IDS, the causal link is still 
established using the general specified condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
a1 
 
a2 
 
a3 
 
a4 
  
Figure 4.25 Reasoning about missed alerts by generalised capability formalisation. 
3- The main aim of the alert correlation and aggregation function is to build an 
attack graph with minimal data and to reduce the false positive rate. Therefore, 
the process of generating further information, which could result in false 
positives, conflicts with the main concept of alert correlation. Therefore, our 
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reasoning revolves around the attack scenario rather than specific potential 
alerts. In other words, the focus is on discovering the intention of the attack and 
recognizing the intrusion plan.  
4.9.2  Intruder intention recognition 
Intruder intention recognition is the task of inferring intrusion goals from the 
observation of intruder actions or the consequences of these actions [49]. Intrusion 
actions are described in terms of conditions required to achieve actions and the 
conditions provided as a result. Observed actions are ordered temporally to constitute an 
intrusion plan. Hence, intention recognition is a prediction task to identify intrusion 
goals from a partial set of observed actions. Taking the case of certain alerts constituting 
an intrusion plan detected by an IDS, the aim of the system would be to predict future 
incoming alerts along the intrusion path.  
Plan recognition in an intrusion context is different, because attackers try to hide their 
activities and identities [163]. The general form of plan recognition assumes that the 
actor follows a series of complete and ordered sets of actions to achieve a specific goal, 
which is not the case in intrusion behaviour [164]. Adversarial recognition involves 
dynamic actions and goal changes based on identified effects. For example, an attacker 
intending to break into a system for a specific vulnerability may change to another 
intention if a new vulnerability is discovered that may provide more control over the 
attacked system. However, in general the ultimate goal of the attacker can be predicted 
– i.e. full access to the target system, even if the behaviour is dynamic. 
Typically, the prediction process is based on the same notion discussed in the previous 
section. Estimated virtual causal edges and virtual nodes are created based on the pre- 
and post-conditions of the observed actions. However, a large number of attack paths 
can be recognised, building a huge attack graph. The virtual node creation is limited to 
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the first malicious activity detected if some of the related actions have already been 
detected. For instance, scanning behaviour is considered suspicious activity, so it cannot 
be predicted what will come next as there is a large number of paths. However, from the 
target system knowledge the attack paths can be bounded to a lesser number. Therefore 
the algorithm progresses to construct virtual paths until a malicious activity is 
recognised. The determination of the malicious level of an activity is based on the 
priority information provided by the rules. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, our approach of defining a layered 
structure of capabilities and an attack classification assists in recognizing intrusion 
intention. Identified capabilities associated with malicious actions are used directly to 
express the intrusion goal, while suspicious actions can contribute to the achievement of 
the intrusion goal. For example, an alert has three post-conditions represented in the 
form of capabilities as follows: stored procedure, PHP injection and SQL injection. The 
most generic capability, SQL injection, is used to recognise the intrusion goal and is 
classified as an SQLI attack plan. In this context, the administrator can take a reactive 
response to prevent this attack before it can achieve its final goal, such as modification 
of the database in the target server. Recognition of attack intention is considered as 
identifying that a group of actions is a subset of another group. It is assumed that the 
attacker has completed all attack stages, and that the task is to find any subset of these 
stages that represents a potential attack.  
Definition 4.8 : let a is an attack consisting of a series of candidate steps a1,a2,.....,an, 
and aˈ is an attack consisting a subset a1, a2, ....,am. aˈ, which is to say a subset of a if 
at least one action from aˈ shares the same generic capability of at least one action from 
a and satisfies the temporal, spatial and vulnerability constraints.  
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Example: suppose attack a consists of five aggregated alerts, with the first two alerts 
belonging to scanning behaviour and the remaining alerts relating to an SQLI attempt. 
Another attack, aˈ, consists of three alerts, the first two being a sign of scanning and the 
third classified as an SQLI attack (SQLIA). Both attacks share the same temporal and 
spatial attributes. It can be predicted that aˈ is a subset of a, as they share at least one 
generic capability. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that two different 
attackers not cooperating will be considered one and the same.  
4.10  Conclusion 
The main objective of alert correlation systems is the identification of the multi-stage 
attack which may be discovered from analysis of the IDS alerts. These alerts have 
certain features that can be used to detect causal relationships between temporally 
distributed activities. In this chapter we have presented the core concept of our 
reasoning framework for alert correlation to address the problem of detection of 
coordinated attacks. MARS framework has been detailed involving multiple 
cooperative components. 
We have defined the underlying principles of our framework based on provides/requires 
model. A combined analysis of IDS’s alerts and description of attack classes are used to 
derive the pre- and post- conditions of each received alerts. A scheme to represent our 
knowledge base has been described using a hierarchal and a multilayer classification. 
Vulnerability modelling is used to support alert verification in order to reduce the 
generated attack graph. The generalisation concept is utilised to predict attack intention. 
A detailed description of the algorithms involved has been presented as well as the 
relationships between the system components. Aggregation and graph reduction 
approaches are also used to obtain the resulting attack events in a manageable graph.         
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CHAPTER 5: MARS FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter has presented the fundamental basis of the proposed framework 
for the multi-stage attack recognition system. In this chapter, the MARS framework is 
practically implemented to evaluate the proposed algorithms discussed in Chapter 4. In 
this chapter, the general architecture of the system is described. Multi-stage attack 
recognition as an alert correlation functionality is a multi-task process. Each task is 
performed by a corresponding component in a sequential manner. Moreover, the design 
details are presented to illustrate how the algorithms are elaborated to obtain the results.  
5.2  MARS components 
The objective of the proposed system is to construct an overview of the security status 
of the system under attack. This functionality consists of a sequence of components, 
with each component responsible for a task and the result of each task supplied to the 
next component. Figure 4.1 in the previous chapter presented the design components 
and the communication between these components. Figure 5.1 shows the workflow of 
the system process starting with the receipt of alerts from the IDS sensors and ending 
with the administrative console.  
 
Figure 5.1 System process flow. 
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5.2.1 Alert collection 
Since the main input of the system is the alert stream generated by an IDS sensor, these 
alerts need to be translated to a generic format. The alert collection component can 
receive alerts from different sensors in various formats. The typical format used in this 
respect is the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [116], which is 
considered the industry standard. In this thesis, multiple sensors to feed the system with 
alerts are not considered due to space limitations and because the implementation of 
such a system is straightforward. Alerts are converted to the standard format and stored 
in the MARS database for effective information search. The standardization is 
performed by an IDS interface (e.g. Snort interface). If a different IDS sensor is used, a 
corresponding interface is required, but the details of this are beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
In our framework, sensor-specific information is converted into attributes and values 
usable by the framework components. The alert names are taken from Snort database 
which are based on vulnerability standards such as CVE and Bugtraq. Each raw alert is 
translated into a standardized alert format and copied to the appropriate fields. The 
attributes contained in the resulting format are shown in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 Description of alert attributes. 
Alert attribute Description 
Alert ID A unique ID identifying the alert 
Sensor ID A unique ID identifying the IDS sensor 
Start Time The time when the attack occurs 
End Time The time when the attack ends 
Source IP Address The source IP address of the detected activity 
Source Port The source port of the detected activity 
Destination IP Address The destination IP address of the detected activity 
Destination Port The destination port of the detected activity 
Signature ID A unique ID identifying the IDS signature 
Signature Priority The severity level of the detected signature 
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Protocol Type The protocol name used in the attacking activity 
Master ID The representative alert ID that represents some aggregated alerts 
Infall Event ID The ID of the corresponding generated event 
 
5.2.2  Adding pre- and post-conditions 
The core of the alert correlation mechanism is the mapping of an elementary alert to its 
pre- and post-conditions. This is to discover any possible relationships between the 
alerts in order to identify the attack patterns. Instances of alerts are created in the 
database with their attributes (IP address, port number and timestamp). All alerts from 
the previous component are processed, as they all are candidates for involvement in the 
alert correlation task. 
The collection of encoded capabilities is constructed using the capability knowledge by 
assigning each alert to its pre and post conditions. For example, the alert 123 shown in 
Figure 5.2 as specified in the knowledge base, has two pre conditions i.e. 100 and 101, 
and two post conditions i.e. 200 and 201. 
Sid:123; pre:100(3);pre:101(3);pos:200(3);pos:201(3) 
Figure 5.2An example of the capability knowledge base specification. 
Two lists are created for each condition set with the format: 
Capability ID (IP Address) , for example: 100(192.0.0.1) 
The initialization of capabilities sets ( pre and post conditions) is implemented to make 
the linking between related alerts faster. 
5.2.3  Alert verification 
IDSs cannot determine whether the occurring attack is likely to be successful. Failed 
attacks in typical cases do not provide further information, because the attacker will find 
another vulnerability to exploit. Running services and vulnerability details gathered by 
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scanners such as Nessus [128] are used to filter alerts. Hence, the amount of processed 
alerts will be reduced to achieve more accuracy. The administrator feedback concerning 
certain attacks can be considered in this respect to achieve more accuracy. Furthermore, 
the false positive rate is the main concern of such systems, so alert verification 
contributes to achieving lower rates of this measure.  
When the correlation process receives false positives as input, the quality of the results 
can be degraded significantly. The goal of the alert verification component is to remove 
alerts that do not represent true attacks. Hence the correlation rules are extended with 
the success of the occurring attack. In the implementation of MARS, a passive 
verification technique is used to provide a higher performance. This is based on the 
assumption of being network and hosts states don’t change frequently over short period 
of time. Nessus scanner is used to scan the protected network to collect all required 
information such as: network configuration, host configuration, running services, and 
detected vulnerabilities. These data is stored in the vulnerability knowledge base to be 
applied in cooperation with the correlation algorithm.     
5.2.4  Alert correlation 
This is the component that implements the proposed correlation algorithm based on the 
pre- and post-conditions of alert instances. The correlation function is performed only 
for alerts that satisfy the conditions. Isolated alerts which are not logically connected are 
saved in the primary correlation container for any further observation. 
Alerts with equivalent attributes and occurring in a certain temporal proximity are 
linked if they satisfy the matching between encoded capabilities. Alert a can be 
considered as causing alert for alert b if a occurs before b and a matching between a 
post conditions and b pre conditions. The matching criteria are more relaxed to 
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maximize detection coverage and that using the generalisation concept in attack 
modelling.  Furthermore, there is no restricted time window to correlate pair of alerts in 
contrast to other proposed systems that are defeated easily by slow-and-low attack. 
However, the administrator has the facility to close any detected event when he/she 
makes sure that there is no further related activities e.g. running service is stopped. The 
correlated alerts which are actually the correlated master alerts (representative of 
aggregated alerts) are saved in the correlation collection. 
5.2.5  Graph reduction 
Generally, the process of graph complexity reduction involves removing some 
redundant graph nodes and edges while keeping the structure of the sequences of the 
attacks. The objective of this component is to remove the transitive edges that represent 
duplicates in the correlation process. The hierarchical approach, which involves 
generalization in relationship discovery, can cause additional links between alerts.  
To keep alert processing to minimum, removing redundant edges is performed during 
the initial sage of the correlation process. This is based on the concept that the 
relationship propagate form parent to children nodes.  However, the removal of edges 
does not affect any loss of data, as the logical connections are specified in layers. 
5.2.6  Event generation 
This is the main component that describes the multi-stage intrusion details. Based on the 
output of alert correlation, a new entry is created for each detected event. However, its 
data is updatable based on the aggregation results of both alerts and events. Any 
upcoming event is compared with previous ones to check for any merging opportunity. 
New events are generated as independent event if at least two alerts are correlated. 
Then, the system checks for any attribute matching with the previous event in addition 
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to any detected logical link based on capabilities information. If a matching is detected 
the two events are combined as single event and the previous event is identified as a 
master event. The event remains open until it is closed either by the administrator or a 
defined time window. The interactive administrative tools provided by the system allow 
the administrator to update or close any open events. Table 5.2 shows the information 
included in each event. 
Table 5.2 Events information. 
Field  Description 
Event ID A unique event identifier 
Start time The earliest start time among involved alerts  
End time The latest end time among involved alerts 
Title The event title constructed by the names of the involved attacks 
Alert count Number of involved alerts 
Priority Importance level of the event based on the severity of involved alerts 
Closed To identify if the event has been identified and closed 
Master ID The ID of the master event if this event has been combined with other event 
 
5.2.7  Alert aggregation 
The alert aggregator component maintains the resulting correlated alerts to minimise the 
redundancy. If a group of alerts share the same source and attack class, it is practical to 
keep only a representative alert and remove any duplicates. This task is done after 
correlation so as not to overload the system by aggregating isolated alerts. The main 
task of this component is to remove redundancy in graph nodes which are representing 
the same attack. There are two levels of aggregation: one is based on the attack 
signature and the other is to extend the aggregation to include all alerts classified as the 
same attack types.  
The aggregation task is performed for all correlated alerts by assigning the first detected 
alert as a master alert. The links between the other alerts (the aggregated ones) are 
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replaced links to the master alert. The start and the end times of the master alert are 
changed to become the earliest and latest times among the aggregated alerts.  However, 
no data will be lost as all the information is saved in the database and the disaggregation 
function is available.   
5.2.8  Attack scenario construction 
The purpose of the attack scenario construction component is to identify high level 
attack patterns that are composed of several individual attacks. For example, consider an 
intruder who first scans a victim host, then breaks into a user account on that host, and 
finally escalates privileges to become the root user. The three steps should be identified 
as belonging to one attack scenario. The attack scenarios are generated as graphs 
composed of nodes and edges: nodes represent the attack name and edges represent the 
logical relationships. The scenario graph is displayed as a summary of the attacker 
activities after performing aggregation and graph reduction to remove redundancy.  
Hence, the final goal of the developed system is to recognise attack stages connected in 
a temporal sequence. The results of event generation and aggregation are expressed in 
an attack graph to describe the attack scenario. An overview of the attack situation is 
displayed for the administrator in the form of an interactive graph. The detailed 
information of each entity in the attack graph can be navigated by the provided 
administrative tools. 
5.2.9  Interactive tools 
The interactive administrative tools are used to provide a dynamic platform. The attack 
scenario is presented as a graph of nodes. To save space, the nodes only show the alert 
name, and other details can be retrieved using the available tools. Reports and results of 
statistical analyses can be also accessed using these tools. Examples of some functions 
can be executed through this component: 
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- Close the open events and that after the administrator makes sure that these events 
will not be used any longer to be combined with other events. This mechanism is 
more reliable than using time windows in addition that the multistage attack 
activities are not frequent to overwhelm the administrator with huge amount of 
administrative tasks. 
- Support the knowledge base with the administrator experience. For example, 
some new unknown attacks which are not identified in the knowledge base can be 
added as temporary or permanent rules.  
- Provide the facility to combine similar events which are not aggregated by the 
system. For example, some attackers try different attack attempts looking for 
some holes in the victim machine.  
- Block IP addresses and send notification about suspicious activities. 
5.3  MARS architecture 
This system is composed of four major sub-systems: a MARS server, a MARS client, 
sensor interfaces (e.g. Snort or Nessus) and a MARS database, as shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3 MARS architecture. 
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These sub-systems can be installed on different machines to take advantage of 
distribution. It has been observed in Chapter 3 the limitations of the performance of 
IDSs, as they require plenty of computational resources. Hence, the MARS system has 
been designed as a stand-alone system running separately from the IDS to avoid any 
impact on the IDS performance. In addition, the database storage to record all alerts 
provides the system with the ability to function as a forensic tool. The server is running 
as a daemon or a service in the background. 
The diagram also shows the communications between the sub-systems. When the 
system starts, two in-memory knowledge bases are created: the capabilities knowledge 
obtained from the attack-defined knowledge, and the vulnerability knowledge supplied 
by the vulnerability scanners, such as Nessus. These details are kept in-memory to allow 
for faster communication and also because they are used frequently. The whole system 
is implemented as an object-oriented design to provide modularity and dynamic data-
structure instantiation. We have made use of C++ programming language to manipulate 
its efficiency.  
The MARS database is the core system storage where the received alerts are handled 
and stored. The correlation, aggregation and event generation results are also saved in 
the database. The interaction with the database is kept to the minimum, as we have 
manipulated the data structures provided by C++ for memory execution. Indexing is 
used for faster access and SQL queries are hardcoded using C++ commands to improve 
execution. The structure of the main database tables and related fields is shown in 
Figure 5.4. 
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Figure.5.4  Main database tables. 
- RulesCollection is a container of all available Snort VRT signatures, bleeding edge 
signatures, community signatures and our developed signatures. Signature ID and 
signature name is a mapping of the information in the original Snort signatures. Each 
signature has a priority field for assigning the degree of severity of the detected attack. 
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The main purpose of the rules collection is the classification of each received alert based 
on the techniques described in Chapter 4. The intrusion category details play a main role 
in specifying the attack scenario and in predicting the possible undetected behaviour. 
Signature direction denotes attack direction, where 0: source address, 1: destination 
address, and 2: bidirectional.  
- InfallEventCollection contains the history of all detected events. An initial record is 
created once a new event is observed. The title of the event is constructed from the 
sequence of intrusion categories. The event remains open for any further joining alert 
until it is closed based on either administrative action or a configurable time period. To 
detect slow-and-low attacks, this period of time can be maximised without affecting the 
system's performance.  
- The final correlation results are stored in the CorrelatedAlerts container, which holds a 
record for each correlated and aggregated events. If the alert belongs to combined 
events, the details of the master and slave events are recorded. Any further aggregation 
will be presented in the AggrCorrelatedAlerts container.  
MARS Client is a sub-system that provides tools offering interactive administrative 
tasks. The graphical user interface is implemented here using the aid of commercial 
tools, namely DevExpress [165], to save on implementation time. Once an event is 
detected, it is directly displayed and the administrator can navigate to obtain detailed 
information. Sensor interfaces are adapters providing communication between the 
MARS system and other tools. For instance, the Snort interface performs alert 
normalization to be compatible with the database formats. A typical deployment of 
these sensors is on different machines.  
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The incoming alerts are directed to the system memory and replicated to the storage 
database. The data format is mostly similar to IDMEF in addition to a few fields 
updated by the system during correlation analysis. For example, the aggregation process 
assigns a master alert for each aggregated group, the MasterID field will be updated 
each time the algorithm executes. Appendix II shows the graphical interface of the 
MARS server and client with some attack graph examples. 
5.4  Real-time and near real-time implementation  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two main algorithms for building an attack graph 
for alert correlation 1) scenario graph algorithms that require complete descriptions of 
all potential combinations of attacks. These approaches suit real-time application, 
though any missing information or different variations of scenarios received will cause 
the correlation function to fail; 2) the other algorithms, of which ours is one, are based 
on an attack type graph such as approaches to model cause and effect conditions, 
vulnerabilities and host information. These approaches are promising as they are more 
dynamic and tolerant of missing descriptions. However, they are mainly implemented in 
offline designs because of high computational requirements. Some efforts have been 
made to implement real-time correlation but most of them rely on a time sliding 
window, which consequently renders the system vulnerable to ―slow-and-low‖ or alert 
flooding attacks.  
Typically, event-driven applications are designed using either relational databases or 
real-time messaging systems [166]. The former approaches are cost-effective and 
provide deep analysis through data history without deadline constraints, but they mostly 
operate in an offline fashion. The latter approaches are capable of functioning in real-
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time processing but experience difficulties in keeping up with inherent complexities in 
correlation systems. 
The main advantage of real-time implementation is the instant detection of attack 
scenarios and a potentially rapid reaction. The disadvantage of these systems is the 
processing of alert streams, which requires the in-memory storage maintenance of a 
large amount of states. In addition, acquired alert data need to be stable for long enough 
so as to obtain an accurate correlation. And that requires a maximum time sliding 
window that is definite even though it is considered large enough. On the other hand, 
offline implementation lacks fast response, which could potentially lead to undetected 
scenarios in the right time to avoid system corruption. However, the usage of a database 
allows for the storage of a huge amount of data, reliable data reduction, dynamic 
updates, and definitely more chance of a comprehensive analysis to achieve higher 
accuracy. 
Hence, we have made a trade-off between responsiveness and reliability by relaxing the 
real-time constraints and restricting the offline requirements. We have defined a small 
constant t seconds, e.g. 10 seconds, as the required interval in which to wait until a very 
small batch of alerts arrive to be processed. The system executes its functionalities on 
the database periodically and this offers a more thorough analysis. This near real-time 
mechanism is to avoid performance problems and the limited available data in real-time 
systems.  
The proposed mechanism is based on the following assumptions: 
1- Even though IDSs generate thousands of alerts per day, the serious attack 
activities are slow-and-low. Persistent attackers will not cause a large noise so as 
avoid notice by the operators. The conducted steps are spaced out over long 
intervals of days or even weeks. Sometimes, in order to defeat time sliding 
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windows in real-time systems, attackers flood the system with huge amounts of 
alerts hiding the real attack. Besides, all techniques used to prevent this type of 
behaviour perform a memory erasure, which certainly causes data loss.  
2- Typically, for the analysis systems to be more accurate, they must be fed by a 
maximum amount of information. Database facilities provide a large amount of 
stored data.  
3- The incremental aggregation mechanism and the database maintenance to ignore 
any redundant and already used data have minimised the performance penalty. 
Every time the system processes a small group of alerts, these are only analyzed 
using the results of the previous stages, without processing all the information in 
the database. 
4- Alert correlation systems are implemented as complementary functions to the 
IDS. Hence, the delay between an alert being reported by the IDS and its 
analysis by the alert correlation system must be small. Extending this delay with 
a small time slot in order to obtain a precise view will not affect the whole 
process. 
5- Alert correlation is not a single task, but a multi-stage functionality: correlation, 
alert aggregation, event aggregation and graph reduction. This complexity 
requires flexible memory and data storage. 
We have implemented a near real-time operation for the proposed alert correlation 
system using a very small time for periodic database access. This will not affect the 
system performance, as shown in the next chapter.  
5.5  Implicit correlation 
Implicit correlation of alerts is used when data analysis brings out some mapping 
between alerts which are indirectly correlated. This approach is mainly based on 
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observing groups of alerts and extracts implicit correlation between them. Other works 
focus on creating an extra layer of relationships between capabilities which can extend 
the algorithm complexity. The multilayer attack classification mechanism refers each 
alert to different layers of attack categories. The alerts share the same generic attack 
class are correlated implicitly to bridge the gap which can be caused by missing alerts. 
However, the increase in number of the graph edges can be reduced using graph 
reduction techniques.  
The implicit correlation is also used in our implementation for performance purposes. 
The aggregation mechanism is used to eliminate the number of redundant alerts as well 
as to reduce the search complexity. The representative alert is treated on behalf of the 
other aggregated alerts in the database. 
The requires/provides model [121] is primarily based on semi-explicit correlation 
between logical attack conditions, unlike scenario-based approaches where logical and 
temporal relations are hardcoded explicitly. Thus, the semi-explicit mechanism is 
extended to consider implicit correlations between attacks. Relaxing the attack 
definitions from specific to general provides the facility for implicit correlation, as 
shown in Chapter 4. Moreover, we assume that attack conditions propagate from an 
attack to others that classified in the same intrusion category. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, graph reduction techniques are not intended to drop information; 
instead, they are intended to make use of implicit connections.  
 a b c d 
time 
 
Figure 5.5  Example of implicit correlation. 
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Consider the four alerts shown in Figure 5.5, which are related to the same scenario 
detected in a temporal order. Alert a has implicit logical connections with alerts c and 
d. There is no need to create a link between c, d and a, as the attack conditions 
propagate from a to c, d and through to b. However, if c is missed, a link is created 
between d and b. Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 shows how the knowledge representation 
mechanism produces such a relationship. Most generic capabilities used to create a 
causal relation between two alerts are not supposed to be correlated directly in the same 
way as b and d. Moreover, the aggregation algorithm provides alert representatives for 
implicit correlations, and hence produces less computational complexity. In [33], alerts 
are classified first, hence more generic attack descriptions are produced, and then if two 
classes are correlated, all their elements can be correlated. This mechanism can increase 
the false positive rate and consume the system's resources. The capabilities themselves 
are classified to provide this generalization concept. 
5.6  Conclusion 
This chapter describes the development and the implementation details of our MARS 
framework. A system comprising several components has been developed to provide an 
evaluation for the proposed algorithms in chapter 4. The MARS architecture has been 
presented involving the MARS server, the MARS client and the administrator 
interactive tools. The system has been implemented to work as a near real time system 
providing a thoroughly analysis and at the same time responding with a short latency. 
We have also discussed our method of the implicit correlation to keep the process of the 
alerts to the minimum.      
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
6.1   Introduction 
The implementation and design of our framework have been illustrated in the previous 
chapter. To test and validate our approach, we have implemented various experiments in 
a variety of test situations. A test-bench has been set up to examine system response and 
to measure the accuracy and performance of the algorithms and their underlying 
modules. A series of experiments have been conducted starting with DARPA2000, a 
benchmark for testing alert correlation approaches. Then a dataset collected from a 
controlled environment is used to measure system functionality. We have demonstrated 
the system's detection accuracy using two of the most common attacks in cyber crimes: 
SQLIA and Botnet attacks. And finally, a performance evaluation of our system in high 
speed networks has been conducted.  
6.2  Evaluation methodology 
It has been discussed in Chapter 3 the evaluation of IDS issues. The evaluation of alert 
correlation systems shares the same difficulties, as these are complement systems to 
IDS.  
- Detection Coverage: Alert correlation systems rely entirely on the coverage 
detection capability of IDSs. Incomplete signature descriptions will lead to 
undetected activities. In addition, coverage of knowledge-base information 
affects the correlation process. Hence, it is essential to have attack signatures 
and correlation rules to achieve maximum coverage. However, correlation 
systems are more flexible in terms of the impact of missed descriptions. In 
contrast, if the IDS misses an alert, there is no way to recover it. If generalized 
techniques are considered, they usually result in a high rate of false positives in 
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IDSs. However, in alert correlation systems, generalized techniques maximize 
the coverage of the correlation process with minimum impact of false positive 
rates.  
- False positives: An essential requirement of alert correlation systems is to 
reduce false positive rates, as these affect IDS function. The false positives 
generated by alert correlation are considered inconsistent and will be ignored. 
The impact of this rate is less, as the construction of attack scenarios requires 
only real persistent attacks. Some extra edges will be attached to the resulting 
graph due to the broad knowledge description. However, the level of consistency 
of these relations is low and only few nodes are involved along the attack path.  
- Detection Accuracy: This measure indicates the detection rate of the true attack. 
It is required to expand the detection accuracy rate while false positive rates are 
kept to a minimum.  
- Performance in high speed networks: The separation of the alert correlation 
system from the IDS distributes the required processing power and offers higher 
performance. Some measures are considered in this respect, such as CPU usage 
and memory requirements. In typical deployment, the functions that have to be 
performed by the correlation system require less than the IDS itself if the IDS 
software implementation is considered. In real-time systems, the memory 
limitation is the main concern, though near real-time implementation provides 
higher performance. 
The typical IDS evaluation methodology [62, 132, 167, 168] is to run the system under 
test against a labelled dataset. The results obtained are analysed and evaluation 
measures are calculated. In most evaluation approaches, the aim is to accomplish a high 
rate of accuracy (soundness) and broader coverage (completeness). Soundness is the 
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capability of distinguishing between legitimate and attack traffic. Completeness is the 
ability to achieve maximum detection coverage to include attacks and their variations. 
In an alert correlation context, accuracy is measured using the system's ability to 
provide a precise recognition of causal relationships between alerts. The completeness 
criterion is determined by assessing the maximum correlation rate that the system can 
achieve. In other words, the aim is to detect diversity of complex multi-stage attacks 
with a minimum level of false positives rates.  
In this respect, four types of criteria are considered to evaluate our alert correlation 
system: 
 Functional characteristics: to evaluate the basic functionality to perform the 
correlation objective.  
 Accuracy and completeness characteristics: to evaluate the quality of the 
correlation function. 
 Reduction characteristics: to evaluate the system's capability of eliminating data 
redundancies.  
 Performance characteristics: to evaluate system efficiency, including system 
capacity under different traffic conditions and resource consumption (CPU, 
memory, disk utilization).  
6.3  Evaluation metrics 
In signal processing, Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) [169] curves are in use 
to assess the quality of a receiver. Similarly, ROC curves have been used to evaluate 
IDSs, such as [170, 171]. The typical metrics used to illustrate IDS assessment are 
detection rate (the average of detected actions to the observable ones) and the false 
positive rate (1-detection rate). For signature-based IDSs as non-parametric IDSs, a 
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single point is used to represent the ROC instead of a curve. Furthermore, IDS measures 
are non-binary, in contrast with signal processing metrics. For this reason, more generic 
metrics are considered to assess our correlation system, which are inspired from 
Information Retrieval (IR) systems [172]. The four measures used are: 
 True positives (TP): denotes the correctly correlated alerts. 
 True negatives (TN): denotes the correctly uncorrelated alerts. 
 False positives (FP): denotes the incorrectly correlated alerts. 
 False negatives (FN): denotes the incorrectly uncorrelated alerts. 
In IR, the confusion matrix is used to measure precision and recall rate. In an alert 
correlation context, precision is used to measure the soundness of the results and recall 
is used to measure the completeness of the results. Figure 6.1 shows the measurement 
terms applied to the correlation problem. 
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Figure 6.1. Confusion matrix. 
The recall rate denotes the proportion of TP (correctly correlated alerts) to the total 
number of TP and FN (incorrectly uncorrelated alerts). 
The true positive rate is the correctly correlated alert rate which is denoted by the recall 
rate, and the optimal measure is 100%. 
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The precision rate denotes the proportion of TP (correctly correlated alerts) to the total 
number of TP and FP (incorrectly correlated alerts). 
          
  
     
 
Hence, the true alerts correlated by the system (assigned to be related but could be not 
related) are the total of TP and FP. On the other hand, the related alerts (known to be 
related and must be correlated) are the total of TP and FN. The optimal result is to 
achieve a higher recall rate with a higher precision rate, which means maximum 
precision and detection coverage. Figure 6.2 illustrates the relationships between the 
confusion matrix measurements. 
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Figure 6.2. Relations between the confusion matrix measures. 
The overall system accuracy can be identified by calculating the percentage of correct 
results (true positives and true negatives) to the total of all identified results. 
 
         
     
           
 
6.4   Datasets 
It has been identified that the unavailability of enough benchmarking datasets is the 
major difficulty in evaluating IDSs in general [132]. However, there are some available 
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datasets have been used to evaluate alert correlation systems, such as DARPA2000 
[161], Defcon [54] and honeypot datasets. However, the DARPA2000 dataset is still a 
reference point in the evaluation process for the comparison of results. The DARPA 
dataset was originally created to assess IDS sensors and is not designed for alert 
correlation systems. Even though it has received a high volume of criticism [22] for lack 
of realism of background traffic, being old and not reflecting the real attack scenarios, it 
is the only well-documented available dataset. The Defcon dataset, a network capture of 
a competition for hackers, is also commonly used to assess the correlation process. 
However, it is different from real-world traffic because it contains a huge volume of 
attack traffic only and with very limited IP addresses. The offline nature of such 
recorded traces creates some problems: first, the sensor alerts are not included and we 
have to use a certain sensor to regenerate the actual alerts, which may be different from 
others based on the sensor coverage. Second, the verification process is typically 
obtained from the status of the target at the attack time, and that has to be done 
manually if using capture files. Furthermore, most of these traces are synthetically 
created and lack a mix of the normal and anomalous traffic existing in real-life traffic.  
On the other hand, the real traces recorded from real-life networks lack necessary 
ground truth. And the attack traffic in these data does not contain enough activities to 
represent successful multi-stage attacks [173]. In the main, datasets can be collected 
using five different methods: 
1- A purely attack dataset with no background traffic, which is very simple to 
produce and is only used for basic validation of detection functionalities. 
2- A dataset consisting of real background traffic obtained from production 
networks and synthetic attacks, which is similar to real-life traffic to some 
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extent. However, it is not fully controlled, has privacy concerns and is not for 
public use. 
3- A dataset similar to 2- above but where the background traffic is sanitised to 
provide semi-real life traffic. However, traffic data sanitation is a cumbersome 
and error-prone task.  
4- An entirely pure real dataset with real background traffic and real attacks 
captured from a production network environment. This method requires 
comprehensive analysis and data labelling, which is difficult, in addition to 
privacy concerns and being unrestrained dataset. Moreover, collected attacks are 
not only insufficient but require lengthy observation, which makes analysis 
difficult.  
5- A dataset with both synthetic attacks and background traffic. The main 
advantage of this method is that the test environment is totally controlled and 
there is no potential for non-identified variables. Consequently, the results 
attained are more reliable and accurate. The drawbacks of this mechanism are 
that it is very costly because various pieces of hardware and software as well as 
services have to be installed, and the fact that it naturally does not reflect real-
life traffic.  
Our evaluation methodology is to use different datasets as follows: 
- Datasets traces from .pcap files using the same timestamp for comparison 
purposes. 
- Datasets obtained from a controlled setup to simulate real-life traffic. 
6.5  DARPA 2000 datasets 
DARPA 2000 datasets, including LLDDOS 1.0 and LLDDOS 2.0 [55], are often used 
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to evaluate IDSs and alert correlation systems. They consist of two multi-stage attack 
scenarios to launch Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS). The evaluation goal 
is to test the effectiveness of our approach to recognize attack scenarios, to correctly 
correlate the alerts, and to minimize the false positives. This experiment is carried out 
mainly for functional testing to see how the system reconstructs attack stages. A 
reduction test is also studied in this respect; however, the background traffic in this 
dataset is limited. We have used these datasets for their available ground truth to assess 
our correlation approach and to compare our results with those of other researchers. 
These datasets do not contain the actual alerts from the IDS sensors, and hence we have 
generated them using a Snort sensor. The resulting alerts can be slightly different from 
others, but the generalized steps are similar. 
Both DARPA 2000 datasets contains attacks conducted in stages. The attacker first 
probes the target system to identify the live machines, then tries to breaks into the 
system, then installs the DDoS software, and finally launches the DDoS attack to an off-
side network. The difference between the two datasets is that the LLDDOS2.0 includes 
more sophisticated stages and stealthy attacks. In LLDDOS 2.0 a HINFO query has 
been used instead of ICMP PING for scanning live hosts. We have tested our methods 
on both, using the traces of the DMZ and the INSIDE network. We have used a player 
[174] to replay the .pcap files using the same delay between packets in the original 
traces. Snort 2.8.3, with maximum coverage configuration, has been used to generate 
elementary alerts that are saved in an MSSQL database connected to the MARS engine. 
6.5.1  Dataset description 
To evaluate the basic functionality of our systems, we replay the individual .pcap files 
corresponding to each attack phase as given by the dataset documentation. These .pcap 
files are replayed in a series based on their temporal order to be analysed by the MARS 
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engine. The main file containing background traffic is also replayed to obtain other 
necessary measurements. However, different researchers use different IDS sensors or 
different configurations of the same sensor to generate alerts from these datasets. In 
addition, the actual alerts collected during the simulation in the DARPA2000 dataset are 
not recorded. For this reason, we had to present the detailed description of the received 
alerts. Moreover, to understand how the correlation method identifies the causal 
relationships between Snort’s alerts, the related alerts generated by Snort during the five 
phases of the attack of INSIDE1.0 and INSIDE2.0 are summarized in Table 6.1. Each 
phase has triggered certain groups of alerts according to the attacker’s activities. In 
addition, Table 6.2 gives some traffic statistics of the four dataset captures. As 
mentioned in early chapters of this thesis, the performance of any alert correlation 
system relies entirely on the underlying IDS performance. In other words, if the IDS 
sensor misses some attacks, the correlation system will consequently miss the attack. 
However, missed attacks can be predicted implicitly by our generalized knowledge 
presented in Chapter 4. 
In Phase 1, the attacker performed ICMP PING from a single outside IP address 
(202.77.162.213) to multiple class C subnets to discover live hosts in the target network 
and 10 hosts were live. In our knowledge-base, the alerts ICMP PING and ICMP Echo 
Replay have no pre-conditions, but they have a post-condition of Disclosure of a Live 
Host. Therefore, when MARS detects these two alerts, it creates a potential relation 
edge with corresponding attributes. And any other alert has a pre-condition of 
Disclosure of a Live Host targeting the same IP address considering the time 
constraints; it will therefore be correlated to the first detected alert. 
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Table 6.1 Description of the attack. 
Phase Dataset Alert name # 
Phase 1: Probing 
INSIDE1.0 
 
ICMP PING 
ICMP Echo Reply 
20 
20 
INSIDE2.0 No alerts  
Phase 2: 
Service mapping 
INSIDE1.0 
 
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 
RPC portmap Solaris sadmind port query 
udp request 
RPC sadmind UDP PING 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port 
Unreachable 
76 
76 
 
3 
72 
INSIDE2.0 
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 
RPC portmap Solaris sadmind port query 
udp request 
RPC sadmind query with root credentials 
attempt UDP 
RPC sadmind UDP 
NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE 
CLIENT_DOMAIN overflow attempt 
2 
4 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
2 
Phase 3: 
Break-ins 
INSIDE1.0 
 
RPC portmap Solaris sadmind port query 
udp request 
RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 
RPC sadmind UDP 
NETMGT_PROC_SERVICE 
CLIENT_DOMAIN overflow attempt 
RPC sadmind query with root credentials 
attempt UDP 
INFO TELNET Access 
28 
 
14 
14 
 
 
14 
 
4 
INSIDE2.0 No alerts  
Phase 4: 
Installation of 
mainstream software 
INSIDE1.0 
RSERVICES rsh root 8 
INSIDE2.0 
The same as in Phase 2 with different 
source IP address 
 
Phase 5: 
Launching DDoS 
attack 
INSIDE1.0 
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 
BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic 
SNMP trap tcp 
SNMP request tcp 
4 
3 
1 
1 
INSIDE2.0 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port 
Unreachable 
1 
 
Table 6.2 DARPA2000 dataset statistics. 
Dataset INSIDE 1.0 DMZ 1.0 INSIDE 2.0 DMZ 2.0 
# Snort Alerts 369 1262 25 12 
#Alerts types 15 14 6 6 
Protocol distribution TCP 9% 5% 9% 17% 
UDP 61% 33% 91% 83% 
ICMP 30% 62% 0% 0% 
# Src IP addresses 16 20 3 2 
# Dest IP addresses 22 769 3 2 
 
In Phase 2, the hosts that are identified they are live, they are port mapped to determine 
the running services. The attacker looks for a sadmind daemon running on Solaris live 
hosts. Three hosts are running a sadmind service (172.16.115.20, 172.16.112.50, and 
172.16.112.10), which are potential targets, creating a number of alerts by Snort. 
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According to our knowledge-base, these alerts have a pre-condition of Disclosure of a 
Live Host capability and a post-condition of Disclosure of running service capability 
sharing the same destination IP addresses of the alerts detected in Phase 1 and with later 
timestamps. Hence, a correlation has been detected between these alerts and the two 
alerts reported in Phase 1. Other activities associated with the discovery of the port 
number connected to the sadmind service generate other alerts, which also are 
correlated. 
In Phase 3, the attacker has already gained the knowledge of the running sadmind 
daemons, and vulnerabilities trials are performed in order to break into the system. 
Remote-to-root attempts against each identified host are executed to cause buffer 
overflow attacks. The detected alerts are shown in Table 6.1, including overflow 
attempts and queries with root credentials. These alerts are consequences of the 
disclosure of a running service and associated port number. The impacts of these alerts 
on the target machine are potential System Access, Remote Access and Admin Access. 
The attacker then tries to verify the level of achieved access using TELNET ACCESS, 
creating the corresponding response from the IDS sensor. 
In Phase 4, a .rhosts file is installed in /tmp directory in order to start up the mstream-
sol software on the victim hosts.  
In Phase 5, the attacker manually launches the DDoS using TELNET login on the 
victim machines running the master daemons of the mstream software. These activities 
are not detected by the IDS sensor; however, they can be detected as bad traffic 
behaviour if Snort is configured to do so. All related packets have spoofed source IP 
addresses using random TCP ports on the victim machines.  
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LLDDOS2.0 is also a DDoS multi-stage attack using a stealthy behaviour to avoid 
detection. Instead of ICMP PING, a DNS HINFO query is used to find out which hosts 
are Solaris. HINFO records contain information regarding running OSs, only sadmind 
query is performed, and those hosts are reported as Solaris. As shown in Table 6.1, there 
are undetected activities in Phase 1. In Phase 2, the same alerts detected in INSIDE1.0 
are detected, including port mapping and overflow attempts. The victim machine 
(172.16.115.20) is broken into and is used to launch the attack. For this reason, it is not 
necessary to consider DMZ capture. In LLDDOS1.0, the attack is accomplished from 
outside the network, so DMZ and INSIDE captures should be considered.  
We have conducted our test to evaluate the functionality of MARS by replaying the 
individual .pcap files of each phase. Then, the whole traffic capture is used in order to 
evaluate the reduction functionality. 
6.5.2 Functional test 
The five .pcap files are replayed in a temporal order using the same timestamps to 
simulate the real attack. An interval of approximately three hours of traffic is analyzed 
by Snort using our test-bench, and alerts are sent to the MARS server where the 
database is located. The detected events evolve over time instead of by batch analysis. 
The results obtained are shown in Table 6.3, both with and without the alert verification 
mechanism.  
Table 6.3 Functional test results, DE: detected events, RA: related alerts, CRBAG: Correlation 
Rate Before Aggregation, CRAAG: Correlation Rate After Aggregation. 
Dataset Alert verification disabled Alert verification enabled 
DE RA CRBAG CRAAG DE RA CRBAG CRAAG 
INSIDE1.0 10 325 2164 84 3 91 661 48 
DMZ1.0 18 984 1464 138 3 91 439 52 
INSIDE2.0 2 16 24 16 2 16 16 16 
DMZ2.0 1 8 12 8 1 8 8 12 
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The number of detected events are shown in Figure 6.3, and it is clear that this number 
is reduced using the verification techniques. Only three events associated with 
successful attacks are identified. For the datasets INSIDE2.0 and DMZ2.0, there is no 
reduction because the attacker has only targeted Solaris systems.  
                               Figure.6.3 Detected events in the functional test. 
- INSIDE1.0: the system has detected a total of 10 events evolved over time. All events 
are related to the actual attack; however, only three events are related to successful 
attacks associated with the IP addresses (172.16.112.10, 172.16.112.50, and 
172.16.115.20). This is determined by the vulnerability model to verify the potential of 
successful attacks. The three events are similar in stages as the attacker 
(202.77.162.213) has performed the same sequence of attack attempts, as shown in 
Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4. Attack graph of the three detected events. 
It should be noted that the alerts displayed in Figure 6.4 are aggregated alerts based on 
our aggregation algorithm discussed in Chapter 4. Phase 5 is not detected because Snort 
itself does not detect any activity explicitly said to be a DDoS attack. However, if Snort 
decoders are enabled, 502 alerts classified as bad traffic are detected, which could be a 
sign of DDoS behaviour. It is not reliable to correlate these alerts, as spoofed IP 
addresses are used and this will have a negative impact on system performance, 
producing a high volume of false positives in real life. Detecting the installation of 
suspicious software in a protected network is more important than detecting actual 
DDoS activities because the attack source will be under control in its initial stages. 
Certain other events are detected if the alert verification is disabled reflecting 
unsuccessful attacks, such as the host (172.16.115.87) shown in Figure 6.5. The attacker 
has carried out the scanning stage and then a sadmind service discovery has been 
performed; however, the target host has not responded and the attack attempt is ended 
after two stages. This behaviour is considered a medium-priority event by MARS, as the 
target host is not running a sadmind service. 
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Figure 6.5. Attack graph of non-critical events(INSIDE1.0) detected by MARS. 
- INSIDE2.0: The nature of the LLDDOS2.0 multi-stage attack is to be stealthy, 
reducing the noise amount over the target network. MARS has detected two events 
associated with the hosts (172.16.115.20, and 172.16.112.50) and there is no 
scanning stage. Only eight alerts (five aggregated alerts) are involved in each event 
and three out of five stages are detected, as shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6. Attack graph of the events detected in INSIDE.2.0. 
The alert verification technique does not reduce the number of detected events, as the 
attacker only targets Solaris hosts where a sadmind daemon is running. 
6.5.3 Accuracy reduction evaluation 
In our initial work [175], certain experiments with DARPA 2000 datasets have been 
performed to comparatively validate our approach. The goal of this initial evaluation 
was to test the effectiveness of MARS in recognizing attack scenarios, correctly 
correlating alerts, and minimizing false positives. In addition to our system, the system 
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developed by [35] (TIAA) is used for comparative evaluation. Table 6.4 shows the 
results obtained, and a few main points can be summarized: 
- Snort has not detected the behaviour of launching the DDoS attack itself; 
however, the sequence of the attack has been detected.  
- Certain different alerts are related to the same attack, such as sadmind daemon 
attempts. However, these alerts are not ignored because the correlation system should 
identify such cases. 
- In the second scenario of the attack, a large amount of behaviour went undetected 
due to the stealthy nature of the attack. However, the correlation system has to 
recognize the security situation by discovering the causal relationships between alerts. 
It is clear from Table 6.4 that the rate of both false positives and false negatives in 
LLDDOS1.0 have been improved. However, the unsatisfactory results from the 
experiment of the second dataset LLDDOS2.0 are similar to the TIAA system due to the 
inability of Snort to detect all the attack activities. To measure the effectiveness of the 
proposed system, the false positives and the false negatives are calculated according to 
the definition of the confusion matrix presented in section 6.2. 
Table 6.4 Comparative results to evaluate MARS effectiveness. 
 LLDDOS1.0 LLDDOS2.0 
 DMZ Inside DMZ Inside 
Elementary alerts 3684 720 1214 199 
Related alerts  1262 369 12 25 
# correlated alerts (relevant) 206 182 8 7 
# correlated alerts (detected)  
TIAA 275 235 13 11 
MARS 223 198 11 11 
# correctly correlated alerts 
(TP) 
TIAA 174 155 3 6 
MARS 184 165 3 6 
# Incorrectly uncorrelated 
alerts (FN) 
TIAA 32 27 5 1 
MARS 22 17 5 1 
False positive rate 
TIAA 25.1% 22.5% 38.5% 36.4% 
MARS 8.25% 8.1% 27.3% 36.4% 
False negative rate 
TIAA 15.5% 14.8% 62.5% 14.3% 
MARS 10.7% 7.23% 62.5% 14.3% 
176 
 
 
The graph in Figure 6.7 shows the main evaluation metrics, which are the false positives 
and false negatives of both systems. It is clear that MARS achieved better performance 
in all dataset traces. However, the high level of false positives for DMZ2.0 traces is 
justifiable because most of the attack activities have been conducted from inside the 
local network. The outside attacker has broken into a vulnerable host and continued 
attacking other hosts locally. 
 
                       Figure.6.7 The main evaluation metrics of MARS and TIAA. 
In the other previous works, the accuracy measurements are mainly based on the 
number of correlated alerts regardless of how many correlation instances are associated 
with the same alert. For example, there is no difference between two situations when 
alert a is correlated with alert b, and the same alert a is correlated three times with b, c 
and d. This case in our evaluation is considered to provide a more accurate assessment. 
To achieve more accuracy, the number of relationships between alerts is considered 
instead of only the number of correlated alerts. Providing a ground truth for a dataset 
based on correlation instances is not an easy task and can be very difficult for huge 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
DMZ 1.0 INSIDE 1.0 DMZ 2.0 INSIDE 2.0
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 (
%
)
Data sets
TIAA(FP)
MARS(FP)
TIAA(FN)
MARS(FN)
177 
 
datasets. Our system has been evaluated using this mechanism on the DARPA dataset 
because of extensive data description available. In addition, the dataset has been 
comprehensively analyzed, assigning each single packet to its associated behaviour. 
This has been achieved by a manual effort in addition to automatic analysis using 
certain tools, such as BASE [176]. For each alert received from the Snort sensor, all 
possible correlation chances are computed and are categorized according to whether or 
not they are related to the main scenario. It should be noted that this process focused on 
the four stages of the DDoS attack detected by the sensor.  
The reduction functionality is vital in alert correlation systems in order to measure the 
system's capability to minimize alert redundancy and false alarm ratios. For this reason, 
experiments have been implemented on the LLDDOS traffic .pcap files using whole 
recorded packets including background traffic. This methodology gives us a broader 
evaluation context beyond detection functionality. Accuracy metrics are calculated to 
determine recall, precision and accuracy rates. Our analysis results for the DARPA 
dataset are summarized in Table 6.5  
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 Alert verification disabled  Alert verification enabled 
 LLDOS1.0 LLDOS2.0 LLDOS1.0 LLDOS2.0 
 DMZ Inside DMZ Inside DMZ Inside DMZ Inside 
# elementary alerts 3684 720 1214 199 3684 720 1214 199 
# related alerts  1262 369 12 25 131 171 12 16 
Correlation rate  
# relevant correlations 1849 2915 61 91 530 623 27 33 
# detected correlations 1788 2959 69 96 528 628 26 37 
TP 1636 2731 42 67 513 613 18 28 
FP 152 228 27 29 15 15 8 4 
FN 213 184 19 14 17 10 9 2 
TN 340 322 16 23 58 37 8 28 
Recall rate (%) 88.4% 93.7% 60.9% 73.6% 96.8% 98.4% 60.3% 87.5% 
Precision rate (%) 91.5% 92.3% 68.9% 82.7% 97.2% 97.6% 68.3% 93.3% 
Accuracy 84.4% 88.1% 55.8% 67.7% 94.7% 96.3% 63% 90.3% 
Correlations with aggregation 177 156 22 65 66 103 12 16 
# detected events 25 17 3 6 3 3 1 1 
# aggregated alerts  135 114 17 37 36 50 8 14 
Reduction rate 96.3% 84.2% 98.6% 81.4% 99.1% 93.1% 99.3% 92.9% 
Table 6.5   Evaluation results of the DARPA datasets – accuracy test. 
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Figures 6.8 to 6.11 illustrate the key results presented in Table 6.5. Our proposed 
system has achieved high levels of accuracy among the datasets in LLDDOS1.0, and 
acceptable levels in LLDDOS2.0. The only low accuracy rate recorded is from the 
analysis of the DMZ2.0 dataset, and of which we are aware because the actual attack 
was performed inside the network. The vulnerability model to verify the importance of 
alerts is also showing a considerable improvement. This is apparent from the number of 
detected events in each dataset. For instance, in DMZ1.0, the number of events has been 
reduced from 25 events to only 3 related events. The overall accuracy rates are higher if 
alert verification is used and satisfactory for other tests. In addition, the volume of alert 
information has been significantly reduced, achieving more than a 90% reduction rate in 
most test cases. 
 
Figure 6.8  Recall rate (%) of the DARPA dataset. 
 
Figure 6.9 Precision rate (%) of the DARPA dataset. 
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Figure 6.10 Overall accuracy rate (%) of the DARPA dataset. 
 
Figure 6.11  Alert reduction rate (%) of DARPA dataset. 
6.6  Real-life experiments in a controlled setup 
To mitigate the problems in the previous datasets, a controlled network setup 
environment has been used to simulate real attack stages. The proposed system has been 
evaluated in a real high-speed network composed of actual and virtualised machines 
connected via switch. Figure 6.12 shows the experimental setup, where multiple 
machines are designated to communicate with services installed on our servers. This is 
to reflect the normal background traffic that can be found in real-world scenarios. The 
false positives generating machine is to add some noise by creating different isolated 
attacks to different machines. The attacking machine is used to carry out the real attack. 
The Snort sensor is connected to the switch's monitoring port in order to analyse the 
passing traffic.  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
DMZ1.0 INSIDE1.0 DMZ2.0 INSIDE2.0
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
(%
)
Data sets
Alert Verification -disabled
Alert verification -enabled
0
20
40
60
80
100
DMZ1.0 INSIDE1.0 DMZ2.0 INSIDE2.0
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 (
%
)
Data sets
Alert Verification -disabled
Alert verification -enabled
181 
 
                                                                                                        
                                                           
                     
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                      
Background Traffic 
(Win , Linux) 
Background Traffic 
(Win , Linux) 
Attacking Machine Servers 
Victim  Machine False Positives 
Generating Machine  
  
Figure 6.12. Test bench. 
To produce a reliable evaluation test, the following conditions are considered: 
1- The traffic should contain malicious attack traffic as well as false positives, 
because in a typical case the IDS sensor generates a high amount of false alarms. 
In addition, some isolated real attacks should be injected to assess the correlation 
system’s capability.  
2- The environment should be controlled and every single action should be 
documented. In this respect, the traffic of each machine has been recorded 
individually and reanalysed it by Snort after the experiment. This is in order to 
determine the original source of each generated alert. The total alert repository is 
compared by individual alert containers in order to obtain a ground truth for our 
evaluation. 
3- The truth file is generated manually by matching individual alerts to the attack 
stages. For the sake of simplicity and accuracy, each attack stage is performed 
using different IP addresses, which are then changed to the original values. Each 
group of alerts is assigned to the corresponding attack stage.  
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We have evaluated our approaches using two common Internet attacks as case studies: 
Botnet and SQLIA. 
6.6.1  Botnet attack experiment 
The Botnet attack is a multi-stage and coordinated process, and to detect such activity 
we need to obtain the whole picture of the attacker behaviour. Network-based and host-
based IDSs can detect certain attacks based on their signatures or protocol analyses. 
However, detected events are treated as isolated activities and uncountable variations of 
Botnets are discovered every day. Attackers tend to change their fingerprints to avoid 
detection by IDS rules despite the fact that the general behaviours are similar. Even 
though the IDS misses some attacks involved in Botnet activity, the network 
administrator is still aware of the global view of a suspected Botnet behaviour. In 
addition, according to several behaviour analyses [177, 178], Botnet communications 
and activities are similar regardless of the common name of any used malicious 
software. For instance, Zeus, Kneber and Bredolab [177] are variations of the same 
malicious modular Botnets. 
BotnetMaster
victim machine
C&C server
Initial Infection stage
Second Infection satge
 
Figure 6.13. Botnet lifecycle. 
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In spite of the fact that different Botnets have been identified in the field of security 
analysis, almost all follow similar steps, which are known as Botnet lifecycles. These 
sequences are shown in Figure 6.13 and summarized as follows: 
1) Initial infection stage: This stage involves scanning for systems running vulnerable 
services or responding to backdoors. 
2) Second infection stage: Remote malicious code is loaded and software is installed in 
the target machine using one or more available attack vectors. The infected system is 
ordered to download the actual Botnet software from a dedicated Bot server. Then, 
the code is executed and the machine becomes a Botnet member. 
3) Connection to the C&C stage: The infected machine connects to the attacker and 
receives commands to be configured and updated using C&C channels over IRC or 
HTTP. In this stage, the actual Botnet activities begin. 
4) Attacking other machines stage: Scanning activities are maintained to discover un-
patched and vulnerable systems to launch further possible infections. 
5) Maintenance stage: Depending upon the capabilities of the target machine, the 
attacker commands the Botnet members to download binaries, to connect to another 
C&C server and to become involved in attacking other victims. The attacker also has 
to be certain that all members can be reached using the Fast Flux DNS technique 
[179] to hide malicious code deliveries under all dynamic network conditions. 
Zeus [177, 180] Botnet is one of the emerging modular Botnets reflecting the darkness 
of cyber crime world, first identified in 2007. It is also known as banking crimeware 
and was motivated initially to steal banking credentials and account information. Some 
of its abilities include stealing data submitted by HTTP forms, emails and FTP account 
information, stealthy injection of HTML on the fly, and all redirection activities to trap 
victims. It is a software package with GUI and its builder is responsible for creating all 
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necessary files such as executable files, PHP files and SQL templates in a straight 
forward manner.  
An older version of Zeus (as the new versions are sold by licence) has been installed on 
one of our machines in our lab and on an isolated network. We have followed the 
typical real-life scenario in simulating the traffic communications between the Bot 
master and the victim machines. The simulated network is monitored by Snort and the 
MARS engine. Snort is configured with all rules enabled including: VRT [23], 
bleeding-Edge [181], Community, and Emerging Threat rules (ET) [182]. 
6.6.2  The basic functionality test for Botnet experiment 
In this section, a simulation of the Zeus Botnet attack has been used to test the detection 
efficiency of the proposed approach. We have pursued a Botnet scenario as occurs in 
real networks, as described later in this section. Initially, the network traffic used 
consisted of attack traffic only in order to assess the effectiveness of MARS. The 
transmitted traffic has been recorded individually in .pcap files for further analysis. 
Based on the typical Botnet scenario, each attacking action is assigned to its 
corresponding stage. The attack steps and their related alerts are shown as follows: 
1)  The attacker starts scanning, looking for vulnerable systems to exploit or to install a 
backdoor in the target machine. In this scenario, the attacker will use a new identified 
application flaw, which is CVE-2010-0188 [39], Adobe Reader in versions earlier than 
9.3.1. An embedded executable code launch command can be used to infect the target 
machine. Metasploit [26] is used to perform this job by copying a malformed malicious 
PDF document to the victim machine. Snort has triggered two signatures related to 
scanning activity and three other signatures in connection to Shellcode and CVE-2010-
0188 vulnerability. As shown in Figure 6.14, the five alarms are correlated in a 
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sequence. This scenario is not necessarily Botnet activity, because it could be any other 
attempt to obtain system access.  
sid: 1394 SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP 
sid: 16490 SPECIFIC-THREATS Adobe Reader malformed TIFF remote code execution attempt  
sid: 15013 WEB-MISC Adobe Portable Document Format file download attempt 
 
 
Figure 6.14. First attack stage. 
2) The target host is infected and starts to connect to the C&C server to download 
binaries and configuration files. An HTTP GET request is sent to the C&C server to 
obtain encrypted configuration files. While these files are encrypted and their names 
and since the URLs are random, it is very difficult for Snort and all other signature-
based IDS to detect such files. However, an alarm has been triggered in this stage 
recognizing the name of the configuration file. These signatures have been added to 
Snort VRT rules in version 2.8.6.1 in July 2010 [23]. 
sid: 2008100 ET TROJAN PRG/ Zeus InfoStealer Trojan Config Download 
sid:16912 BLACKLIST URI request for known malicious URI - net/cfg2.bin 
The previous signatures are part of a group of signatures to block certain suspicious 
URI requests containing malicious websites tracked by Zeus Tracker [180]. 
3) Followed by the configuration files, an HTTP POST request was sent to the same 
C&C server used in the second stage to fetch PHP files, and again the data in POST 
BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN 
NMAP -f -sS 
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NOOP 
BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN 
NMAP -sS 
SPECIFIC-THREATS Adobe 
Reader malformed TIFF remote 
code execution attempt 
WEB-MISC Adobe Portable 
Document Format file download 
attempt 
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request is encrypted. Snort fired an alarm similar to the alarms in the second stage but 
with different URIs.  
sid:16929 BLACKLIST URI request for known malicious URI - gate.php?guid= 
4) Despite the fact that the previous two steps can be performed without a Snort 
response using some obfuscation techniques, this stage can be identified. The server 
response for the last step contains some recognized behaviour, which is the string 
Content-Type:text/html, and the actual data are not in HTML or other legitimate 
formats. Actually, there is a signature in Snort that can catch this piece of traffic, which 
is sid:16460 [23], but it is deleted due to false positive concerns, as this case may exist 
in normal traffic. Therefore if we have a system that recognizes false positives 
generated by Snort, and this is the case with the MARS system, this alert will be 
ignored if it is not involved in a real attack scenario. For this reason, the 16460 rule is 
enabled to provide more information, and in case of an isolated false alarm, it will not 
contribute to the attack picture. In addition, Snort has triggered other alerts based on ET 
rules that identified some small binary downloads, which are suspicious behaviours that 
need to be noticed. The sequence of correlated and aggregated alerts involved in this 
stage and the previous two stages are shown in Figure 6.15. 
sid:16460 WEB-MISC text/html content-type without HTML-possible malware C&C 
sid:11192 POLICY download of executable content 
sid:2003179ET POLICY exe download without User Agent 
sid:2007671 ET POLICY Binary Download Smaller than 1 MB Likely Hostile 
sid:2009033 ET POLICY Suspicious Executable (PE under 128) 
sid: 2000419 ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download 
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Figure 6.15. The second, third and fourth attack stages. 
5) The last stage involves maintenance and update by downloading further binaries. In 
addition, the infected machine participates in fast scanning and visiting malicious 
websites that can be detected by policy rules. And on certain occasions, the infected 
machine sends large numbers of DNS requests experiencing query failures or 
redirection, which are very obvious signs of a Botnet attack. This part of the attack 
scenario is shown in Figure 6.16, and the whole attack graph is shown in Figure 6.17. 
sid: 2009028 ET MALWARE 404 Response with an EXE Attached - Likely Malware Drop 
sid: 2009885 ET SCAN Unusually Fast 404 Error Messages (Page Not Found), Possible Web Application 
Scan/Directory Guessing Attack 
sid: 2011085 ET POLICY HTTP Redirect to IPv4 Address 
 
Figure 6.16.  The fifth attack stage. 
It should be noted that these stages can be extended to perform the main purpose of the 
infected machines, such as DDoS, spam and the distribution of malware. These 
activities will also be included in the attack map if originated from the same machine.  
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Figure 6.17. Graph of the extracted Botnet scenario. 
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6.6.3  SQL injection attack (SQLIA) experiment 
An SQLIA is also a multi-stage and coordinated process, and to detect such activities 
we need to correlate the attacker’s actions. Some of these attack actions are detected by 
IDSs based on available signatures. However, unlimited SQLIA variations are 
discovered every day, in addition to the use of evasion techniques to deceive IDSs. 
Moreover, some of the generic attack symptoms can be detected and are typically 
considered isolated alerts. Hence, we need a correlation system to process different 
activities over time in order to provide a global view of the attacker’s intention.  
The typical SQLIA scenario is summarized as follows: 
1. Application fingerprinting via input validation [183]: in this stage the attacker 
tries to discover any vulnerable entry into the Web application using certain basic 
techniques. This involves testing a Web page form its fields, query strings in URL 
REQUEST and POST, or crafted values in cookies. A combination of strings such 
as ′ , ″ , ), #, --, etc., can be sued to generate possible application errors. The attacker 
has to perform this stage to fingerprint the application and the database, otherwise it 
will be unclear which SQLI technique should be used. This stage can be a 
combination of scanning and port mapping activities using some available fuzzing 
tools.  
2. Database fingerprinting: to gather information about the application and the 
database incorporated in the previous stage. Analysis of different responses through 
error messages is used to choose the appropriate method of injection, and this is 
based on the type of the target database. Then database column numbers are 
discovered and which ones are vulnerable. In this respect, different databases use 
different syntax.  
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3. Attack stage: by exploiting the detected vulnerable columns to obtain extra 
information, such as database version, server name, user table name, etc. A typical 
injection technique is to use SELECT UNION to craft query statements in URL 
requests.  
4. Information disclosure: includes extracting data in user and password tables. It is 
based on the available privilege levels gained by the attacker. Data modifications 
can be performed, such as adding new user accounts and making deletions and 
updates.  
5. Advanced attack: to interact with the operating system in order to achieve full 
control over the target system. Therefore, this is the most dangerous action that can 
be exploited by such attack. This stage involves uploading files, such as shared 
objects for Linux and Dynamic Link Library (DLL) for Windows. User-defined 
functions supported by SQL databases can be used for more interaction with the OS 
through direct command execution. Furthermore, the attacker can add some user 
accounts and local groups to the OS.  
We consider SQLIA as a multi-stage attack conducted by an attacker to compromise a 
target system. PHP Web application vulnerabilities are exploited to gain access to the 
MySQL database and to obtain table names, column names and stored data. 
Consequently, the attacker acquires administrator privileges to upload malicious files to 
control the Web server hosting the target application. We have followed the typical 
scenario in real-life, simulating the traffic communications between the attacker and the 
victim machine. The simulated network is monitored by Snort and the MARS engine 
where Snort is configured with all the rules.  
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6.6.4  The basic functional test of the SQLIA experiment 
In this section, simulating SQLIA has been used to test the detection accuracy of the 
proposed approach. We have pursued the SQLIA scenario as occurs in real networks, as 
described later in this section. Network traffic has been recorded in a .pcap file for 
further analysis. We have used a similar technique as the one implemented in the last 
experiment using attack traffic only, and then the experiment will be repeated using a 
mix of real and synthetic traffic. The attack steps are as follow: 
(1)The attacker starts to perform scanning and port mapping, looking for running 
services; Snort has triggered two signatures related to scanning.  
 sid: 2000537 BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN NMAP -sS 
 sid:2000545 BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN NMAP -f -sS 
(2)Discovery of vulnerabilities (basic SQLI techniques)  
The attacker will initially use the basic techniques such as the symbols: ' , * , and " to 
determine if the target website is vulnerable to SQLI. Also some other strings such as 
1 = 1 , '1' = '1'))/*, or 1=1--, or "a"="a", can be injected. 
And if an error is displayed on the target website, it means that the site is vulnerable, 
e.g.:  Warning: mysql_result(): supplied argument is not a valid MySQL result resource 
Snort generates certain alerts related to this stage: 
 sid:1000303 WebAttack PHPInjection test \' detected 
 sid:1000304 WebAttack PHPInjection test 1=1 or 1=2 
Figure 6.18 shows the evolving attack events generated by the MARS system based on 
Snort alerts. 
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Figure 6.18. The first triggering event. 
 
(3)Discovery of the number of columns in the target database: The attacker uses 
ORDER BY to determine the total number of columns in the database. For instance, the 
statement includes ORDER BY 1 to request the page to display the first column if no 
error is displayed. This number is increased and decreased until the exact number of 
columns is identified. 
(4)Discovery of the vulnerable columns out of the identified ones in carried out in step 
2. The UNION SELECT statement is used to identify which column is vulnerable that 
can be exploited to get access to the database, as follows: 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
Then all vulnerable columns are displayed; in this experiment, 4, 6 and 7 are vulnerable. 
Three types of signatures are generated by Snort in this stage. 
sid:2010963 ET WEB_SERVER SELECT USER SQL Injection Attempt in URI 
sid:1000302 WebAttack PHPInjection -1=select detected 
sid: 1000305 WebAttack PHPInjection -union allselect 
(5)Exploitation of the vulnerable columns to disclose the database information: In this 
step, the attacker discovers the database name, version and usernames by substitution of 
these variables in the vulnerable columns fields of the UNION SELECT statement as 
follows: 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,concat(database(),version(),user()) ,7,8 
BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN 
NMAP -f -sS 
WebAttack  PHPInjection test \'' 
detected 
WebAttack  PHPInjection test 1=
1 or 1=2 
BLEEDING-EDGE SCAN 
NMAP -sS 
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This statement will display the requested information on the column 6 position of the 
site page. This step is important because different versions of databases, MySQL in our 
case, have different syntaxes. Snort responds with certain alarms. 
sid:2011042 ET WEB_SERVER MYSQL SELECT CONCAT SQL Injection Attempt 
sid:2011073 ET WEB_SERVER Possible Attempt to Get SQL Server Version in URI using SELECT VERSION 
sid:1000302 WebAttack PHPInjection -1=select detected 
sid:1000305 WebAttack PHPInjection -union allselect 
(6)Disclosure of table names, usernames and passwords. The attacker will use the same 
statement in step 5 to identify the names of the database tables, and to obtain the login 
names and passwords from the user table. An example of this statement is shown below: 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,concat(table_name,column_name,table_schema),7,8 FROM information_schema_tables 
WHERE column_name LIKE %pass% 
Snort triggers similar alarms to the previous step. 
(7)File privilege server path discovery: Knowledge of file privilege levels is very 
important in order to read, write and upload files. An example of the statement used in 
this respect is: 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,load_file(‘/’),7,8 FROM information_schema.user_privilages 
In order to upload files to the target server, it is necessary to determine the server paths, 
and there are different and easy techniques for this, for example: 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,@@datadir,7,8 
The next action is to check the directories with write permission. Temporary directories 
are the best choice in this respect, such as: /temporary/ , /temp/, /images/,/cache/, …etc. 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,load_file(‘/etc/password’),7,8 INTO OUTFILE ‘/home/www.site.com/images/passFile.txt’/* 
UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,’<?system($_get[‚c‛])?;>’,7,8 INTO OUTFILE ‘/home/www.site.com/images/c.php’/* 
Below are some related Snort alerts: 
sid:2010037 ET WEB_SERVER Possible SQL Injection INTO OUTFILE Arbitrary File Write Attempt 
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sid:1020053 WebAttack PHPInjection load_file 
Figure 6.19 shows the extracted attack graph for the detected events. 
 
Figure 6.19.  The second and third events. 
(8)Advanced attack stage: The attacker can list, modify, insert and delete some or all 
information in the target database. In addition, files containing scripts or libraries can be 
uploaded to configure the server and to provide more interaction with the operating 
system. Snort reacts to some activities while others are not detected. However, the 
correlation system can support discovery of the whole behaviour.  
sid:1100061 WebAttack SQLInjection QueryData Domain 
sid:2006443 ET WEB Possible SQL Injection Attempt -- DELETE FROM 
sid:2006444 ET WEB Possible SQL Injection Attempt -- INSERT INTO 
sid:2006447 ET WEB Possible SQL Injection Attempt -- UPDATE SET 
Figure 6.20 shows the whole extracted attack graph consisting of a detected SQLIA 
event. 
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Figure 6.20.  Extracted SQLIA scenario graph. 
6.6.5  Accuracy and reduction evaluation 
In the last sections we have evaluated the correlation functionality for detecting Botnet 
and SQLIA behaviour. Then, the same steps are repeated by mixing the original attack 
with background traffic, isolated attacks and false positives. This is to determine the 
recall, precision and accuracy characteristics of our approach simulating a real-life 
environment. The target machine is attacked by Metasploit, with a similar behaviour to 
a Botnet attack. The Nessus tool is also used for generating scanning behaviour. The 
background traffic contains synthetic traffic using the traffic generator [134] and real 
traffic using a communication with running services. The real traffic is limited 
compared with the synthetic one, but at least it is more reliable than pure artificial 
traces. It should be noted that we have intentionally avoided creating any other multi-
stage attacks than our planned attack. The multi-stage attack has been performed 
carefully over a period of three hours to allow for intervals between steps. The 
generated data is labelled using source IP addresses, destination IP addresses and 
timestamps. We met the test requirements described earlier in this chapter to avoid 
errors.  
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Table 6.6 Accuracy and reduction evaluation for Botnet and SQLIA experiments (AVd: alert verification 
disabled, Ave: alert verification enabled). 
 Botnet SQLIA 
 AVd AVe AVd AVd 
# Snort alerts 1328 1186 
FP (Snort) (%)  76% 73% 
Correlation rate  
# relevant correlations 753 492 661 91 
# detected correlations 777 496 669 96 
TP 734 489 637 67 
FP 43 7 32 29 
FN 19 3 24 14 
TN 135 112 117 23 
Recall rate (%) 97.5% 99.4% 96.4% 97.5% 
Precision rate (%) 94.5% 98.6% 95.2% 96.8% 
Accuracy 93.3% 98.4% 93.1% 95.8% 
Correlations with aggregation 87 52 66 45 
# detected events 8 1 11 1 
# aggregated alerts  78 53 74 45 
Reduction rate 94.3% 96% 93.8% 96.2% 
 
Table 6.6 shows the results of the evaluation test for both Botnet and SQLIA 
experiments. The improvement in accuracy measures over DARPA datasets is due to 
the fact that all attack stages were detected by Snort. Only one high-priority event 
would be detected if alert verification is used. The other events are with low priority, 
and these consist mainly of scanning behaviour. In addition, in a real-world situation, 
multi-stage attacks are not frequent and do not cause any noise because the attacker 
must achieve its target in a stealthy manner. It is observed from these experiments that 
the system has achieved significant data reduction and only one event is detected using 
the alert verification component. 
6.7   Performance evaluation 
It has been identified in Chapter 3 that performance is a critical factor for the IDS as a 
real-time system. This experiment has been performed to evaluate the performance of 
the MARS engine as a complement component to IDSs. The performance 
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characteristics include resource consumption (CPU and memory usage) and processing 
time of each alert. The objective of this experiment is to show that the correlation 
engine will not affect the performance of the IDS's detection functionality. Two groups 
of experiments have been conducted: one for offline implementation to measure alert 
processing time, and the other for online implementation to assess performance under 
different traffic volumes.  
For the offline test,  Snort and MARS are tested to process a batch of a number alerts 
starting from 1,000 alerts to 100,000 under the same conditions. A pcap file contains 
1,300,000 packets to generate 1000 alerts are read by Snort and thereafter processed by 
MARS system. Then the pcap file is replayed to generate alerts from 1000 – 100,000 
alerts. The CPU and Memory usage reading is taken from the task manager. The test has 
been conducted on a Dual Quad-Core 2.0GHZ machine with RAM of 4.0 GB. Snort is 
configured to log to an MSSQL database the same as MARS. The database server is 
installed on the same machine to evaluate the worse performance case. Figure 6.21 and 
Figure 6.22 show the results obtained for both systems.  
 
Figure 6.21. Comparison of resource usage by Snort and MARS (offline test). 
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These illustrate that the MARS correlation engine consumes less resources compared to 
the Snort system for both CPU and memory usage. The alert processing time using 
Snort increases proportionally with the number of alerts input. However, the MARS 
engine is relatively stable even with the increase in the volume of alerts. And this is 
explained by the fact that Snort inspects packet headers and content whereas MARS 
inspects alert information.  
 
Figure 6.22. Alert processing time of Snort and MARS. 
A real-time evaluation has been conducted to demonstrate that the correlation system 
will not affect overall performance, even with high-speed network traffic. The 
performance of Snort in high-speed environments has been studied intensively in 
Chapter 3, demonstrating the efficacy of Snort. It has been observed that Snort is 
capable of processing incoming traffic with speeds of less than 750MB with acceptable 
levels of packet dropping. Both systems have been tested with traffic ranging from 
100MB to 750MB, as shown in Figure 6.23. The CPU resource demand by Snort 
increases dramatically with higher traffic speeds. On the other hand, the MARS engine 
1
10
100
1000
10000
1 5 25 125
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 t
im
e 
(s
ec
)
No. of processed Alerts (Thousands)
Snort
MARS
199 
 
continues to be stable, as the required processing power is less compared to the deep 
packet inspection performed by Snort. Hence, alert correlation systems can be deployed 
without requiring considerable resources.  
 
Figure 6.23. Comparison of resource usage by Snort and MARS (online test). 
It has to be mentioned that is not a comparison between Snort and MARS as equivalent 
systems that perform the same functionalities. Snort processes all received packets and 
inspects them against its rules to generate alerts. MARS takes these alerts and analyses 
them to obtain the coordinated attacks while the number of alerts is typically less than 
the number of network packets. Hence, in Figure 6.22, Snort has processed about 
1,300,000 packets to produce 1000 alerts and only these alerts has been processed by 
MARS. The goal of this experiment is to prove that MARS engine does not affect the 
overall performance of the NIDS system. 
6.8   Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have discussed the evaluation issues related to the assessment of alert 
correlation systems. Majority of the evaluation approaches are based on finding the 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
10 100 1000
R
es
o
u
rc
e
s 
u
sa
g
e(
%
)
Transmitted Traffic (MB) )
Snort(CPU)
MARS(CPU)
Snort(Memory)
MARS(Memory)
200 
 
rates of false positives and false negatives. We have evaluated our system using 
different metrics to identify the functionality, the reduction and the accuracy rates. An 
experimental platform has been developed to perform different tests. The MARS tool 
has been tested using DARPA 2000 data set to compare our results with others. The 
obtained results have showed that the proposed system is capable to detect all attack 
instances with lesser false positive rates. Then, we have implemented a real life test 
using a controlled testing environment to evaluate the MARS capabilities to detect two 
types of current cyber attacks i.e Botnet and SQLI attacks. It has been demonstrated that 
our framework can applied to detect complex multi-stage attack. Botnet and SQLIA 
traffic have been analyzed as case studies to measure accuracy and performance of 
MARS tool.  We have confidence that our system has achieved an improvement in 
relation to identification of attack plans and reduction in graph complexity. False 
positives have been reduced comparing with other approaches using vulnerability 
knowledge base. We have also evaluated the performance of the MARS system using 
offline and online testing. It has been demonstrated that the MARS function does not 
affect the system’s overall performance as the resulting latency is mainly caused by the 
NIDS system e.g Snort. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
7.1   Introduction 
Network Intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) are gaining widespread interest as a 
complement to traditional preventative techniques. More critical data is migrated to 
online systems, which creates the need for efficient data-protection mechanisms and 
monitoring tools. However, the performance of NIDSs is still debatable in terms of the 
nature and amount of traffic to be processed, as well as detection accuracy. In this 
thesis, we have addressed several complex issues in the field of NIDS technology in 
relation to performance in high-speed networks and alert management systems.  
In the initial stages of this research we implemented a comprehensive evaluation 
methodology to measure the capability of software-based NIDSs in keeping up with 
increasing network bandwidth. NIDSs, as network product systems, must exhibit the 
same performance requirements and traffic characteristics. Furthermore, NIDSs perform 
highly performance-intensive functions, such as deep packet inspection and state 
maintenance. We have provided in-depth NIDS performance analyses utilizing a 
representative real-life Gig network environment. The focus has been mainly on the 
performance evaluation of Snort as a de facto open-source NIDSs. The results obtained 
illustrate that software-based NIDSs installed on a general-purpose machine are not 
capable of keeping up with traffic above 750Mbs in an ideal scenario. When the NIDS 
becomes unable to handle packets in real-time, it starts to drop these, potentially 
resulting in attack patterns being injected into the protected network. 
The identified packet loss problem in the NIDS performance test in the initial phase of 
this research has raised some considerations that have motivated the work implemented 
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in the rest of this thesis. We have found a proportional linear relationship between 
packet loss and the rate of missed attacks. The missed attack limitation can be the result 
of other factors, such as the absence of signatures and the use of evasion techniques. 
However, we have adopted a dual-solution approach to mitigate both problems 
irrespective of the root cause. Alert correlation systems have been widely used in 
network management systems to localize the fault cause and to determine the 
dependencies between detected events. We have proposed a reasoning alert correlation 
framework consisting of several integrated components to draw an attack graph. Our 
approach can build an overall view of the system's security status even with incomplete 
alert information. The outcome of the proposed framework is the minimisation of the 
effects of missing audit data, the reduction of the large volume of redundant alert which 
are mostly false positives, and the extraction of an attack behaviour summary in the 
form of a multi-stage attack scenario. 
Received alerts are analysed and abstracted to a higher level of attack description using 
a generalisation mechanism. Pre- and post-conditions inspired from requires/provides 
models are applied to detect correlation characteristics. Supporting knowledge-bases are 
formalized in a multi-level abstraction based on attack taxonomies. Generic signature 
representatives in the form of attacker capabilities are constructed to obtain the 
relationships between elementary alerts. To achieve an effective correlation system we 
have used alert verification based on a vulnerability knowledge-base to suppress the 
generalisation methods in the generalised attack concept. 
The proposed alert correlation framework has been implemented in a tool called MARS 
(Multi-stage Attack Recognition System) to validate our approach. A repository 
contains alert data, mapped IDS signatures and detected events. Knowledge-bases reside 
in-memory, where they are used by the detection engine. In addition, interactive 
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administrative tools are developed to dig in resulting events and aggregated alerts. The 
developed system has been evaluated by various datasets applying different realistic 
attack scenarios. Evaluation metrics have also been described in detail, and the results 
obtained have been demonstrated in various forms. 
7.2   Evaluation of NIDSs in high-speed environments  
The main objective of this part of our research is to deal with the shortage of 
information available on the evaluation of the performance of NIDSs in high-speed 
networks. Most previous efforts have focused on the accuracy functions of the NIDSs 
using moderate traffic loads. We have intended to provide a realistic evaluation 
methodology reflecting real-life situations. We accept as true that if some packets are 
not analysed by the NIDS under high traffic loads, this means that it will become 
vulnerable to evasions from attackers. We have elaborated our evaluation tests using 
extreme conditions under various scenarios. A multi-tier test methodology has been 
utilized to investigate the system-under-test response, starting from moderate to 
advanced hardware implementations. Snort performance has been evaluated on different 
operating system (OS) platforms using host-based and virtual configurations. The 
virtualisation test was motivated by its successful inception within the industry/business 
community.  
The test-bench was established using 10 Gbps network cards and supported by a Xenon 
Quad-Core server and other machines with multi-processing powers. To achieve 
practical results, we customised the traffic to be semi-real traffic with a range of packet 
sizes, protocol distributions, number of connections and elapsed times. The outcome of 
the test can be summarized as follows: 
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- It can be ascertained that Snort is not suitable for all configured implementations 
with high volumes of traffic, e.g. above 750Mbps.  
- There are no significant performance improvements, even with multi-core 
processing configurations. In practice Snort, being a non-multithreaded design, 
does not utilize the processing power provided by the hardware implementation. 
- The implementation of Snort on virtualised platforms and using the current 
configuration is not promising. This is realistic as virtualisation has its limitations 
in terms of disk I/O performance. 
- Packet drop caused by Snort performance efficacy results in the degradation of 
overall system effectiveness and opens it up to overload and evasion attacks. 
7.2.1  Avenues for future research 
Architectural techniques to improve Snort performance are not the main focus of our 
research. However, along the course of the performance evaluation, certain researches 
directions have cropped up that lend themselves to recommendation. 
There should be a mechanism to achieve a lower rate of packet drops by utilising the 
available multi-core system. This can be done by performing an architectural re-design 
of the Snort system to scale for high volumes of traffic with minimum packets loss. A 
parallel concept can be employed for Snort in order to distribute the system processing. 
In other words, Snort could be rebuild as a multithreaded application to run multiple 
threads concurrently in order to utilise the processing power of multi-core systems. This 
will increase the packet processing capabilities of Snort, and hence result in fewer 
packets dropped.  
Splitting traffic over multiple instances of Snort engines have been studied in some 
respects [14, 43]. However, these mechanisms have not been implemented and 
evaluated in a systematic manner. The received network traffic can be divided based on 
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flow level to insure that all packets related to a single flow are passed to the same 
engine. The main concern is the problem of the distribution mechanism, as it adds more 
burdens to the process. Efficient algorithms for light-weight processing techniques are 
required to achieve cost-effectiveness.  
It has been identified in the NIDSs literature that updated datasets are a necessity in 
testing NIDSs, whether for performance or function evaluation. DARPA datasets are 
still the benchmark in spite of being old and criticised for lack of realistic background 
traffic. Moreover, there is a shortage in open-source traffic generators, and the available 
tools have some limitations and cannot be relied upon.  
7.3   A reasoning framework for alert correlation  
The NIDS fire alerts coressponding to individual activities that are isolated from others, 
leaving the prediction of incoming attacks to the adminstartor's estimation. Detection of 
the actual intrusion may fail due to a variety of reasons: attacks may be missed due to 
performance degregation, the corresponding signature not being provided, or the 
attacker using a new variation of the intrusive behaviour. In order to provide a remedy 
for missed attacks, whether caused by packet loss or the absence of signature 
descriptions, we have proposed a fault-tolerant solution. The proposed system gathers 
all information required to construct a context for understanding the attacker's 
behaviour. A state record of each activity is built using aggregation and intellegent 
correlation of detected events. Therefore, the decision is made according to a higher 
level of information fusion. 
A reasoning framework for alert correlation has been presented consisting of several 
incorporated components. Therefore our objective is not limited to the estimation of the 
security perspective, but provides a reduction in alert redundancies and false positives, 
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in addition to the detection of multi-stage attacks and attack verification. The alerts are 
supplied by the IDS in real-time and then each alert is abstracted to an attack concept 
based on signature modelling in the knowledge-base. Pre- and post-condition 
mechanisms are applied to extract the relationships between events according to 
temporal information based on time context and spatial characteristics, e.g. the location 
of the detected activity and the vulnerability description.  
Attack modelling: We have modelled attacks and attack capabilities on the basis of 
inheritance and abstraction principles. Specific attack descriptions provided by the IDS 
can reduce the detection domain and do not recognise the dependencies between alerts. 
Alerts are modelled to attack concept abstractions based on the status of the system 
being monitored. For example, consider two attack scenarios, m1 and m2, including the 
installation of some backdoor Trojans. Scenario m1, in order to succeed, requires Trojan 
x to be installed, and scenario m2 needs Trojan y to succeed. However, the IDS rules 
have a signature for Trojan x, whereas Trojan y is unknown. According to the 
hierarchical generalisation of attack capabilities, both scenarios will be categorized as 
Trojan activities due to the similarity of their effect on the targeted system. The Trojan 
installation action is just a single step among a sequence of stages in the performance of 
the attack.  
We have developed a set of algorithms to employ for the proposed farmework: 
Alert correlation algorithm 
The inputs of the algorithm are the instances of detected attack capabilities in the form 
of encoded pre- and post-conditions. The intilization of these encoded conditions is 
performed based on an in-memory knowledge-base of the attack concepts. The 
correlation between the instances of elementary alerts is created according to partial 
matching of hierarchical multi-layer capability descriptions. The matching criteria are 
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based on the rules infered from the knowledge-base. The source addresses of certain 
attacks are considered whilst for others it is the destination address that is taken in 
account according to the signature direction. This technique is proposed in order to 
broaden the maximum detection coverage. This can result in a huge correlation of links; 
however, a supression mechanism to distinguish only those connections that are related 
is achieved using a vulnerabilty knowledge-base. In the intial stage, fine-grained 
correlations are identified and saved in a temporay container.  
Alert verfication 
To avoid degradation in the correlation process quality, which can be caused by having 
a false positive as an input, we have developed a filtering meachnism. A 
complementory algorithm was developed to examine the oppotunity of attack success 
according to vulnerability analyses and running services on the target system. This is an 
opposed technique to the generalisation mechanism of abstracting alerts in order to 
reduce false positives. Therefore the objective is to prioritize attacks based on their 
success, where failed attacks are assigned low priority. However, the failed attack is 
ignored unless it is considered as an attempt of real attack. The vulnerability knowledge 
is updated in a passive fashion to minimise communication load during the detection 
process.  
Data reduction 
The final result of the system is to produce a summarized attack graph in the form of 
generlised events. In practice, this graph should be concise and meaningful, 
disregarding insignificant details. The graph consists of nodes representing attack steps 
and edges to specify the logical connection between these temporally ordered steps. We 
have developed two algorithms for data reduction: one to minimise the number of 
involved redundancy nodes and the other to remove duplicate edges. 
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Graph reduction  
Two algorithms have been developed to remove transitive edges from the resulting 
graph. We assume that the causal relationships propagate from root to leaf nodes. 
Online graph reduction is performed throughout the first stage of the correlation 
process. And offline algorithm is an optional, further reduction after the attack graph is 
built to ensure that we have the minimum available graph. In addition, this technique is 
used to restrain the relaxing mechanism in attack capabilities. 
Alert aggregation  
In contrast to graph reduction algorithms where the number of nodes is not affetcted, 
here nodes are aggregated. We aggregate two alerts according to their similarity, e.g. 
attack type and spatial and temporal characteristics. We also use a window time to 
determine the temporal proximity of alerts that can be aggregated.  
Event generation algorithm 
Simultaneously during the correlation process, infall events are generated if at least two 
correlated alerts are identified. Moreover, every detected infall event is examined if it 
corresponds to a previous one. However, the recognized event is not reported untill the 
resulting information is reduced and aggregated. The aggregated and verfied alerts are 
linked to compose a new event representing the detected multi-stage attack. 
Near real-time detection 
Real-time correlation systems have been investigated in several research efforts. Most 
of these methods tend to allocate memory space to store a bulk of states for a period of 
time which is naturally finite. This can be useful for a limited time but is vulnerable to 
detection avoidance. On the other hand, keeping a large amount of states in memory 
becomes problematic if the number of states increases. All previous works assume that 
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related activities fall in a short time period, e.g. a few hours in the best-case scenario. 
Therefore, we have developed a near real-time system to overcome the slow-and-low 
attack. This technique leverages the analysis domain to include even very old activities. 
However, to sustain higher performance, the alert data is maintained every time the 
analysis executed.  
7.3.1  Avenues for future research 
Along the development of our framework, we have identified certain directions for the 
improvement of the system's functioning. 
1- Knowledge-based correlation approaches are precise and generate less false 
positives. They require the description of every possible capability and map IDS 
signatures to these capabilities. Probablistic approaches can uncover unidentified 
relationships but they may produce false relationships. An amalgamation of both 
techniques can be used in order to exploit their advantages. However, statistical 
analyses can be employed to compute the similarities between alerts, and the 
knowledge-base can be used to validate these decisions. This notion is borrowed 
from the amalgamation of anomaly-based IDSs with signature-based IDSs. 
Anomaly-based approaches have been investigated for several years but are still 
immature. Even though some vendors claim that they are employing these techniques 
in their products, they are considered black boxes. Therefore the use of an anomaly-
based IDS as a standalone system is impractical in terms of the high number of false 
positives generated. We believe that such collaboration needs further investigation in 
order to facilitate the correlation process. 
2- We have adopted a passive approach to vulnerability acquisition, which is useful 
in providing knowledge about protected networks. Instead, active analysis of the end-
host response for the attacker can be considered to yield more precise results. This is 
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due to the information supplied by the vulnerability scanner being insufficient for the 
formulation of decisions regarding the success of attacks. The victim's point of view 
about the attack can support the analysis process by providing accurate details, e.g. 
whether the target port accepts the connection or not, which is not identified by the 
normal scanner. 
3- As the correlation accuracy can be improved with the involvement of the 
maximum amount of available information, host-based IDS alerts may be used. In 
addition, Web application IDS tools can also utilized to obtain reliable and true 
observations. The incorporation of such systems requires a normalization stage to 
unify the supplied information. 
4- The problem in terms of the discrimination between different attackers attacking 
the same target machine has been a debatable issue in the field of alert correlation. It 
is very difficult to decide whether or not a group of attackers are cooperating. 
Reliance on the source IP address is not feasible, as a single attacker can use several 
spoofed IP addresses. Therefore a behaviour analysis that is not based on traditional 
information is required. Analysis of only temporal characteristics is unrealistic 
because, as stated on many occasions throughout this thesis, a skilful attacker's 
activities can be conducted over long periods of time. 
7.4  Implementation and evaluation of our framework 
The proposed algorithms have been implemented in MARS tools to validate their 
practical application. The MARS server represents the core of the system that performs 
the functions of the collaborated components. Knowledge bases are stored in the 
memory and the MARS database is interacted with periodically to handle received 
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alerts. We have also developed extensible client tools for the administrator to obtain 
reports of multi-stage attacks in a visualised format. 
We have evaluated the proposed system using a variety of datasets and by conducting 
real-life scenarios. We have also explained the evaluation metrics and applied these to 
obtain reliable results. Functional, accuracy and reduction evaluations have been 
implemented on all test categories. The results obtained have shown significant progress 
among all test parameters. For instance, the testing of the DARPA datasets yielded a 
96.3% accuracy rate and a 99.1% reduction rate for INSIDE1.0. The alert verification 
mechanism has raised the overall accuracy among all conducted scenarios. Moreover, 
performance evaluation has also been elaborated using offline and online tests. The 
results have illustrated that MARS consumes less resources than Snort in both tests. We 
can conclude that the application of MARS does not affect the overall IDS performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 
 
Bibliography 
[1]. D.S. Wall, ―Cybercrime, media and insecurity: The shaping of public perceptions 
of cybercrime,‖ International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, vol. 22, no. 
1, 2008, pp. 45-63. 
[2]. S.W. Lodin and C.L. Schuba, ―Firewalls fend off invasions from the Net,‖ IEEE 
Spectrum, vol. 35, no. 2, 1998, pp. 26-34. 
[3]. J.C. Perez, ―Gartner: Security concerns to stunt e-commerce growth,‖ IDG News 
Service, 2005. 
[4]. K.P. Yee, ―Aligning security and usability,‖ Security & Privacy, IEEE, vol. 2, no. 
5, 2004, pp. 48-55. 
[5]. R. Trost, Practical intrusion analysis: prevention and detection for the twenty-first 
century, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2009. 
[6]. G. Vasiliadis, S. Antonatos, M. Polychronakis, E. Markatos and S. Ioannidis, 
―Gnort: High performance network intrusion detection using graphics processors,‖ 
Springer, 2008, pp. 116-134. 
[7]. P. Fogla, ―Improving the efficiency and robustness of intrusion detection systems,‖ 
PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2007. 
[8]. M. Akhlaq, F. Alserhani, A. Subhan, I.U. Awan, J. Mellor and P. Mirchandani, 
―High Speed NIDS using Dynamic Cluster and Comparator Logic,‖ Proc. the 2010 
10
th
 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology(CIT), 
IEEE Computer Society, 2010, pp. 575-581. 
213 
 
[9]. A.A. Ghorbani, Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention: Concepts and 
Techniques, Springer-Verlag New York Inc, 2009. 
[10]. K. Julisch, ―Using Root Cause Analysis to Handle Intrusion Detection Alarms,‖ 
PhD, University of Dortmund, Germany, 2003. 
[11]. T.H. Ptacek and T.N. Newsham, ―Insertion, evasion, and denial of service: 
Eluding network intrusion detection,‖ Secure Networks, Inc., Jan, 1998. 
[12]. M. Handley, V. Paxson and C. Kreibich, ―Network intrusion detection: Evasion, 
traffic normalization, and end-to-end protocol semantics,‖ Proc. the 10th conference 
on USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Association, 2001, pp. 9. 
[13]. C. Kruegel, F. Valeur, G. Vigna and R. Kemmerer, ―Stateful intrusion detection 
for high-speed network's,‖ Proc. the IEEE symposium on Security and Privacy, 
IEEE, 2005, pp. 285-293. 
[14]. I. Charitakis, K. Anagnostakis and E. Markatos, ―An active traffic splitter 
architecture for intrusion detection,‖ Proc. the 11th IEEE/ACM International 
Symposium on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer Telecommunications 
Systems(MASCOTS 2003). , 2003, pp. 238-241. 
[15]. M. Aldwairi, T. Conte and P. Franzon, ―Configurable string matching hardware 
for speeding up intrusion detection,‖ ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, 
vol. 33, no. 1, 2005, pp. 99-107. 
[16]. C. Clark, W. Lee, D. Schimmel, D. Contis, M. Koné and A. Thomas, ―A hardware 
platform for network intrusion detection and prevention,‖ Network Processor 
Design: Issues and Practices, vol. 3, 2004, pp. 99–118. 
214 
 
[17]. B.L. Hutchings, R. Franklin and D. Carver, ―Assisting network intrusion detection 
with reconfigurable hardware,‖ Proc. the 10th Annual IEEE Symposium on Field-
Programmable Custom Computing Machines, 2002, pp. 111-120. 
[18]. H. Youm and J. Lee, ―Web 2.0 Security Technology Trends and Promoting 
Standardization,‖ Journal of Telecommunications Technology Association, vol. 117, 
2008, pp. 21-29. 
[19]. G. Young and J. Pescatore, ―Magic Quadrant for Network Intrusion Prevention 
System Appliances,‖ Gartner RAS Core Research Note G, vol. 167309, 2009. 
[20]. M. Roesch, ―Snort–Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks,‖ Proc. the 13th 
USENIX conference on System administration, USENIX Association, 1999, pp. 229-
238. 
[21]. V. Paxson, ―Bro: A system for detecting network intruders in real-time,‖ 
Computer Networks, vol. 31, no. 23, 1999, pp. 2435-2463. 
[22]. J. McHugh, ―Testing intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and 1999 
DARPA intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by Lincoln 
Laboratory,‖ ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, vol. 3, no. 4, 
2000, pp. 262-294. 
[23]. ―Snort ‖; http://www.snort.org/. 
[24]. J. Beale, A.R. Baker and J. Esler, Snort IDS and IPS Toolkit, Syngress Publishing, 
2007. 
[25]. G. Vigna, W. Robertson and D. Balzarotti, ―Testing network-based intrusion 
detection signatures using mutant exploits,‖ Proc. the 11th ACM conference on 
215 
 
Computer and communications security, ACM Press New York, NY, USA, 2004, pp. 
21-30. 
[26]. D. Maynor and K.K. Mookhey, Metasploit Toolkit for Penetration Testing, Exploit 
Development, and Vulnerability Research, Syngress Press, 2007. 
[27]. L. Schaelicke, T. Slabach, B. Moore and C. Freeland, ―Characterizing the 
Performance of Network Intrusion Detection Sensors,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion 
Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2820, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 
2003, pp. 155-172. 
[28]. A. Valdes and K. Skinner, ―Probabilistic Alert Correlation,‖ Proc. the 4th 
International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection Springer-
Verlag, 2001, pp. 54-68. 
[29]. X. Qin, ―A probabilistic-based framework for infosec alert correlation,‖ PhD, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. 
[30]. S. Lee, B. Chung, H. Kim, Y. Lee, C. Park and H. Yoon, ―Real-time analysis of 
intrusion detection alerts via correlation,‖ Computers & Security, vol. 25, no. 3, 
2006, pp. 169-183. 
[31]. H. Debar and A. Wespi, ―Aggregation and Correlation of Intrusion-Detection 
Alerts,‖ Proc. the 4th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion 
Detection Springer-Verlag, 2001, pp. 85-103. 
[32]. F. Cuppens, ―Managing Alerts in a Multi-Intrusion Detection Environment,‖ Proc. 
Third International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, IEEE 
Computer Society, 2001, pp. 197-216. 
216 
 
[33]. F. Cuppens and R. Ortalo, ―LAMBDA: A language to model a database for 
detection of attacks,‖ Proc. 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference 
Springer, 2001, pp. 197-216. 
[34]. P. Ning and D. Xu, ―Toward Automated Intrusion Alert Analysis,‖ Network 
Security, 2010, pp. 175-205. 
[35]. P. Ning, Y. Cui, D.S. Reeves and D. Xu, ―Techniques and tools for analyzing 
intrusion alerts,‖ ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 
vol. 7, no. 2, 2004, pp. 318. 
[36]. K. Julisch and M. Dacier, ―Mining intrusion detection alarms for actionable 
knowledge,‖ Proc. the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge 
discovery and data mining, ACM, 2002, pp. 366-375. 
[37]. A. Zhang, Z. Li, D. Li and L. Wang, ―Discovering novel multistage attack patterns 
in alert streams,‖ Proc. International Conference on Networking, Architecture, and 
Storage-Cover, IEEE, 2007, pp. 115-121. 
[38]. B. Zhu and A.A. Ghorbani, ―Alert correlation for extracting attack strategies,‖ 
International Journal of Network Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2006, pp. 244-258. 
[39]. ―Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),‖  
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0188. 
[40]. N. Paulauskas and J. Skudutis, ―Investigation of the Intrusion Detection System 
―Snort‖ Performance,‖ Electronics and Electrical Engineering, vol. 7, no. 87, 2008, 
pp. 15-18. 
[41]. ―NSS Labs,‖ http://nsslabs.com/. 
217 
 
[42]. W. Lee, J.B.D. Cabrera, A. Thomas, N. Balwalli, S. Saluja and Y. Zhang, 
―Performance adaptation in real-time intrusion detection systems,‖ Proc. the 5th 
international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection, Springer-Verlag, 
2002, pp. 252-273. 
[43]. L. Schaelicke, K. Wheeler and C. Freeland, ―SPANIDS: a scalable network 
intrusion detection loadbalancer,‖ Proc. the 2nd conference on Computing frontiers, 
ACM, 2005, pp. 315-322. 
[44]. M. Aldwairi, ―Hardware Efficient Pattern Matching Algorithms and Architectures 
for Fast Intrusion Detection,‖ PhD, North Carolina State University, 2006. 
[45]. V. Paxson, K. Asanovic, S. Dharmapurikar, J. Lockwood, R. Pang, R. Sommer 
and N. Weaver, ―Rethinking hardware support for network analysis and intrusion 
prevention,‖ Proc. the 1st USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security USENIX 
Association, 2006, pp. 11-11. 
[46]. S. Axelsson, Intrusion detection systems: A survey and taxonomy, Technical 
Report, Chalmers University of Technology, Dept. of Computer Engineering, 2000. 
[47]. J. Riordan, D. Zamboni and Y. Duponchel, ―Billy goat, an accurate worm-
detection system,‖ Research Report RZ3609, IBM Research GbmH,. Zurich 
Research Laboratory, 2005. 
[48]. F. Valeur, D. Mutz and G. Vigna, ―A Learning-Based Approach to the Detection 
of SQL Attacks,‖ Intrusion and Malware Detection and Vulnerability Assessment, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3548, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 
533-546. 
218 
 
[49]. F. CUPPENS and A. MIEGE, ―Alert correlation in a cooperative intrusion 
detection framework,‖ Proc. the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
2002, pp. 202-215. 
[50]. A. Wespi and H. Debar, ―Aggregation and Correlation of Intrusion-Detection 
Alerts,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
2212, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2001, pp. 85-103. 
[51]. F. Valeur, G. Vigna, C. Kruegel and R.A. Kemmerer, ―A Comprehensive 
Approach to Intrusion Detection Alert Correlation,‖ IEEE Transactions on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 1, no. 3, 2004, pp. 273--318. 
[52]. A. Todd, R. Raines, R. Baldwin, B. Mullins and S. Rogers, ―Alert Verification 
Evasion Through Server Response Forging,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion 
Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4637, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 
2007, pp. 256-275. 
[53]. G. Tedesco and U. Aickelin, ―Real-Time Alert Correlation with Type Graphs,‖ 
Information Systems Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5352, Springer 
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 173-187. 
[54]. ―DEFCON : Hacking conference,‖ http://www.defcon.org/. 
[55]. ―MIT Lincoln Laboratory ‖; http://www.ll.mit.edu/. 
[56]. A. Lazarevic, L. Ertoz, V. Kumar, A. Ozgur and J. Srivastava, ―A comparative 
study of anomaly detection schemes in network intrusion detection,‖ Proc. the Third 
SIAM International Conference on Data Mining 2003, pp. 25–36. 
[57]. V. Kumar, J. Srivastava and A. Lazarevic, ―Intrusion Detection: A Survey,‖ 
219 
 
Managing Cyber Threats, Massive Computing 5, Springer US, 2005, pp. 19-78. 
[58]. R. Bace and P. Mell, Intrusion detection systems, US Dept. of Commerce, 
Technology Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001. 
[59]. I. Ristic, Apache security, O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2005. 
[60]. J.P. Anderson, Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance, Technical 
Report, James P Anderson Co. FortWashington, Pennsylvania,USA, 1980. 
[61]. D.E. Denning, ―An intrusion-detection model,‖ IEEE Transactions on software 
engineering, vol. SE-13, no. 2, 1987, pp. 222-232. 
[62]. H. Debar, M. Dacier and A. Wespi, ―Towards a taxonomy of intrusion-detection 
systems,‖ Computer Networks, vol. 31, no. 8, 1999, pp. 805-822. 
[63]. J.M. Estevez-Tapiador, P. Garcia-Teodoro and J.E. Diaz-Verdejo, ―Anomaly 
detection methods in wired networks: a survey and taxonomy,‖ Computer 
communications, vol. 27, no. 16, 2004, pp. 1569-1584. 
[64]. P. Garcia-Teodoro, J. Diaz-Verdejo, G. Macia-Fernandez and E. Vazquez, 
―Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges,‖ 
Computers & Security, vol. 28, no. 1-2, 2009, pp. 18-28. 
[65]. S. Zanero, ―Detecting 0-day attacks with learning intrusion detection system,‖ 
Blackhat Briefings, USA, 2004. 
[66]. S.E. Smaha, T.A.S. Inc and T.X. Austin, ―Haystack: An intrusion detection 
system,‖ Proc. the IEEE fourth Aerospace Computer Security Applications 
Conference, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988, pp. 37-44. 
220 
 
[67]. N. Ye, S.M. Emran, Q. Chen and S. Vilbert, ―Multivariate statistical analysis of 
audit trails for host-based intrusion detection,‖ IEEE Transactions on Computers & 
Security, vol. 51, no. 7, 2002, pp. 810-820. 
[68]. D.E. Denning, D. Edwards, R. Jagannathan, T. Lunt and P. Neumann, ―A 
Prototype IDES—A Real-Time Intrusion Detection Expert System,‖ Computer 
Science Laboratory, SRI International, 1987. 
[69]. T.F. Lunt, A. Tamaru, F. Gilham, R. Jagannathan, P.G. Neumann and C. Jalali, 
―IDES: a progress report [Intrusion-Detection Expert System],‖ Proc. the Sixth 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, IEEE Computer Society Press, 
1990, pp. 273-285. 
[70]. H.S. Vaccaro and G.E. Liepins, ―Detection of anomalous computer session 
activity,‖ Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1999, pp. 280-289. 
[71]. S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland and J.M. McAlerney, ―Practical automated detection 
of stealthy portscans,‖ Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 1, 2002, pp. 105-
136. 
[72]. M. Bishop, Introduction to computer security, Addison-Wesley Professional, 
2004. 
[73]. B.V. Nguyen, An application of support vector machines to anomaly detection, 
Technical Report CS681, Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA, 2002. 
[74]. S. Forrest, S.A. Hofmeyr and A. Somayaji, ―Intrusion detection using sequences of 
system calls,‖ Journal of Computer Security, vol. 6, no. 3, 1998, pp. 151-180. 
[75]. D. Mutz, F. Valeur, G. Vigna and C. Kruegel, ―Anomalous system call detection,‖ 
221 
 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 9, no. 1, 
2006, pp. 61-93. 
[76]. C. Kruegel, D. Mutz, W. Robertson and F. Valeur, ―Bayesian event classification 
for intrusion detection,‖ Proc. the 19th Computer Security Applications Conference, 
IEEE Computer Society, 2003, pp. 14-23. 
[77]. A. Valdes and K. Skinner, ―Adaptive, Model-Based Monitoring for Cyber Attack 
Detection,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 1907, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2000, pp. 80-93. 
[78]. D. Barbara, N. Wu and S. Jajodia, ―Detecting novel network intrusions using 
bayes estimators,‖ Proc. the First SIAM Conference on Data Mining, 2001. 
[79]. M.L. Shyu, S.C. Chen, K. Sarinnapakorn, L.W. Chang, E. Miami Univ Coral 
Gables Fl Dept Of and E. Computer, A novel anomaly detection scheme based on 
principal component classifier, Defense Technical Information Center, 2003. 
[80]. W. Wang, X. Guan and X. Zhang, ―Processing of massive audit data streams for 
real-time anomaly intrusion detection,‖ Computer Communications, vol. 31, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 58-72. 
[81]. K. Dong Seong, N. Ha-Nam, T. Thandar and P. Jong Sou, ―An Optimized 
Intrusion Detection System Using PCA and BNN,‖ Proc. the 6th Asia-Pacific 
Symposium on Information and Telecommunication Technologies ( APSITT 2005) 
2005, pp. 356-359. 
[82].  N. Ye, X. Li, Q. Chen, S.M. Emran and M. Xu, ―Probabilistic techniques for 
intrusion detection based on computer audit data,‖ IEEE Transactions on Systems, 
222 
 
Man and Cybernetics, Part A, vol. 31, no. 4, 2001, pp. 266-274. 
[83]. D.Y. Yeung and Y. Ding, ―Host-based intrusion detection using dynamic and 
static behavioral models,‖ Pattern Recognition, vol. 36, no. 1, 2003, pp. 229-244. 
[84]. S.B. Cho and H.J. Park, ―Efficient anomaly detection by modeling privilege flows 
using hidden Markov model,‖ Computers & Security, vol. 22, no. 1, 2003, pp. 45-55. 
[85]. M.V. Mahoney, ―A machine learning approach to detecting attacks by identifying 
anomalies in network traffic,‖ PhD, Florida Institute of Technology, 2003. 
[86]. W. Lee and S.J. Stolfo, ―A framework for constructing features and models for 
intrusion detection systems,‖ ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 
vol. 3, no. 4, 2000, pp. 227-261. 
[87]. J.E. Dickerson and J.A. Dickerson, ―Fuzzy network profiling for intrusion 
detection,‖ Proc. the 19th International Conference of the North American on Fuzzy 
Information Processing Society, 2000, pp. 301-306. 
[88]. S.M. Bridges and R.B. Vaughn, ―Fuzzy data mining and genetic algorithms 
applied to intrusion detection,‖ Proc. the National Information Systems Security 
Conference, 2000, pp. 13-31. 
[89]. C. Gates, ―Co-ordinated port scans: a model, a detector and an evaluation 
methodology,‖ PhD, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 2006. 
[90]. S. Ramaswamy, R. Rastogi and K. Shim, ―Efficient algorithms for mining outliers 
from large data sets,‖ ACM SIGMOD Record, vol. 29, no. 2, 2000, pp. 427-438. 
[91]. E.M. Knorr, ―Outliers and data mining: Finding exceptions in data,‖ PhD, The 
223 
 
University of British Columbia (Canada), 2002. 
[92]. L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic, P.N. Tan, V. Kumar, J. Srivastava and P. 
Dokas, ―Minds-minnesota intrusion detection system,‖ Proc. Next Generation Data 
Mining Challenges and Directions, MIT Press, 2004. 
[93]. D. Barbará, J. Couto, S. Jajodia and N. Wu, ―ADAM: A testbed for exploring the 
use of data mining in intrusion detection,‖ ACM SIGMOD Record, vol. 30, no. 4, 
2001, pp. 15-24. 
[94]. D.F. Gong, ―White Paper: Deciphering Detection Techniques: Part II Anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection,‖ Network Associates (McAfee Security), 2003. 
[95]. F. Anjum, D. Subhadrabandhu and S. Sarkar, ―Signature based intrusion detection 
for wireless ad-hoc networks: a comparative study of various routing protocols,‖ 
Proc. the IEEE 58
th 
on Vehicular Technology Conference(VTC 2003), 2003, pp. 
2152-2156 Vol.2153. 
[96]. G.A. Stephen, String searching algorithms, World Scientific Pub Co Inc, 1994. 
[97]. R.T. Liu, N.F. Huang, C.H. Chen and C.N. Kao, ―A fast string-matching algorithm 
for network processor-based intrusion detection system,‖ ACM Transactions on 
Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), vol. 3, no. 3, 2004, pp. 614-633. 
[98]. J. Beale, A.R. Baker, J. Esler, T. Kohlenberg and S. Northcutt, Snort: IDS and IPS 
toolkit, Syngress Media Inc, 2007. 
[99]. F. Yu, ―High speed deep packet inspection with hardware support,‖ PhD, 
University of California, 2006. 
224 
 
[100]. R.S. Boyer and J.S. Moore, ―A fast string searching algorithm,‖ Communications 
of the ACM, vol. 20, no. 10, 1977, pp. 762-772. 
[101]. A.V. Aho and M.J. Corasick, ―Efficient string matching: an aid to bibliographic 
search,‖ Communications of the ACM, vol. 18, no. 6, 1975, pp. 333-340. 
[102]. A. Barkalov and L. Titarenko, Logic synthesis for compositional microprogram 
control units, Springer Verlag, 2008. 
[103]. E.W. Spitznagel, ―High Performance Packet Classification,‖ PhD, Washington 
University, 2005. 
[104]. T. Abbes, A. Bouhoula and M. Rusinowitch, ―On the fly pattern matching for 
intrusion detection with Snort,‖ Annals of telecommunications, vol. 59, no. 9, 2004, 
pp. 1045-1071. 
[105]. S. Rubin, S. Jha and B.P. Miller, ―Protomatching network traffic for high 
throughputnetwork intrusion detection,‖ Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on 
Computer and communications security, 2006, pp. 47-58. 
[106]. D. Stuttard and M. Pinto, The Web Application Hacker's Handbook: Discovering 
and Exploiting Security Flaws John Wiley & Sons 2007. 
[107]. E. Chickowski, ―Don’t Fear the Unknown: Behavior Analysis Intrusion 
Prevention Defends Against Zero-Day Attacks.,‖ 2006; 
http://www.processor.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles%2Fp2817%2F32p17
%2F32p17.asp. 
[108]. ―Request for Comments (RFC),‖ http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html. 
225 
 
[109]. J.D. Case, M. Fedor, M.L. Schoffstall and J. Davin, ―RFC1157: Simple network 
management protocol (SNMP),‖ Internet RFCs, 1990. 
[110]. S. Wu, U. Manber and E. Myers, ―A subquadratic algorithm for approximate 
regular expression matching,‖ Journal of algorithms, vol. 19, no. 3, 1995, pp. 346-
360. 
[111]. ―Snort-AI (Snort with Artificial Intellegence) ‖; http://snort-ai.sourceforge.net/. 
[112]. ―The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,‖ http://www.lbl.gov/. 
[113]. M. Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation, International Thomson 
Publishing, 1996. 
[114]. I.Tripwire, ―Tripwire changing monitoring and reporting solutions,‖ 
http://www.tripwire.com/it-compliance-products/te/ost/. 
[115]. C.A.D.B. Cid, ―Ossec, open source host-based intrusion detection system,‖ 
http://www.ossec.net/. 
[116]. H. Debar, D. Curry and B. Feinstein, ―RFC4765: The Intrusion Detection 
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF),‖ IETF, 2006. 
[117]. S.T. Eckmann, G. Vigna and R.A. Kemmerer, ―STATL: An attack language for 
state-based intrusion detection,‖ Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 1, 2002, 
pp. 71-103. 
[118]. E. Michel and M. Ludovic, ―ADeLe: An attack description language for 
knowledge-based intrusion detection,‖ Proc. the 16th international conference on 
Information security: Trusted information: the new decade challenge Kluwer, 2001, 
226 
 
pp. 353-368. 
[119]. O. Dain and R.K. Cunningham, ―Fusing a heterogeneous alert stream into 
scenarios,‖ Proc. the 2001 ACM workshop on Data Mining for Security Applications, 
Citeseer, 2001, pp. 1–13. 
[120]. B. Morin, L. Mé, H. Debar and M. Ducassé, ―M2D2: A formal data model for 
IDS alert correlation,‖ Proc. the 5th international conference on Recent advances in 
intrusion detection (RAID'02), Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 115-137. 
[121]. S.J. Templeton and K. Levitt, ―A requires/provides model for computer attacks,‖ 
Proc. the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms, ACM, 2000. 
[122]. Z. Li, J. Lei, L. Wang and D. Li, ―A data mining approach to generating network 
attack graph for intrusion prediction,‖ Proc. Fourth International Conference on 
Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery (FSKD 2007) IEEE, 2007, pp. 307-311. 
[123]. J. Ma, Z. Li and W. Li, ―Real-Time Alert Stream Clustering and Correlation for 
Discovering Attack Strategies,‖ Proc. the 5th International Conference on Fuzzy 
Systems and Knowledge Discovery, IEEE, 2008, pp. 379-384. 
[124]. L. Zhitang, Z. Aifang, L. Jie and W. Li, ―Real-Time Correlation of Network 
Security Alerts,‖ Proc. the  IEEE International Conference on e-Business 
Engineering(ICEBE 2007). 2007, pp. 73-80. 
[125]. R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, ―Mining sequential patterns,‖ Proc.  the Eleventh 
International Conference on Data Engineering, 1995., 1995, pp. 3-14. 
[126]. N. Desai, ―IDS correlation of VA data and IDS alerts,‖ Security Focus June 
2003; www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1708. 
227 
 
[127]. R. Gula, Correlating ids alerts with vulnerability information, Technical Report, 
Tenable Network Security, 2002. 
[128]. ―Nessus: Security Scanner,‖ http://www.nessus.org. 
[129]. P. Porras, M. Fong and A. Valdes, ―A Mission-Impact-Based Approach to 
INFOSEC Alarm Correlation,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science 2516, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2002, pp. 95-114. 
[130]. G.F. Lyon, Nmap Network Scanning: The Official Nmap Project Guide to 
Network Discovery and Security Scanning, Insecure, USA, 2009. 
[131]. L. Wang, A. Liu and S. Jajodia, ―Using attack graphs for correlating, 
hypothesizing, and predicting intrusion alerts,‖ Computer communications, vol. 29, 
no. 15, 2006, pp. 2917-2933. 
[132]. P. Mell, V. Hu, R. Lippmann, J. Haines and M. Zissman, ―An overview of issues 
in testing intrusion detection systems,‖ NIST IR, vol. 7007, 2003. 
[133]. ―D-ITG V 2.6 ‖; http://www.grid.unina.it/Traffic/index.php. 
[134]. ―LAN Traffic V 2 ‖; http://www.topshareware.com 
[135]. ―Karalon's Traffic IQ Pro ‖; http://www.karalon.com/trafficiqpro.htm. 
[136].―SmartBits,‖ http://www.spirent.com. 
[137]. J. Sommers, H. Kim and P. Barford, ―Harpoon: a flow-level traffic generator for 
router and network tests,‖ SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev., vol. 32, no. 1, 2004, 
pp. 392-392. 
[138]. L.M. Rossey, R.K. Cunningham, D.J. Fried, J.C. Rabek, R.P. Lippmann, J.W. 
228 
 
Haines and M.A. Zissman, ―LARIAT: Lincoln adaptable real-time information 
assurance testbed,‖ Proc. the IEEE Aerospace Conference 2002, pp. 2671-2676, 
2678-2682. 
[139]. ―CANVAS ‖; http://www.immunitysec.com/products-canvas.shtml. 
[140]. F. Massicotte, F. Gagnon, Y. Labiche, L. Briand and M. Couture, ―Automatic 
evaluation of intrusion detection systems,‖ Proc. the  22nd Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference(ACSAC'06). 2006, pp. 361-370. 
[141]. L. Juan, C. Kreibich, C.H. Lin and V. Paxson, ―A Tool for Offline and Live 
Testing of Evasion Resilience in Network Intrusion Detection Systems,‖ Springer, 
2008, pp. 267-278. 
[142]. ―Infrastructure Security Report- ARBOR Networks,‖ 2010;  
http://www.arbornetworks.com/report. 
[143]. E. Verplanke, ―Understand packet-processing performance when employing 
multicore processors,‖ Embedded Systems Design, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 36. 
[144]. T. Vermeiren, E. Borghs and B. Haaodorens, ―Evaluation of software techniques 
for parallel packet processing on multi-core processors,‖ Proc. the First IEEE 
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference(CCNC 2004). , 2004, pp. 
645-647. 
[145]. F. Schneider, J. Wallerich and A. Feldmann, ―Packet capture in 10-gigabit 
ethernet environments using contemporary commodity hardware,‖ Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, vol. 4427, 2007, pp. 207. 
[146]. L. Foschini, A. Thapliyal, L. Cavallaro, C. Kruegel and G. Vigna, ―A Parallel 
229 
 
Architecture for Stateful, High-Speed Intrusion Detection,‖ Information Systems 
Security, 2008, pp. 203-220. 
[147]. ―ProCurve Series 2900 Switch,‖ http://www.hp.com 
[148]. ―NetCPS. ,‖ http:// www.netchain.com/NetCPS/. 
[149]. ―Tfgen.,‖ http:// www.st.rim.or.jp/~yumo/pub/tfgen. 
[150]. ―Http Traffic Generator.,‖ http://www.nsauditor.com/. 
[151]. ―Hping V 2,‖ http://www.hping.org/download.html. 
[152]. ―Bandwidth Monitor ‖; http://sourceforge.net/projects  
[153]. ―Nload ‖; http://www.sourceforge.net/projects/nload/. 
[154]. A. Singh, ―An introduction to virtualization.,‖ 2004;  
       http://www.kernelthread.com/publications/virtualization. 
[155]. ―Business value of virtualization: Realizing the benefits of integrated solutions,‖ 
2009;http://h18000.www1.hp.com/products/servers/management/vse/Biz_Virtualizat
ion_WhitePaper.pdf. 
[156]. J. Xu, M. Zhao, J. Fortes, R. Carpenter and M. Yousif, ―On the use of fuzzy 
modeling in virtualized data center management,‖ Proc. the 4th International 
Conference on Automotatic Computing (ICAC2007), IEEE, 2007, pp. 25. 
[157]. ―SATA Technology,‖ http://www.serialata.org/. 
[158]. ―Disk Queue Length Counter,‖  
         http://www.windowsnetworking.com/articlestutorials/Windows-Server-2003-
230 
 
PerfTuning.html. 
[159]. M. Akhlaq, F. Alserhani, I.U. Awan, J. Mellor, A.J. Cullen and P. Mirchandani, 
―Virtualization Efficacy for Network Intrusion Detection Systems in High Speed 
Environment,‖ Information Security and Digital Forensics, Lecture Notes of the 
Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications 
Engineering 41, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 26-41. 
[160]. J. Zhou, M. Heckman, B. Reynolds, A. Carlson and M. Bishop, ―Modeling 
network intrusion detection alerts for correlation,‖ ACM Transactions on Information 
and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 10, no. 1, 2007, pp. 4-es. 
[161]. J.W. Haines, R.P. Lippmann, D.J. Fried, E. Tran, S. Boswell and M.A. Zissman, 
DARPA intrusion detection system evaluation: Design and procedures, Technical 
Report, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. 
[162].  ―Security Focus - BugTraq.‖ http://www.securityfocus.com 
[163]. X. Qin and W. Lee, ―Attack plan recognition and prediction using causal 
networks,‖ Proc. the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference 
(ACSAC'04), IEEE, 2005, pp. 370-379. 
[164]. H.A. Kautz, ―A formal theory of plan recognition and its implementation,‖ 
Reasoning about plans, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1991, pp. 69-124. 
[165]. ―Developer Express,‖ http://www.devexpress.com/. 
[166]. J.W.S. Liu, Real-time systems, Prentice Hall, 2000. 
[167]. S. Axelsson, ―The base-rate fallacy and the difficulty of intrusion detection,‖ 
231 
 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 3, no. 3, 
2000, pp. 186-205. 
[168]. R.P. Lippmann, D.J. Fried, I. Graf, J.W. Haines, K.R. Kendall, D. McClung, D. 
Weber, S.E. Webster, D. Wyschogrod and R.K. Cunningham, ―Evaluating intrusion 
detection systems: The 1998 DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation,‖ Proc. 
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition(DISCEX'00), IEEE, 
2002, pp. 12-26. 
[169]. K.H. Zou, A.J. O'Malley and L. Mauri, ―Receiver-operating characteristic 
analysis for evaluating diagnostic tests and predictive models,‖ Circulation, vol. 115, 
no. 5, 2007, pp. 654. 
[170]. D. Alessandri, ―Attack-Class-Based Analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems,‖ 
PhD, University of Newcastle, 2004. 
[171]. R. Lippmann, E. Kirda, A. Trachtenberg, H. Dreger, A. Feldmann, V. Paxson and 
R. Sommer, ―Predicting the Resource Consumption of Network Intrusion Detection 
Systems,‖ Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 5230, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 135-154. 
[172]. E.M. Voorhees, D.K. Harman, N.I.o. Standards and Technology, TREC: 
Experiment and evaluation in information retrieval, MIT press Boston, 2005. 
[173]. ―iCAST/Acer eDC 2007 Intrusion Detection Alert Data Description,‖ 
http://www.chmao.idv.tw/project/acer07.html. 
[174]. ―Colasoft Packet Player,‖ http://www.colasoft.com/packet_player/. 
[175]. F. Alserhani, M. Akhlaq, I. Awan, A. Cullen, J. Mellor and P. Mirchandani, 
232 
 
―Multi-Tier Evaluation of Network Intrusion Detection Systems,‖ Journal for 
Information Assurance and Security (JIAS), vol. 5, 2010, pp. 301 - 310. 
[176]. ―Basic Analysis and Security Engine,‖ http://base.secureideas.net/. 
[177]. K. Baylor and C. Brown, ―Killing Botnets: A view from the trenches,‖ 
October,2006; ttp://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/white_papers/wp_botnet.pdf. 
[178]. E. Stinson and J.C. Mitchell, ―Towards systematic evaluation of the evadability 
of bot/botnet detection methods,‖ Proc. the 2nd Conference on USENIX Workshop 
on offensive Technologies, USENIX Association, 2008, pp. 1-9. 
[179]. H. Choi, H. Lee and H. Kim, ―BotGAD: detecting botnets by capturing group 
activities in network traffic,‖ Proc. the Fourth International ICST Conference on 
COMmunication System softWAre and middlewaRE(COMSWARE '09). , ACM, 
2009. 
[180]. ―Zeus Tracker,‖ https://zeustracker.abuse.ch. 
[181]. ―Bleeding edge threats,‖ http://www.bleedingthreats.net/. 
[182]. ―Emerging Threats,‖ www.emergingthreats.net/. 
[183]. ―Open Web Application Security Project: OWASP Top Ten - Injection Flaws.,‖ 
2010; http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-njection_Flaws. 
 
 
 
233 
 
Appendix I  Snort signatures 
An example of a Snort signature description: 
 
Rule:  
-- 
Sid: 
610 
-- 
Summary:  
This event is generated when an attempt to login as the 
superuser is attempted using rsh. 
-- 
Impact:  
Serious. If successful the attacker may have gained superuser 
access to the host. 
-- 
Detailed Information:  
This rule generates an event when a connection is made using 
"rsh" with the username "root". Such activity is indicative of 
attempts to abuse insecure machines with a known default 
configuration.  
 
Some UNIX systems use the "rsh" daemon which permits remote 
"root" logins. This may allow an attacker to connect to the 
machine and establish an interactive session. 
-- 
Attack Scenarios:  
An attacker finds a machine with the "rsh" service running and 
connects to it, then proceeds to guess the "root" password 
-- 
Ease of Attack: 
Simple, no exploit software required 
-- 
False Positives:  
A system administrator may be logging in to a host using the 
username "root" 
-- 
False Negatives:  
If a local username is not the same as the remote one ("root"), 
the rule will not generate an event. 
-- 
Corrective Action:  
Investigate logs on the target host for further details and more 
signs of suspicious activity 
 
Use ssh for remote access instead of rsh. 
 
Deny remote root logins to the host, use a normal user and 
"sudo" or give the user the ability to "su" to root where 
appropriate. 
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Appendix II  MARS GUI 
 
1.  MARS server interface 
Figure.1 shows the MARS server interface with the following information: 
Database IP : the IP address of the database server. 
Server IP : the IP address and the operating port of the MARS server. 
Client connections: the number of the connected MARS clients. 
Analysis count: how many times the MARS server has analysed the database. 
Last Analysis time: the time of the last analysis connection.  
 
            Figure.1 MARS server interface 
 
2. MARS client interface 
The Figures 2-4 show the MARS client interface displayed to the administrator. 
Evolving events are displayed as a list and old treated ones can be retrieved using events 
query.  The available information through this form includes: 
Event ID : a unique number to identify all detected events. 
Event Title: to describe the attacking activities based on the attack category. 
Priority: indicates the severity level of an event (High, Medium ,and Low). 
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Start-time and End-time: to show the start and the end time of the event, these times are 
not fixed as can be changed based the results of the event detection analysis. 
Alert count: denotes the number of alerts involved in the detected event. 
Steps: to identify the number of the attack stages. 
Elapsed time: denotes the difference between the start and the end time of an event. 
Confirmation: is used by the administrator if he thinks that an event is identified. If the 
detected event is not clear it is left until further information is received. 
Dealing : this facility is used if an event needs more vulnerability investigation and risk 
analysis. 
Close : when an event is identified, confirmed, and treated based on the organisation 
policy, it is closed to minimise the system process. 
Each events listed on the top of the main form has its related alerts information listed on 
the bottom as shown in Figure.2. These alerts are aggregated and the number of 
involving alert instances is displayed.   
The attack graph of each event can be displayed using the menu list as shown in 
Figure.4. The administrator can navigate each node to show its details. The detected 
attack steps (graph nodes) are ordered temporally from left to right and the edges show 
the causal relationships.  
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Figure.2 MARS client interface -1 
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Figure.3 MARS client interface -2 
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Figure.4 MARS client interface -3
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Acronyms 
BPF : Berkeley Packet Filter 
CPU : Central Processing Unit 
DARPA : Defence Advance Research Project Agency 
DNS : Domain Name Server 
DDoS : Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
DoS: Denial of Service Attack 
DMZ : Demilitarized Zone 
FPGA : Field Programmable Graphical Array 
FTP : File Transfer Protocol 
GHz : Giga Hertz 
GB : Giga Bytes 
GUI : Graphical User Interface 
Gbps : Giga bits per second 
HIDS : Host based Intrusion detection System 
HTTP : Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
ID : Identification 
IDS : Intrusion Detection Systems 
IP : Internet Protocol  
IP Address : Internet Protocol Address 
IT : Information Technology 
IDES : Intrusion Detection Expert System 
IPS : Intrusion Prevention Systems 
IRI : Informatics Research Institute 
ICMP : Internet Control Message Protocol 
I/O : Input/Output 
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IRC : Internet Relay Chat 
LAN : Local Area Network 
MARS: Multi-stage Attack Recognition System 
Mbps : Mega bits per second 
MB : Mega Bytes 
NIDS : Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
NSRG: Network Security Research Group 
NIC : Network Interface Card 
NAPI : New Application Program Interface 
OS: Operating System 
PCI : Peripheral Component Interconnect 
PCIe : Peripheral Component Interconnect Express 
RFC: Request for Comments 
RPC : Remote Procedure Call 
RAM : Random Access Memory 
SNMP : Simple Network Management Protocol 
SMTP : Simple Mail transfer Protocol 
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol 
UDP : User Datagram protocol 
VLAN : Virtual Local Area Network 
 
 
